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15 April 1986

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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

SADCC ASSESSES COST OF RSA MILITARY, ECONOMIC DESTABILIZATION

Luanda SADCC ENERGY in English Vol 3 No 10, 1985 pp 17-18, 21

[Text]

South African aggression and destabilisation has cost its neighbours in excess of \$10 billion in the five years since the founding of SADCC. This is more than:

- All the foreign aid received by the SADCC States during this five year period;
- One-third of all SADCC exports in the past five years.

It must, however, be remembered that even before 1980 the countries of the region incurred massive costs as a result of South African and Rhodesian aggression. The following calculations do not, for instance, include the costs of South African aggression against Angola during 1975-79; nor the costs to Mozambique and Zambia of imposing internationally agreed sanctions against Rhodesia. These earlier costs are at least comparable to those dealt with in this analysis.

This paper attempts to quantify some of the costs to the independent States of Southern Africa (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) of South Africa's campaign of military and economic destabilisation against them in the five years since the founding of SADCC in 1980.

THE COST OF DESTABILISATION

Direct War Damage. The most obvious impact of destabilisation relates to the direct consequences of South African military actions — its invasions of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique and Lesotho; its clandestine commando raids on bridges and oil terminals; and its support for puppet anti-government groups.

It is estimated that the approximate costs, in millions of US Dollars, of South African destabilisation during this period are:

Direct war damage	1 610
Extra defence expenditure	3 060
Higher transport and energy costs	970
Lost exports and tourism	230
Smuggling	190
Refugees	660
Reduced production	800
Lost economic growth	2 000
Boycotts and embargoes	260
Trading arrangements	340
Total	10 120

(These items are discussed in the following paragraphs. More detailed calculations are available from the SADCC Secretariat.)

Direct war damage includes major attacks, like those which caused \$80 mn damages to the Thornhill air base in Zimbabwe; \$24 mn to the oil refinery in Luanda; and, \$20 mn to the oil storage depot in Beira. In reality, however, most of the damage is not from single large explosions, but to the hundreds of houses, schools, lorries, and so on which have been destroyed. Of particular significance is the enormous damage which has been done to the region's transport system: railway lines sabotaged, bridges destroyed, locomotives and wagons damaged, etc. The estimated total cost of such direct war damage is \$1610 mn, most of which relates to Angola and Mozambique.

Extra Military Expenditure. Stepped up South African aggression, particularly since 1980, has forced the SADCC States into ever higher military budgets for larger and better equipped armies as well as expanded people's militias. These armies must be fed, clothed, housed and transported — all of

which use up resources which are desperately needed for the development of the countries concerned. It is impossible to know what "normal" defence budgets would have been if there were no threat from South Africa, but SADCC estimates that destabilisation has forced its member States to spend an extra \$3060 mn on defended.

Higher Transport and Energy Costs. The region's railway network has been a particular target, especially for the puppet rebel groups. This is because South Africa understands that Angola and Mozambique have the natural ports for most SADCC cargo, and thus the only way to keep cargo flowing through its ports is by disrupting competing railways. Thus landlocked States, particularly Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, have had to pay higher transport costs, while Angola and Mozambique have lost revenue. Finally, sabotage of power lines and oil installations by puppet groups and South African commandos has forced Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe to use more expensive fuel or pay extra to have it transported. The combined amount for higher transport and energy costs and lost transport revenue is \$970 mn.

Lost Exports and Tourism. Several SADCC States have lost vital foreign exchange earnings, particularly because the breakdown of transport links disrupted the export flows of coal, iron and steel, sugar, etc. The raid on the Luanda oil refinery meant lost oil exports for Angola. Raids have prevented the production of crops and cement for export in Mozambique. Tourism, an important foreign exchange earner, has been adversely affected by destabilisation. The total prejudice to SADCC States in lost exports and tourism to date is at least \$230 mn.

Money spent on higher military budgets and repairing damage should have been more productively employed on development projects.

Smuggling. Perhaps surprisingly, smuggling by bandit groups has cost Angola and Mozambique \$192 mn. Diamonds, semi-precious stones, ivory from more than 10,000 elephants, and timber are smuggled and sold through South African firms.

Refugees. The war has created tens of thousands of refugees. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between drought and war refugees, but in some areas South African and bandit group activities have effectively cut off relief to drought victims, thus creating a famine. So drought victims became

war refugees. The cost is difficult to estimate accurately but SADCC put the figure at \$660 mn.

Reduced Production. Destabilisation has undermined SADCC economies, most seriously the economies of Mozambique and Angola. In addition to lost exports, there has been a serious fall in agricultural and industrial production for local consumption. Numerous development projects have been delayed. Based purely on what could reasonably be expected to have been produced without the war, SADCC estimates the value of lost production at \$800 mn.

Lost Economic Growth. Money spent on higher military budgets and repairing damage should have been more productively employed on development projects. Unquestionably, factories have not been built and capital goods not purchased due to the conflicts. This lack of investment has significantly slowed growth in what are still very poor countries. If the money referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 above had been productively invested, it is conservatively estimated that it would have increased domestic production in the region by more than \$2000 mn during this five year period alone. Clearly this loss continues into the future.

ECONOMIC AGGRESSION

South Africa not only attacks its neighbours militarily: it also destabilises them economically. A key reason for the founding of SADCC was to reduce the region's de-

pendence on South Africa. For its part, the apartheid State is wielding its economic power to keep its neighbours weak and dependent, while at the same time trying to strengthen its economic hold.

Boycotts and Embargoes. Because of frequent disruption caused to the railways in Angola and Mozambique by South African proxies, most SADCC cargo still passes through South Africa. Pretoria can, therefore, cut the flow of goods at any time it wishes to apply additional pressure on its neighbours. It has done this to all the neighbouring States. Conversely, Maputo is the natural port for the South African Transvaal, but with the founding of SADCC the apartheid State boycotted Maputo (at extra expense to itself, but costing Mozambique considerable revenue). The cost of such boycotts and embargoes has been estimated at \$260 mn.

Trading Arrangements. A number of member States have special trading arrangements with South Africa. Although the countries concerned gain substantial revenue from such arrangements they do so at a high cost due to, for instance, higher prices of

fuel, and at a loss of industry. It has been estimated that, on balance, such arrangements have cost at least US\$340 mn during the past five years. Furthermore, South Africa is increasingly using such arrangements for political purposes, particularly to force member States to recognise the bantustans. It is further feared that withdrawal from such arrangements could bring blockades and increased destabilisation.

South African Penetration of the Region. There is a wide range of other effects of economic destabilisation which simply cannot be quantified. South African companies in the neighbouring States engage in transfer pricing and other improper practices to take goods and money from the SADCC States. They also block the development of independent SADCC industry and trade routes.

For example, South African domination of forwarding has kept cargo flowing through South Africa even after the line to Beira was reopened. South African boards of

directors have blocked the expansion plans of local managers in subsidiary companies operating in SADCC States.

Undermining Investment in the SADCC Region. One of the objectives of South African destabilisation has been to undermine confidence in the ability of the SADCC member States to manage their own affairs effectively. South Africa points to the situation in neighbouring States as evidence that they are incompetent.

A massive programme of disinformation has been mounted by the South African Government both in the region and internationally to foment unrest and to distort people's perception of what is happening in Southern Africa. Too often multinational companies believe the South African interpretation of events; and even when they do not, the South African-induced disruption makes them reluctant to invest or to expand their activities. It is, however, impossible to quantify the damaging effect that such psychological factors have on the development of the region.

Clearly, however, South African action makes the SADCC region seem a less attractive and less stable environment for investment.

SADCC COOPERATION

Towards Reduced Dependence. Many of SADCC's programmes are specifically designed to reduce the region's dependence on South Africa and, as far as is practicable, to insulate its member States from the repercussions of South African instability.

A Southern African Transport and Communications Commission (SATCC) has been established in Maputo to coordinate the rehabilitation and efficient operation of the region's transport network so that the natural trade routes can be used, thus avoiding excessive and expensive dependence on South African railways and ports. Telecommunications infrastructure is rapidly being upgraded so that SADCC member States can communicate with each other more efficiently and without going through South Africa.

In respect of energy, national electricity grids are to be interconnected so that power can flow between countries. Furthermore, a detailed feasibility study is in hand to determine how best the region might become self-sufficient in the supply of oil products.

Programmes are being developed in Mining and Industry to reduce dependence. Work is also underway to establish a food security system which will increase regional self-reliance.

The war has created tens of thousands of refugees.

Thus the SADCC States are working closely together both to meet the challenge of destabilisation and to enhance regional economic development in spite of the adverse conditions obtaining in Southern Africa.

A task to be shared. Although many of SADCC's strategically important projects are under implementation, many others are still at the level of studies. SADCC requires a massive inflow of technical, managerial and financial resources if its programmes are to be implemented expeditiously. The region looks to the rest of Africa, and to the international community as a whole, to express clearly their solidarity with and support for SADCC in its efforts to reduce dependence and to mobilise the additional resources urgently needed if the region's objectives are to be met.

CONCLUSION

South Africa's aggressive activities constitute a growing threat to peace which cannot be confined to this region or even this continent; it is an international problem. South Africa has, however, been recognised for decades as a problem of particular concern for African States, but in recent years the international debate has concentrated on the issues of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and her domestic racist policies. Without distracting from the importance of these issues, this paper seeks to draw attention to the heavy cost being borne by OAU

member States neighbouring South Africa and to suggest that this aspect of the struggle should be given equal prominence in international debates.

The most obvious impact of destabilisation relates to the direct consequences of South African military actions.

There should be a continuing effort to expose the irrationality and hypocrisy of western financial and technical resources being used to shore up a regime which is substantially engaged in destroying economies which these same western interests are helping to develop.

The demand for sanctions must be viewed in the context both of destabilisation and of western support for the apartheid regime. Those opposed to sanctions argue that they will hurt the neighbouring States. Undoubtedly this is true. But if it accelerated the ending of apartheid, it would be well worth the additional cost. And those who are concerned about the negative effects of sanctions on the neighbouring States should provide assistance to these States to minimise that impact.

More important, however, destabilisation is directly linked to sanctions. The very existence of SADCC threatens South Africa's economic stranglehold on the region. If SADCC States were free to use the most convenient and cheapest ports and railways, and free to buy fuel and other goods on the world market, their dependence on South Africa would be sharply reduced. Then sanctions would not hurt the neighbouring states so much.

So South Africa destabilises its neighbours to keep them dependent so that they will be harmed by sanctions. South Africa's capacity to sustain its destabilisation is buttressed by support from the same western states who point to the harm sanctions would do.

SADCC's figures can only be estimates at best — the organisation does not keep a score card of destruction. But in making its estimates, SADCC has erred on the side of caution, listing only those things which can be sensibly quantified. Thus \$10,000 mn — an astronomical sum for a region of nine developing countries, some of which are least developed and land-locked — is surely an underestimate. And SADCC has only costed bricks and mortar, steel and machinery. There is no price for blood, no cost that can be assigned to the thousands who have died as a result of actions instigated and supported by apartheid. ■

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CSO: 3400/1396

ANGOLA

POLICY OF NONALIGNMENT DISCUSSED

Luanda SADCC ENERGY in English Vol 3 No 10, 1985 pp 9-10

[Article by Paulo Teixeira Jorge]

[Text] From September 1961 until the proclamation of Angola's independence, M.P.L.A. worked untiringly to guarantee its presence and participation in the many meetings of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, in spite of the limited means at its disposal and its limited status as observer.

In the fourteen years (1961-1975) that went by, the diplomatic activities undertaken by the M.P.L.A. delegations at the three levels of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries consisted essentially in the establishment or furthering of contacts

with delegations of member countries and other participants, in order to keep them informed on the progress of armed struggle for national liberation and, of course, to seek and obtain the essential political, diplomatic, material and financial support for development of the struggle for independence. We should, however, stress that this diplomatic action was extraordinarily difficult, because of the preconceived ideas prevailing among certain governments about the M.P.L.A.'s political line and because of the continuously hostile attitude expressed by the Zaire delegations at all international gatherings. However the perseverance of the leaders and fighters of M.P.L.A., and particularly of President Agostinho Neto, as well as the achievements of the armed struggle inside the country, led to victory over the many obstacles that arose. After the proclamation of independence, in November 1975, the People's Republic of Angola was admitted as a full member of Non-Aligned Countries. As such, Angola took part in the

Fifth Summit of the movement, in Colombo, from August 16th to 19th, 1976.

From that time on, Angola's delegations have undertaken more dynamic action within the movement, by participating directly in debates, both at plenary session and in meetings of the political and economic commissions, on major international issues; by concerting its position

"Angola's delegations have undertaken more dynamic action within the Movement, by participating directly in debates both at plenary session and in meetings of the political and economic commissions on major international issues."

with that of others, making a serious contribution to the just stance of the movement on the international situation, by reinforcing its cohesion and unity of action, by solving conflicts and differences between member states and by giving growing support to the genuine national liberation movements.

The People's Republic of Angola, as a sovereign state, gradually took on its responsibilities within the international community and has developed a coherent and praiseworthy diplomacy over the course of its ten years of independence.

Let us try to describe, in a few words, this diplomacy within the Non-Aligned Movement.

Angola's political positions have always been guided essentially by scrupulous regard for the main guidelines of foreign policy of the People's Republic of Angola,

by nobility sentiment, by the intransigent defence of just causes and the flexibility that this or that circumstance, relationship or situation might demand or when the practice of decision by consensus lacked it.

Thus, the People's Republic of Angola has fought tirelessly and conscientiously for the legitimate rights of the peoples of South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Western Sahara, Palestine, East Timor, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, Nicaragua, Chile, Uruguay, Puerto Rico and El Salvador, to freedom, independence, democracy and to be masters of their own destinies; it has acted bilaterally or multilaterally contributing to negotiated settlements of conflicts and differences between movement's member states; it has unequivocally condemned the Pretoria regime for its illegal occupation of Namibia, and for its war-mongering strategy towards the states of southern Africa, and for the practice of hateful apartheid, universally recognised as a crime against humanity, and has denounced the connivance of certain Western powers and Israel with the racist Pretoria regime and their refusal, based on fallacious arguments, to apply global and mandatory sanctions as demanded by the international community. It has unconditionally supported both the strategy for setting up a new, more just and equitable international economic order and the strategy for south-south cooperation, deploring however the lack of concrete steps in this direction despite the importance and farsightedness in this respect of the "Economic Declaration" and the "Programme of Action for Economic Cooperation" adopted at the historic Algiers Summit in September 1973. It has consistently intervened in favour of an end to the arms race, for complete and general disarmament, for destruction of the weapons of mass destruction, for détente, for the safeguarding of peace and international security and for social progress; it has acted in concert with others in favour of the recognition by non-aligned countries that the socialist countries are natural or preferred allies of underdeveloped countries, and very particularly of the national liberation movements, a position accepted at the Algiers Summit; it has seriously committed

itself to safeguard the unity of the movement at the level of its strategic interests and objectives and its world influence and expression.

And yet the People's Republic of Angola has never failed, in the context of all this diplomacy, to express its concern and even its disagreement in relation to the formation of tendencies, in relation to positions taken by some non-aligned countries regarding the representativity of the People's Republic of Kampuchea within the U. N.; regarding passivity and indifference in the face of genocide against the people of East Timor, carried out by the inglorious position of the movement which has failed to identify with or show solidarity with the heroic armed struggle of the people of East Timor; regarding renewal or establishment with former colonial powers of particularly close ties in the military field, as seen in the maintenance of military bases, concession of harbour facilities, air bases and "rapid intervention units" used as springboards for aggression against the movement's member states; against the proposing of admission of members or observers who do not rigorously conform to established criteria currently in force, which could lead the movement gradually to become transformed into a "second edition" of the United Nations, watering down its essence and the reason for its very existence; against the lack of a collective solidarity in material terms, not merely formal terms, in relation to the internationally recognised national liberation movements, and towards non-aligned countries who are directly attacked by the imperialist powers or indirectly through their special tools, South Africa and Israel.

The holding of the Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries in Luanda, capital of the People's Republic of Angola, in September 1985, was an auspicious occasion for serious reflection on the current situation within the Movement, arising from several international political and economic factors.

The continuing deterioration of the international political situation, marked by proliferating political and military conflicts, a runaway arms race and the back-drop threat of a nuclear war with catastrophic consequences, the international eco-

economic crisis and recession and the breakdown of global economic negotiations, the flashpoints of crisis and the conflicts between member countries of the Movement and the meagre results gleaned from mediating missions, the internal and external causes that have not made viable the setting up of a new international economic order, are all themes that certainly merited the closest attention and due consideration of the delegations participating in the Ministerial Conference in Luanda, in order to safeguard the credibility, political cohesion and unity of action, and therefore the international prestige of the Movement as a whole. ■

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CSO: 3400/1372

ANGOLA

RETROSPECTIVE LOOK AT AGRICULTURAL, INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

Luanda SADCC ENERGY in English Vol 3 No 10, 1985 pp 5-9

[Text] **People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, the MPLA. This was a political force that had united all the true patriots, decided to overcome Portuguese colonialism by armed warfare.**

After independence, the MPLA had to cope with militaristic and neo-colonialistic attempts to return to the previous situation by puppet movements — the FNLA and the UNITA. Then MPLA had to resist local invasions provoked by racist South Africa, which continued an underclared war against our country.

The Angolese people, firm and decided under the control of the MPLA, the Worker's Party, and President José Eduardo dos Santos, is maintaining alive the flame of combat for national unity and for socialism. Its purpose is to create an Angolese fatherland that is totally free, independent and progressive.

Agriculture was selected during the first MPLA congress to be the basis of planned economic growth. The Party and the State constantly demonstrate their principal desire, which is to increase agricultural production, because most of the population lives in the country, and solutions to the problems of depend on agricultural development as much as that of agro-foodstuff industries and exportation.

The general objectives set for agriculture result from these obligations and may be summarised as the need for self-sufficiency in food and increasing exportations in order to improve the life of the workers by consolidating the socialist sector of agriculture.

The objectives have not been entirely achieved due to a number of general factors outside the agricultural sector and despite, a slight improvement of agricultural production during these last years. The principal reason is the politico-military situation in the major regions of the country that prevents farming being carried out normally — not only the occupation by the South Africans of part of the province of Cunene, but particularly the

guerilla activities of the puppet bands of UNITA in the region of the Central Plateau and in vast areas of the provinces of South Kwanza, Benguela, Huila and Malanje.

Despite this situation that disturbs major farming regions, some improvements in agriculture have taken place.

Projects have emerged for the agricultural complexes of Cela and of Camabatela, intended for the development of stock-raising and the production of milk and meat. Technical assistance contracts have been signed for the fulfilment of these projects.

At the complex of Cavaco, where bananas are grown, the water pump and irrigation system has been rehabilitated, and other complementary crops are also being raised.

On account of the politico-military situation, the agricultural Complex of Matata has been reorganised on the basis of cooperatives to supply a tomato concentrate factory, after its rehabilitation. Sheep raising, rice forming and horticulture have been developed in the Complex of Kwzan-Bengo despite the present difficulties.

Considerable importance is given in general to the development of the cooperatives and farmers' associations, which is where most of the agricultural work-force may be found, and which produce a very great part of the crops such as cereals, cotton, manioc, coffee and vegetables. The second seminar devoted to agricultural cooperatives and support to peasant farmers was held in 1982. An overall strategy was defined for activity with peasants and a general development programme drawn up.

Farm produce is despatched to the urban centers through marketing channels

reserved for it within the scope of the overall emergency programmes which offer to farmers facilities relating to new technologies, delivery of farming equipment, services, organised distribution systems and also assistance with mechanized ploughing, where justified.

Despite considerable difficulties due to the politico-military situation, the authorities have given their full attention to stock-raising. There is a great increase in numbers of cattle, particularly in North Kwanza.

In Huila, Benguela and Namibe, meat is supplied primarily by private producers.

A number of positive results have been achieved in poultry farming thanks to complete reorganisation of the production units, by installing incubation rooms and automation systems.

Reorganisation of coffee farming as a state enterprise has led to the founding of 31 territorial enterprises in accordance with the project delineated. Problems relating to domestic marketing, transformation and exportation, associated with those of production have been solved by founding the Cafangol-UEE, an enterprise that buys coffee on the coast for transformation and exportation.

It is a noteworthy fact that the peasant sector makes a significant contribution to quantities marketed although efforts must be stepped up to give this sector more production and marketing support. The data show a below are not precise with respect to marketed peasant produce.

The directive given in the emergency programmes to create of agricultural development enterprises (EDA) should allow significant progress in marketing, supplies of technical equipment and technical assistance to this type of farming.

STATISTICS ON 1983 FARM PRODUCTION

Rice	3,144 tonnes
Maize	22,698 t
Sunflower seeds	224 t
Cotton	2,132 t
Potatoes	8368 t
Kidney beans	764 t
Peanuts	579 t
Palm oil	2,441 t
Coffee	15,631 t
Bananas	15,293 t
Lemons	2,293 t
Pineapples	641 t
Tobacco	21 t
Beef	2,272 t
Pork	1,200 t
Poultry	647 t
Eggs	9,053,000 eggs
Milk	314,000 litres
Sawn wood	4,967 m ³
Unsawn wood	57,090 m ³

INDUSTRY

The industrial infrastructure of the People's Republic is characterised by a system with defects that are natural for a country which has only recently been freed from colonialism. Alongside modern and technologically developed industries are relatively primitive enterprises with production methods that are practically artisanal. After independence and during the second war of national liberation, wholesale abandon of existing industrial units and massive flight of technicians occurred. Consequently production efficiency fell, and equipment and machines rapidly wore out, due to undisciplined use and maintenance, as well as the shortage of skilled middle-level technicians and supervisors.

Thus the organization, strengthening and development of industrial activity has been defined as key to economic and social development at the present time, both because of industry's high rates of growth and because it pulls other sectors along with it. The goal has been set to remove all impediments to attaining nearly full-capacity levels of production and productivity, as well as to diversify the structure of production in order to correct sectoral and regional imbalances.

Production of Feedstuffs: In 1982, 33,627 and 41,502 tonnes respectively of maize and wheat flours were produced.

There are nine national mills for maize flour while new ones are being built at Kicolo and Katepa in the provinces of Luan-da and Malanje. With regard to wheat flour, seven mills are operational which

are evidently of great importance because they are the basis of bread manufacture.

The production of foodstuffs made from semolina surpassed 1973 levels — reaching 60% of the target set for 1982, thanks particularly, to factories such as Cambal. Biscuit-production grew dynamically when compared with expectations, producing 1,273 tonnes. The production of edible oil by four plants amounted to 4,353 Kl in 1982 while 1,122 tonnes of margarine were produced by a plant at Lobito.

There are four fruit canning plants, three meat canning plants, and three plants which can both meat and fruits. They produced in 1982 a total of 403 tonnes of canned meat and 1,212 tonnes of canned fruit. With respect to production of alcoholic beverages, the five breweries produced 690,249 Hl in 1983.

Wine bottling started in 1981 in the northern zone and rehabilitation of other wine bottling plants is being studied at Benguela and Cabinda.

The production of soft drinks was 124,383 Hl in 1983, or 40% of the target. Sugar production in 1982 reached its planned target of 27,768 tonnes, while rock salt and refined salt production in the same year was 21,913 tonnes and 2,363 tonnes, respectively.

Light industry: The textile and garment-making industry is given priority in the process of national reconstruction in order to satisfy the requirements of the working masses. Its master plan, which was discussed and adopted in 1981 as a guide, takes detailed stock of plant and equipment, assesses the market and gives perspectives for the industry's development and rehabilitation.

Textile production in 1983 amounted to 13,507,000 m², which was 90% of the norms laid down by the Plan, and 227,526 blankets were produced, i.e. 51% of the plan. With regard to the shoe industry, production figures for 1983 were: 487,000 leather shoes, 135,000 cloth shoes and 304,727 plastic shoes.

A national company, the Panga-Panga Company, was founded in the wood industry for the purpose of converting timber into plywood, compressed wood or fibre board. Forest exploitation has been activated together with the transportation

of logs and sawn wood. Furniture manufacturing enterprises were created at Luanda, Huambo, Benguela and Huila. Production of plywood amounted to 4,240 m³ in 1983.

Production levels were satisfactory in the light chemicals industry with 44,6 millions of boxes of matches (56% of forecast), 35,126 foam mattresses and 8,800 tonnes of soap.

In the area of graphic arts, whose master-plan was approved in 1983, a printing plant was built at Luanda (Macutanga) with considerable book production capacity.

Heavy Industry: Tyre production in 1983 amounted to 54,882 tyres and a considerable increase is expected for the following years, because of renovation of the Mabor and the Ned and Curbol enterprises which is underway. These factories are expected to manufacture tyres, bicycles and mopeds.

1983 marked the start of execution of the contract for rehabilitating the national steel industry, which anticipates the production of 60,000 tonnes of steel rods over two and a half years. Comparatively, production amounted to 6,652 tonnes during 1981/1983.

Studies of a system for recovery of scrap have been completed and operations started in 1983 with the commissioning of the Northern Region Enterprise.

Mining: Diamond production has been satisfactory, in spite of the existence of some problems of infrastructure and increased smuggling in 1980/81/83, given the current politico-military situation in the areas where the diamond enterprise operates.

DIAMOND PRODUCTION (CARATS)

Year	1) Planned	2) Actual	3) as % of 1)
1980	1,400,200	1,485,498	106.09%
1981	1,600,689	1,400,481	87.49%
1982	1,400,000	1,603,000	114.05%
1983	1,143,327	1,006,540	88.03%

Production of quartz amounted to 1,782,550 tonnes in 1980 and 1,030,050 in 1981, but work was stopped in April 1982, on account of the attacks in the producing region.

With regard to phosphates, production and marketing started with the founding of the state enterprise Fosfang in the province of Zaire. Phosphate production is aimed at the domestic agricultural market, and also for export. Extraction of black granite started in 1978 and, up to 1983, the Ornamental Stone Enterprise had delivered and exported 7,692 m³.

ENERGY

Oil: Oil is a sector of great importance in the economy and all necessary steps are being taken to gradually increase production and to improve the marketing facilities. Advanced technologies are being used to optimise the work of exploration, production and processing.

Hydroelectric energy: To acquire full knowledge of the country's hydroelectric capacities so that all sources of energy may be rationally used, studies have been carried out covering the hydrography of the basins of the Kwanza, the Congo and the Queve; the rivers of N'gunza, Quicimbo, Evale, Balombo and Cubal da Hanha; the basins of the Catumbela, the Kunene, the Kubango and the Upper Zambeze.

The studies covered a total area of 502,541 km² with assured energy production of 71,186 GWH/year, and an estimated average of 86,126 GWH/year. The work of building the hydroelectric complex of Capanda is expected to be completed in 1990. This is a major project that will allow the agricultural and industrial development of several provinces of the country when it is in operation.

FISHING

The catches of the national industrial fishing fleet are satisfactory when compared with the Plan, i.e., 174,919 tonnes against 114,000 tonnes planned. But this figure is still insufficient to cover requirements and measures have been taken to fill the gap by importation, and agreements have been signed with certain foreign countries.

The production of dried or semi-processed fish amounted respectively to 12,448.6 and 8,567 tonnes in 1983. ►

FOREIGN TRADE

Foreign trade is of strategic importance for the People's Republic of Angola to help in resolving the new and increasingly complex problems of economic and social development. Particular attention is therefore paid to the growth of exports.

The relatively low level of our country's domestic production and productive forces, added to negative internal and external factors, cause the People's Republic of Angola to continue to support its economy through imports aimed at satisfying the population's basic needs. Importation opens the doors to a widening of productivity with regular procurement of technical equipment required to satisfy the targets laid down for production and consumption.

Foreign trade continues on a falling trend, due to the aforesaid negative factors. The principal products exported at present are oil and its by-products, diamonds and coffee. Smaller quantities are exported of cement, marble, quartz, fishmeal, phosphates and wood, but these are not economically important. The principal importers are the state enterprises: Importang-UEE, importing foodstuffs; Mecanang-UEE, importing equipment; Angomedica-UEE, importing medicines and hospital equipment; Maquimport-UEE importing office equipment.

With regard to exports, Exportang-UEE export sisal, fishmeal, quartz and granite. The other products exported such as oil, diamonds, coffee and phosphates are exported by the relevant producing enterprises.

With regard to international economic relations, the People's Republic of Angola is developing relationships with the whole international community, in accordance with the principles of equality; non-interference, mutual respect and reciprocity of advantages. The country is thus taking an active part in the establishment of a new world economic order.

Particular attention is being given to enhancing regional cooperation on the African continent. Similarly, relations with the socialist countries are given priority and, with their stable basis and long-term prospects, will contribute to consolidate our decision to achieve development by the construction of socialism.

During the years 1981, 1982 and 1983, 190 cooperation documents were signed with socialist countries (agreements, protocols, memoranda). They relate principally to agriculture, industry, building, energy, finance and planning, commerce, agriculture and science.

During the same time, documents of the same type—agreements, protocols, pacts or regulations—were signed with non-aligned countries in Africa and Latin America. These apply in particular to technical, scientific and cultural cooperation, to the training of staff and to business and finance. The accent is in general placed on the political will shown within the non-aligned countries and also among members of regional organisations such as SADCC. The purpose is to follow the targets defined by Action Programmes, like that of Lagos, with the purpose of setting up a new world economic order.

Again during the years 1981, 1982 and 1983, 24 documents of the same type were signed with capitalist countries such as Denmark, France, Italy, Holland, Portugal, Austria, Belgium and Spain. The principal sectors concerned are fishing, banks, health, agriculture, industry, building, transportation, energy; oil and education.

EDUCATION

In the area of education and teaching, the guidelines laid down by the MPLA Workers' Party, have led the Ministry of Education to draw up a whole series of measures that are intended firstly to control the "scholastic explosion", in primary schools and, secondly, to increase teaching efficiency at the intermediate and higher levels. Similarly, measures have been taken to improve the quality of teaching and the factors that contribute to it, such as the teacher training, the organisation of school attendance, improvement of student reception facilities, supply of scholastic equipment and technical, scientific or educative improvements.

The main guidelines define the legal features of control of the "scholastic explosion" ensuring that education democratic, free of charge and also obligatory. The general law on education is thus complete but it has not yet been possible to implement it fully. The basic reason for this delay in entirely applying the guidelines are the physical obstacles to implementation—the socio-economic conditions of the country and the difficulties resulting from South African aggression since 1981.

Great efforts have nevertheless been made to improve the quality of teaching by suitable means, such as the distribution of teaching equipment and the acquisition of technical, scientific or educational supplies. Similarly, attempts are continuing to raise the cultural and vocational level of the teachers. In this context, pre-university teaching is being extended to nearly all the provinces of the country. Thus the teachers of the eighth class, for example, may make progress while continuing their training at the ISCED (Higher Institute of Educational Sciences). We should also note, the Institute's first attempts at correspondence courses, which are still experimental.

Despite the National Literacy Center's organizing difficulties and the country's socio-political situation, literacy tasks have been fulfilled, particularly with respect to the number of literacy teachers to be trained.

To cite a few facts and figures relating to concrete action completed and which show the progress in quality of teaching: the effective development of accelerated training of teachers;

63 and 211 diplomas were awarded in the teacher training schools in 1982 and 1983, and 496 during the scholastic year 1983/1984; 25 and 36 diplomas at the Industrial Teaching Institute in 1982, 1983 and 18 during the year 1983/1984;

— the completion during 1983 of the first courses for school inspectors, 127 in number, and implementation of structures of school inspections at national and provincial levels;

— the acquisition and construction of 90 laboratories for physics, chemistry and biology in third level primary schools and in the teacher training schools;

— the construction of a factory for exercise books and pencils in the province

of Benguela, while another factory in Luanda will later supply the whole northern region of the country with scholastic equipment.

HEALTH

Health care has developed considerably since the independence of the People's Republic of Angola was proclaimed, and follows the guidelines laid down by the higher authorities. This clearly and objectively reflects the importance that the Party and the Government give to everything concerned with health.

The sector drew up a programme of action, including health education, which covers the principal areas of health care, although it is not yet as widespread as desired. Meanwhile, in 1982, with primary health care in mind, a health education programme was put into action with the

participation of other sectors and entities, particularly the building industry, education, social affairs, provincial authorities and OMA, the Angolan Women's Organization.

The programme is designed for all sectors and fields, covering primary health care, education and nutrition, prevention of the principal infectious diseases (tuberculosis, tetanus, whooping cough, diarrhoea, measles, poliomyelitis and yellow fever) and the prophylaxis of the principal endemic diseases (trypanosomiasis, malaria, tuberculosis, leprosy and schistosomiasis), treatment of common illnesses and distribution of basic medicines.

The part of the programme concerned with primary health care has been revised and put into practice. It is divided into eight components, of which health education is an integral part, rounding out the activities in the field of health.

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ANGOLA

10 YEARS OF OIL INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT VIEWED

Luanda SADCC ENERGY in English Vol 3 No 10, 1985 pp 11-16

[Text] **Petroleum product supply to Angolan consumers was conducted up to 1976 by Angolan subsidiaries of Shell, Texaco, Mobil and Petrofina and by Portuguese-owned SACOR). The oil products were obtained primarily from the Luanda refinery plus some direct imports to terminals at Lobito and other coastal locations.**

Shell and Mobil also owned and operated lube oil blending plants at Luanda using imported base stocks and additives. In 1976, SONANGOL U.E.E. — Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis de Angola, a state-owned company was legally established with administrative and financial independence.

The oil industry is of strategic importance to the Angolan national economy and SONANGOL's

objectives are the implementation of national policy and the conduct of operations in respect of

- Petroleum exploration and production.
- Product distribution and marketing.

SONANGOL

Under the Petroleum Law (No. 13/78) of 26th August, 1978, SONANGOL was established as the exclusive concessionaire for hydrocarbon exploration and produc-

tion activities. At its formation, SONANGOL acquired the oil production operations of the Portuguese company AN-GOL. This acquisition also provided the initial nucleus for SONANGOL's present Hydrocarbon Directorate, which is responsible for exploration and production activities.

However, as the concessionaire for all exploration and production operations in Angola, the Hydrocarbon Directorate's scope and size of responsibilities is much greater than that of the very limited operations of ANGOL. Thus, the organisa-

Angola has a history of oil exploration that dates back to 1910, sixty-six years prior to the formation of SONANGOL. In that year a concession was granted to the company Canha E Formingal of an area of 114,000 square kilometres in the onshore Congo and Kwanza Basins. In 1915 the first well was sunk in the Kwanza Basin.

Pema (The Companhia de Pesquisas Mineiras de Angola) and Sinclair from the U.S. were companies also involved in early Angolan exploration.

In 1962 the first seismic survey of the Cabinda offshore area was conducted by Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, and a discovery well was drilled in the same year.

By 1976 production was running at a combined total of over 100,000 B/d from three sites, offshore Cabinda, onshore Kwanza and Congo basins, having peaked during the Colonial period at 172,000 B/d in 1974.

During the period 1952-1976, 30,500 km of seismic survey was run and 368 exploration and 302 development wells drilled. A total of 23 fields were discovered; 3 of these offshore.

In 1958, a very small oil refinery (100,000 tons per annum, or about 2,000 B/D) was constructed in Luanda by PETRANGOL, a company owned principally by Petrofina S.A. of Belgium. The Portuguese Government held nominal, non-participating shares in PETRANGOL.

During 1972-73, there was a substantial expansion of the Luanda Refinery to 1.5 million TPA (30,000 B/D). It is a conventional hydroskimming refinery which is oriented primarily towards production of LPG gasoline, jet fuel and gas oil for domestic Angolan markets.

tion's capability has necessarily and substantially expanded and has been built primarily with Angolan geologists, geophysicists and engineers who have gained experience with other oil companies operating in Angola. The Hydrocarbon Directorate actually has two roles. A fundamental responsibility is to protect national interests in the exploration and production sector. SONANGOL thus monitors, and ultimately controls, all exploration and production activities in the country with tutelage from the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum and support from other government departments. In addition, SONANGOL invests in certain of the exploration and production operations in association with international oil companies; principally offshore Cabinda but also on onshore activities, plus production sharing agreements in Block 2 and Block 4.

The Hydrocarbon Directorate must, therefore, also view its industry from the perspective of an equity participant as well as an agent of the state.

As a result of the exploration and production activities, SONANGOL owns approximately one half of the crude oil produced in Angola. A small portion is supplied to the Luanda refinery while the bulk is sold to international customers. The foreign marketing operations are coordinated by SONANGOL Limited, a subsidiary officed in London.

Initially, SONANGOL's structure for petroleum product distribution and marketing was also moulded by the acquisition of ANGOL. Subsequently, the Angolan operations of Shell, Fina and Mobil were acquired through negotiated purchase and as SONANGOL's responsibilities expanded, it became clear that an organisational structure with new areas of responsibility was required.

In 1983 the Distribution Sector was reorganised with a far greater degree of decentralisation resulting in the programmed transfer of administrative financial, personnel and supply functions at head office being delegated to the corresponding distribution centres.

Back-up facilities such as Transport, Administration and Supply are centred at the Head Office in Luanda, Angola's capital city, and key regional centres, which are also organised for the employee support programmes which include cooperative housing, medical services, cre-

ches and catering. SONANGOL's Corporate Management and the central Administration and Finance Directorate are based in the Luanda Head Office, as are Directorates for Planning, Negotiations and Projects and other corporate support groups.

HUMAN RESOURCES

SONANGOL has encountered serious difficulties in obtaining the necessary human resources in sufficient qualities and quantities, for meeting the development objectives laid down, given the shortage of trained personnel in the country.

Using the motto «Man — the most important factor in the Organisation», SONANGOL has sought to create the professional and social conditions for cost-effectively increasing the efficiency of its human resources. This is in the knowledge that the individual development and satisfaction of its workers will contribute immeasurably towards achieving the objectives of the organisation.


Great attention is given, and a collective effort is made, to counteract the shortage of national management personnel with technical and professional training.

A management level in 1977 of 528 workers (corresponding to a basic salary of \$2.8 million), had increased by 1983 to 3,010 workers (with a basic salary of \$17.7 million).

Within the Company, great attention and importance is given to the training of new management personnel, and the further technical education of existing personnel.

In the training of upper and middle management within the framework of the normal Education System in force at SONANGOL, the following policy has been decided on:

- a) Workers operating within the Company develop at the same time their academic training in Angola. In 1983, there were 140 employees enrolled on University courses. Many other workers were actively involved in courses at schools and institutes throughout Angola.
- b) Under the supervision of the Ministry of Education, there is a National Petroleum Institute, where 63 employees are attending courses for complete training in specialised areas within the field of petroleum.



c) On the basis of international agreements, in various countries throughout the world, SONANGOL has 31 of its technical staff undergoing training: 28 of these are university courses and the remainder at colleges, using the student grant system.

As from 1982, new initiatives were introduced, underlining the need for Foreign Companies operating within Angola to replace, on specific dates, and in the various occupational categories, their foreign work-force, with national personnel.

They are required under SONANGOL's control, to comply with plans for recruitment and training of management personnel at all levels for the sector. To the same end, various professional training centres have been created and better utilization of the capacities established at national education level is becoming a fact. A special fund has also been created for this activity. The exchange of ideas and technology between SONANGOL and the Operating Companies has contributed greatly towards advancement in this area.

On a parallel with this, SONANGOL is directing its efforts towards cooperation with the University and Institutes, in the implementation of specific programmes,

within the Faculties. This has resulted in the creation of specialised courses in the field of petroleum and the provision of practical support for teaching institutions, supplying teaching aids such as laboratories and libraries and financing projects serving these institutions.


In addition there exists a programme for further technical education for professional personnel. Each year, about one hundred workers attend training courses, apprenticeship courses, and refresher courses, both within the country and abroad.

INVESTMENT

SONANGOL has continued with its aggressive investment programme over recent years aimed at eliminating bottlenecks and increasing production capacity.

Oil exploration activity has led to numerous new oil discoveries which have demanded a major on-going investment programme expenditure. Some of the recent major investment projects in which SONANGOL provides direct investment include:

- 1) Gas injection facilities in Cabinda.
- 2) Development of the Takula field.
- 3) Development of the offshore Cabinda



fields of Kungula, Kambala and Livuite.

- 4) Construction of Kwanda oil field services base.
- 5) Development of Lumueno, Quinfuquena and Quinguila fields.
- 6) Development of the Essungo and Cuntala fields.
- 7) Construction of the Quinfuquena oil terminal.

At the same time, SONANGOL is undertaking projects aimed at the creation and development of infrastructure that, in the near future, will generate higher levels of production.

Since 1980 the investment programme in the area of Distribution has been characterised by the acquisition and commissioning of road tankers and rail tank cars, together with the construction of new storage installations. Significant new distribution capacity has therefore been introduced across the country.

Some of the major Distribution investment projects have been:


- 1) Construction of marine terminals at Cabinda and Lobito.
- 2) LPG storage installations at Lobito and Namibe.
- 3) New bulk plants at Malange, Porto Amboim and Huambo.
- 4) Transport bases at Luanda and Lobito.

Sonangol is also engaged in investment activity in the following areas:

- 1) Farms and cattle rearing stations in the provinces of Bengo (Kilunda and Sonhi) and Zaire (Soyo and Lucata).

- 2) Housing for SONANGOL staff.
- 3) Air Transport (both helicopters and aircraft).
- 4) Partnership in Petromar — a company set up to manufacture plant and equipment for the oil industry.
- 5) Supply of food for SONANGOL employees.

It can be seen that SONANGOL's in-



vestment policy is intended not only to create new means of production, but also to increase the standard of living of all of its workers.

PETROLEUM LAW

On 26th August 1978 a Petroleum Law (No 13/78) was introduced which governs all activities relating to the search for, and production of, petroleum in the People's Republic of Angola. This Law contains the following major principles:

- a) The State is the sole owner of the nation's petroleum deposits.
- b) SONANGOL is the sole concessionaire with the right to explore for, and produce petroleum.
- c) SONANGOL is permitted to enter into association with capable foreign companies in order to obtain financial and technical support to carry out the discovery, development and productions of the production of the country's petroleum resources.

- d) The agreements of association are for an agreed duration, generally divided into a period of exploration and of development and production.
- e) SONANGOL and any foreign companies with which it associates are obliged to observe the terms of the Petroleum Law as well as general requirements to conserve petroleum deposits and protect the natural environment.
- f) SONANGOL and operating companies are also obliged to present a plan for the utilisation of any natural gas discovered to the Minister of Energy and Petroleum, since gas flaring is prohibited without prior Ministerial approval.

The basic forms of association provided for in the Law include:


- 1) «Joint Ventures», in which both SONANGOL and its partner(s) share in investments according to their percentage interest, and receive petroleum produced in the same proportion.
- 2) «Production Sharing Agreements», in which the foreign company serves as a contractor to SONANGOL, makes the necessary investments and is compensated by receiving a share of the oil produced.

The law provides that in any association, SONANGOL must participate in the management of the operation.

JOINT VENTURES

In practice, SONANGOL's joint ventures evolved from the exploration and production operations which existed prior to 1976. The most important of these is in offshore Cabinda, where Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (CABGOC) — now owned by Chevron — has conducted operating for many years. During 1977-1978, SONANGOL and CABGOC negotiated an agreement whereby SONANGOL became a 51% participant in an offshore Cabinda joint venture. Both partners contribute their share of the large new development investments and divide the oil produced on a 51/49 basis.

CABGOC acts as technical operator for the venture and reports, in this role, to a SONANGOL/CABGOC joint management committee. Similarly, SONANGOL is a 51% owner of onshore joint venture operations in the Congo and Kwanza River Basins in association with the Angolan subsidiaries of two other international companies Texaco and Petrofina.



PRODUCTION SHARING AGREEMENTS

In 1978, all of the offshore area of Angola (except for Cabinda) to a water depth of about 200 metres, was divided in 'blocks' of approximately 4000 square kilometres each. SONANGOL also developed a production sharing agreement of these concession areas. This is a contractual form of agreement which is widely used in developing countries throughout the world. SONANGOL's version does contain one unique feature called the 'price cap' as explained on page 18.

SONANGOL has entered into a series of these production sharing agreements in Blocks 1 (the most northerly), 2, 3, 4, 6 and 9 with a number of international oil companies. Exploratory drilling has been conducted on all blocks with the greatest success to date occurring in the Congo Basin. Oil production began in Block 2 in 1981 and will begin in Block 3 in 1985.

As the Petroleum Law states, SONANGOL is the concessionaire in all of these blocks. In addition, SONANGOL is a participant in the contractor groups in Block 2 (with Texaco, Total and Braspetro) and Block 4 (with Petrofina, Braspetro and British Petroleum). In the special case of Block 4, a jointly-owned company (ESPA-UEM), of which SONANGOL is part owner) has been established to function as technical operator for SONANGOL and its contractor group.



JOINT VENTURE COMPANIES

On a limited and selected basis, SONANGOL also participates in joint venture companies which provide services and supplies to the oil exploration and production companies.

These joint ventures are formed in line with the provisions of the Law on Foreign Investments (No. 10/79) of 1979. This law was directed not only towards the development of the country's petroleum activities, but also towards the overall economic development of Angola's human and other resources. Its objective is to unite Angolan efforts with foreign managerial and technical skills to benefit the country's productivity and growth.

An important example of the application of this Law is the creation of Petro-mar, a joint venture company which has established a large construction yard on the coast at Ambriz, north of Luanda, to build offshore oil installations, submarine pipelines, port facilities and related equipment. Petro-mar is a joint venture between SONANGOL and the French company Bouygues Offshore.

ANGOLAN EXPORTS OF CRUDE OIL 1977-1983



PRICE CAP PROVISION

Although Production Sharing Agreements are commonly used in many countries throughout the world, the Angolan version contains a unique provision known as the Price Cap. As a result, SONANGOL, rather than its foreign oil company contractors, received the majority of the increased revenue which resulted from the rapid crude oil price increases in the early 1980's.

During a period of declining prices, the same provision helps to ensure that the foreign companies receive adequate profits for their investments.

RELAUNCHING THE SECTOR

1976 was a decisive year in the history of the Angolan petroleum activity, as SONANGOL was established as the national concessionaire of all rights for exploration and production of hydrocarbons in Angola. The Ministry of Petroleum was later created as a supervisory organization for the development of this overall activity.

The new objectives to be achieved for the relaunching of the activity in this sector, according with the policy of the country's economic development, are:

- a) To develop recovery programmes in order to increase the production already declining in the old oil fields.
- b) To begin exploration in new areas in order to increase the proven reserves and, to develop new oil and gas production.
- c) To take effective control of the performance of the sector programmes.

In this way, SONANGOL began to control and coordinate the exploration activity:

- a) Conferring new vigor to the petroleum sector, both as concessionaire and as partner.
- b) Participating in the definition of all exploration programmes to be carried out in each area.
- c) Approving the programmes to be conducted.

In 1979, SONANGOL collected and compiled the available data concerning the sedimentary basins and carried out a new 8000 Km seismic survey programme on the continental platform. The interpretation of the old and new data enabled division of the continental shelf platform into 13 blocks, — each of about 4000 square kilometres. As separately described, SONANGOL then entered into production sharing agreements sharing agreements for several of these blocks with international oil companies. Each of the agreements contained substantial 'minimum exploration work obligations' by the oil companies.

Separately, SONANGOL worked with partners in the older joint venture areas to intensify exploration and appraisal efforts.

The results of these activities from 1979 up to 1983 may be summarised as follows:

- 1) 83,173 Km of seismic survey was conducted about 95% offshore.

- 2) 118 exploration wells were drilled, including 25 offshore in Cabinda and 47 in the offshore Soyo area (Blocks 1, 2 and 3).

- 3) 120 further development wells were being drilled.

The success of the exploration activity is amply demonstrated by noting the evolution of proven reserves of crude oil and oil production:

- 1) 1983 reserves increased by about 150% compared to the amount from the same areas in 1976 (1651) million barrels versus 654 million barrels.
- 2) 1981/82 represented a period when the steady decline in oil productions since 1974 was reversed.
- 3) 1984 estimated production of about 72 million BBLs is the peak ever achieved in Angola.

TWO OIL BASINS

Following the relaunching of petroleum sectors after 1976, development activities have been concentrated in two oil basins which are subdivided into 8 areas, where 15 foreign oil companies participate with SONANGOL. Other companies are expected to join SONANGOL in the near future.

In offshore Cabinda, oil production capacity in 1984 was approximately 160,000 B/D and an increase in available capacity to 200,000 B/D is forecast for 1985.

During 1982 in Cabinda, the first Gas Injection Project (GIP) in Angola was implemented. Not only was production level increased but approximately 733,000 barrels of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) was recovered and exported.

In the onshore Congo Basin, crude oil production which started in 1965 is in decline, and recovery projects are being implemented using water and gas injection.

In the onshore Kwanza Basin, the oil fields already produced almost 85% of its recoverable reserves, but efforts are being made to sustain production at a level of 4,000 B/D. This production has traditionally been delivered by pipeline to the Luanda refinery.

In offshore Block 1, the first seismic work began in May 1982 and the first drilling in December of the same year. Minimum work obligations include 9 explora-

tion wells during the first three years, and another two in each of the following two years. This represents a minimum investment of 112 million dollars (80 million dollars for the first three years and 16 million dollars for each of the subsequent two years).

The activity in Block 2 began in 1980. In almost 20 exploration wells drilled to date, 4 commercial discoveries have been made. Two fields already being in production — Cuntala and Essungo — with a total production of 11,700 B/D attained in 1983. Recent commercial discoveries were the Lombo Este and Tubarão fields in the Southern part of Block 2.

Block 3 started its exploration activity in 1980. Six of the 17 drilled wells to date are considered commercial, and the remaining ones are being appraised. A major development project is being implemented for Palanca and Pacaça fields, and for a sea-loading terminal. Production should begin in early 1985 and the first exports will be in July.

The Production Sharing Agreement for Block 4 was signed in March 1984, with a start on its activity anticipated for the first quarter of 1985. The Block operator is E. S. P. A. U. E. M. (Mixed Economic Enterprise) which is owned by SONANGOL (51%), Braspetro (24.5%) and Petrofina (24.5%).

Within this scope, SONANGOL aims to simultaneously train Angolan staff as one of the conditions for assuming the role of operator in future.

In Block 9, the first well was drilled in January 1982. Up to now no commercial discoveries have been made, but the re-evaluation of technical data is continuing in order that the contractor can decide whether to extend the exploration period.

The development of such oil company exploration and development programmes in Angola has been made possible through the assistance of various specialised oil service or contractor companies.

About 150 of these service companies were operating in Angola at the end of 1984, with the following specialities: contract drilling, mud and cement suppliers, electric logging firms, geophysical and seismic processing firms, vessel repairs and maintenance firms, air transport contractors, civil constructors, technical assistan-

ce advisers, plus engineering/construction companies which specialise in large projects. Companies of various nationalities bid under identical conditions for development of the oil industry. American, Brazilian, French, Dutch, English, Italian, Lebanese and other companies are working in Angola and performing to high standards.

Some of these have installed their industrial bases in Cabinda, supporting the operations of the SONANGOL — CABGOC Association while the Kwanda base in Soyo was developed by SONANGOL for provision of material and services to oil companies operating in Blocks 1, 2, 3 and 4.

OTHER FACILITIES

The storage installations of SONANGOL are being expanded with the construction of new installations strategically located throughout Angola.

The programme include the installation of new capacity in the interior totalling approx. 40,000 m³, the creation of new ocean terminals at Cabinda, Soyo and Lobito, totalling approx. 50,000 m³ and the refurbishment of the installations of Namibe. SONANGOL also plans to replace the five existing installations in Luanda, with a total capacity of 93,200 m³.

SONANGOL has its own transport fleet with which to supply the coastal installations from Luanda, to transfer products between installations and to distribute to consumers. Today, SONANGOL's Distribution activity in Luanda takes direct responsibility for the installations and activities in Luanda and North of Angola, including Cabinda, Zaire, Kwanza North, Malange, Lunda North and Lunda South. Decentralised regional operations have been established for the Lobito/Benguela area and the Central and Southern regions. Support activities have been developed both at the Head Office and in the provincial operations, — Transport, Offices, Supply Centres and Housing. Social services have also developed for an ever increasing number of employees.

SONANGOL is also responsible for marketing, storage and distribution of bottled and bulk LPG gas throughout the country.



(SONANGOL)

A new Luanda storage and filling installation is under construction replacing existing installations. Once completed, it will have a storage capacity of 600 m³, and a filling capacity of 10,000 bottles per day.

SONANGOL's vast fleet of vehicles is managed by a Technical Group which is structure to operate and maintain the road distribution of hydrocarbon products throughout Angola.

DIRECT MARKETING

When SONANGOL was founded, it assumed the responsibility of marketing about 50% of the crude oil produced in Angola. Because of limited experience and knowledge of the complex international oil market, SONANGOL initially used an agent to assist with its foreign crude oil sales, contracting and logistics arrangements. In 1983, however, SONANGOL established a direct presence in the market-place by creating a subsidiary with an office in London. This was done in compliance with the guidelines of the First MPLA Congress:

«SONANGOL should sell Angolan oil at the best possible price directly to end-consumers avoiding intermediates and agents».

The objectives of the wholly-owned SONANGOL subsidiaries are as follows:

- 1) Maintaining a continuous presence in the international market-place with direct contact with ultimate crude oil customers.
- 2) Diversifying geographically and commercially the crude oil customer mix in order to minimize dependence on a single market.
- 3) Arranging imports and exports of certain petroleum products for Angola — principal LPG imports and bunker fuel exports.
- 4) Developing an international oil trading activity to enhance Angolan knowledge of the oil markets with the ultimate objective of markets with the ultimate objective of maximizing overall Angolan income.

SONANGOL Limited's London office arranges the oil-trading transactions and provides administration and accounting service, while the actual contracts are undertaken by SONANGOL S. A. which is another SONANGOL wholly-owned subsidiary incorporated in Monrovia, Liberia, with an office in Geneva.

As a result of these arrangements, SONANGOL is now in contact with all international oil companies — both state and privately-owned — and has separately been instrumental in implementing a regional supply policy for petroleum products through other countries of Southern Africa.

The SONANGOL crude oil marketing policy has always been based upon a pragmatic strategy utilising flexible pricing so as to sell the full oil entitlements of the company. Thus, in spite of the difficult market conditions in recent years, SONANGOL and Angola have been able to avoid loss of revenue due to lack of adequate marketing arrangements.

SONANGOL intends to continue with this strategy as Angolan oil production increases in future years. ■

KENYA

PANOCO TO BEGIN PROSPECTING IN JULY

Paris INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 8 Feb 86 p 6

[Text] The oil company Pan Ocean Oil (Panoco) intends to begin prospecting operations in Kenya in July this year, company president Vittorio Fabri di Guevara said last week. Panoco is budgeting to spend 180 million dollars on its Kenyan activities over the next two years. The company is already conducting operations in Angola, Benin, Gabon and Nigeria.

In Kenya a number of oil companies have been given licences for prospecting since a new law governing the use of Kenya's oil resources was adopted in 1984. They include Amoco (which is committed to investing some 43 million dollars), Marathon, Union Oil, Total, Mobil, Petro-Canada, Petrofina and Oil Corporation of Kenya. The new law stipulates that if oil is discovered 40 per cent of the production will belong to the prospecting company until its investments are recouped.

I.O.N.--Still unknown in east Africa, Panoco has on the other hand hit the headlines in the west, and particularly in Benin. In that country, by making startling promises it succeeded in ousting a Norwegian company, Saga, but it was unable to hold to its pledge to raise output from the Seme oil-field to 25,000 barrels per day within a year. In specialist circles it is considered that Pan Ocean Oil has neither the financial nor the technological resources to prospect for oil.

/6091

CSO: 3400/1395

KENYA

BRIEFS

DIAMOND SALES UP--Diamond Trust of Kenya Ltd has recorded a 13.8 per cent pre-tax profit increase over the previous year for the year ending September 30, 1985. The Trust's chairman, Mr Sultan E. Shariff, said that the rise of profits from Sh39,076,000 to Sh44,459,000 makes 1985 a remarkable year for the company. The company also increased its loans from Sh590 million to Sh834 million, a growth rate of 41.4 per cent, while deposits increased from Sh615 million to Sh968 million, a growth of 57.4 per cent. Said the chairman: "The landmark achievement in our history thus far was the crossing of the billion shillings mark in total assets in March 1985." These increased from Sh845 million to Sh1,264 million by September 30, 1985, registering a growth of 49.6 per cent. The profit after tax was Sh25,036,000. An interim dividend of 12.5 per cent on the paid-up share capital of Sh31.8 million was paid on August 31, 1985. [By Anderea Morara] [Text] [Nairobi SUNDAY NATION in English 2 Mar 86 p 22] /6091

CSO: 3400/1395

REUNION

BRIEFS

MIR RECEIVES LIBYAN TRAINING--Serge Sinamale, leader of the MIR (Mouvement pour l'Indeependance de la Reunion) went with nine of his supporters to Libya for a six-week course in political education and training in the handling of small arms. It was the first visit to Tripoli by such a large group from Reunion, and its members were subjected on their return last week to harassment by French police. No fewer than 20 officers accompanied by gendarmes mounted dawn raids on the homes of the MIR members and took them away for interrogation. All were released soon afterwards. I.O.N.--This visit to Libya coincided with the formation at the end of December of the Front Anti-colonialiste de la Reunion (FAR), which THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER was among the first to reveal in its January 18 issue (ION No 215), and with attempts to forge some sort of alliance with Jean-Claude Barret, the president of the Union Generale des Travailleurs Reunionnais en France, which some time ago distanced itself from the island's communist party (see ION No 217). While it is difficult to envisage a revival of the Reunion independence movement, renewed activity by a handful of militants cannot be ruled out. Throughout their questioning by the police last week they were extremely reticent about the sort of activity they were intending to undertake. [Text] [Paris THE INDIAN OCEAN NEWSLETTER in English 8 Feb 86 p 3] /9274

CSO: 3400/1374

SOUTH AFRICA

SADF CHIEF OUTLINES THINKING ON DEFENCE POLICY, TACTICS

Cape Town LEADERSHIP SOUTH AFRICA in English Vol 5 No 1, 1986 pp 27-30

[Interview with the new chief of the South African Defence Force, General Jannie Geldenhuys by Hugh Murray; date and place not given]

[Text]

The new chief of the South African Defence Force, General Jannie Geldenhuys, is regarded by his peers as "the ultimate soldier". In this interview with publisher and editor, Hugh Murray, he outlines his thinking on defence policy and tactics.

Murray: Four months ago you took over as Chief of the Defence Force. How have your management strategies differed from those of your predecessor?

Geldenhuys: General Constant Viljoen, my predecessor, was in this chair for about five years. He was a well-known figure, a strong leader and had a reputation for getting things done. When I took over the Defence Force it was merely a question of continuing where he had left off.

Murray: What were the issues when you assumed command?

Geldenhuys: A major concern was the Defence Force's role of supporting the police in incidents of internal unrest. Of course we are still defining for ourselves how we will fulfil this task now and in the future.

Another aspect was the defence budget. It is public knowledge that we are going through tough times financially. We (here I mean top management) have had to look hard at productivity to ensure the continued growth and development of the Defence Force in real terms with perhaps less financial resources. It is currently a focal point in our thinking.

Murray: A regular bone of contention is the amount of money spent on defence. Will the Defence budgets continue to escalate?

Geldenhuys: I think it is wrong to talk of "continuing escalation". If you study Defence expenditure over the last few years you will find that it has not increased in real terms. You must understand I am not talking in nominal rand values but in constant rand values.

In fact, there has been a slight drop in defence expenditure over the last ten years or so. If future budgets seem to be higher that would reflect an increase in nominal rand values, but looked at over the years the Defence budgets will not show any dramatic changes.

The Defence Force is aware that in our present situation other projects, such as education or the constitutional changes, require priority financing, which underlines what I said about productivity. In the last year or two, we have managed - despite the economic problems in the country - to bring down our running costs. The Defence Force is like any other organisation: if it doesn't move forward it moves backwards. When there is a shortage of money the only way to ensure continued growth, to ensure there are funds for capital projects is to increase productivity and bring down running costs, which we have succeeded in doing.

Murray: The role of the Defence Force seems to have taken on a very different cast in recent times. Is it necessary for the Defence Force to operate in the townships, to be linked, in the eyes of blacks, with the police?

Geldenhuis: In analysing the supporting role the Defence Force gives the police two basic factors must be considered, namely, that South Africa finds itself in a period of rapid change which consequently leads to some insecurity. And about us we find the manifestation of Eastern and Western interests which makes it difficult to do long-term planning.

Any big organisation wants long-term plans, which are easy to devise in a stable environment. You formulate certain scenarios and plan according to the scenarios. We are faced with the international political scene which is so unstable that a scenario formulated today could be outdated tomorrow. And likewise with the internal situation.

Some countries, such as Switzerland and England, have had the same constitutions for years, centuries even. But in our case, since the Union of South Africa was formed after the Anglo Boer War, the constitution has been under almost constant revision. There has been the independence of the national states, the formation of the President's Council and the recent constitutional changes – all of which illustrate the rapid changes taking place in the country.

Management studies have shown that whenever there is change one of the side effects is a resistance to those changes. That is natural human behaviour. Feelings of insecurity creep in; group conflict is also a product of change. So to a very large extent, the unrest can be ascribed to the changes taking place. Nor should one be surprised at this phenomenon.

Murray: Did you consider that the unrest would be as sustained as it has been?

Geldenhuis: It would be naive to think that within the near future there will be, overnight, a dramatic de-escalation of unrest. I am not predicting that it will increase or forever stay at the current level, but I think it would be unwise to create expectations of a sudden total peace.

Also consider that thousands of people have become accustomed to certain

institutions, to certain traditions, to certain customs of government. So some people will experience a natural tendency to resist certain changes.

Murray: You are talking about both left and right wing resistance?

Geldenhuis: Yes. As I mentioned, management studies have proven that changes cannot be made without certain emotional turbulence.

Murray: If I could just interrupt you . . . the direct pain of the unrest is being felt by blacks. They are in the frontline against the Defence Force: can the Defence Force's relationship with them improve?

Geldenhuis: South Africa, perhaps to a larger extent than many other countries, is in a conflict situation. I am not talking about conflict within the country. I am talking about South Africa and its place in the East/West conflict and how this manifests itself here. There are forces opposing the South African authorities, in terms of the East/West situation, which it would be most irresponsible to ignore.

I admit that in South Africa, as in virtually any country where there are different language or cultural groups, there is always a potential for friction. But it must not be assumed that the current conflict is all generated internally. There are certain forces trying to exploit the unrest by driving a wedge between the parties.

To answer your question more directly, it is not a matter of making the Defence Force more acceptable. I think that during the past few years there has been a general acceptance of the South African Defence Force by all population groups. For example, there are volunteers from all the population groups in the Defence Force. In fact in the last few years there has been a steady increase in members from population groups other than white. And this has happened at a time when there has been a decrease in white employees in the Department of Defence.

In South West Africa there is certainly more harmony between the Defence Force and the local population than is generally acknowledged. The same holds for South Africa. So it is not a matter of doing something to make the SADF more acceptable to other population groups. It is more a question of identifying who is disturbing this harmony and taking counter

measures. The trick, in a conflict situation, is to manage change. In my opinion anyone who promotes friction is doing the country harm. Of course some people don't intend to cause harm but because of their beliefs and convictions they unknowingly further the causes of people who are trying to exploit the situation. It is official policy that the Defence Force not only protects the borders, the country and its peoples; defends their sovereignty, integrity and self-respect; but is also there to ensure evolutionary, constitutional, legal and lawful change. We do not decide when there is a necessity for change, nor do we identify what changes must be made. We leave that to the politicians. But we think that it is a basic truth that the Defence Force should play a role in protecting this lawful development so that decisions are not forced upon the country by some form of armed aggression from beyond or within our borders.

Murray: You see your presence in the townships as being in defence of peoples' rights?

Geldenhuis: I know there is a general tendency to accuse the Defence Force of protecting its members who are perceived to act against the innocent inhabitants of a village or a house. But that is a very, very one-sided view. I think that, in the majority of cases, the Defence Force acts in a protective role towards civilians.

I also believe that someone who wants to go to school has a right to go to school. Or if someone wants to go to work, he has a right to do so. If he is then intimidated with threats of physical violence he is entitled to protection. Normally, the police provide this protection. But South Africa has always had a relatively small police force so our role should be seen as that of the "champion of the people", allowing them to exercise their rights. I do not think that one should see the Defence Force's support of the police as an act against the local population.

Murray: In his address at the opening of Parliament, the State President said that apartheid was outdated, what does that mean to the Defence Force? How are you going to create a homogeneous army?

Geldenhuis: I think one must look at what has happened in South West Africa because in many ways what is happening in this country has already happened there. This is

not to say we are in the same situation, but there are certain similarities.

Some units of the South West African Defence Force would seem to be ethnically-based, but in others there appears to be racial integration. At face value it may appear that this was politically inspired but in fact it was the result of normal military planning based on military considerations. For instance, an infantry battalion formed in Ovamboland for service and training in that region, would draw its recruits from that area and would probably end up being an all-Ovambo battalion.

Yet the South West African Military Band, which serves the whole country, has members from all over South West Africa. So while the Ovambo battalion has the appearance of being an ethnic unit, the band is fully integrated.

I think that in South Africa, the future shape, size and composition of the Defence Force will, of course, fall within the political framework, and it will always have to develop within the limits of the various laws. But it will also depend on what tasks are foreseen for the Defence Force and how it will be organised to meet those demands.

Murray: Do you foresee a time when officers' messes will be mixed, or when there will be mixed units doing service in the townships?

Geldenhuis: As I have said, we operate within the laws of the country and we do so without any negative feelings. But at certain training institutions it has been the custom, for a number of years, for members of different population groups to use the same mess.

Murray: Is the militant right wing a threat to security?

Geldenhuis: One reads a lot in the media about animosity or even opposition towards the Defence Force. One could get the impression that there is a general upsurge against doing military service, but the statistics tell a different story. I can't deny that there are critics of the Defence Force on the extreme right and the extreme left. Criticism is something that any organisation will monitor, but it has not reached proportions where there is cause for alarm.

Murray: The SADF is seen as being all powerful in southern Africa. If the political situation got out of hand, would a military junta be a feasible alternative?

Geldenhuys: There is a perception that the SADF is starting to play a role over and above the normal role of the military. But this allegation seems to me to be more imagined than real. Of course certain arguments are advanced to support this theory but the military situation must be seen against the changing external and internal environment and the conflict in which we find ourselves. Perhaps the military is more prominent and more topical than 10 years ago because conditions have changed. Angola without 40 000 Cubans is one thing. Angola with 40 000 Cubans is another. Situations such as these tend to create tension and conflict.

It is common knowledge that the SADF has conducted operations in Maputo, Gaborone, and Maseru. But then it is understandable that in a time of conflict the military would appear to be more prominent. Likewise it is perhaps only natural that a government would consult more with the Minister of Defence at such a time than during years of peace.

Many governments institute a war cabinet when their country is at war. That cannot be seen as a military takeover but merely the management mechanism to cope with a particular situation. I think this is the way it should be seen in South Africa. The SADF is very much a Western democratically-styled defence force.

Murray: So allegations that the Defence Force operates unilaterally without due regard for international implications are unfounded?

Geldenhuys: Military decisions requiring political authority cannot be made without political deliberation.

Murray: Given mounting international criticism at SADF cross-border raids, are those raids absolutely necessary and will there be others?

Geldenhuys: Government has a clear-cut political policy, which I think is very sensible, of propagating and fostering good relations with its neighbours. I think the record shows that they take positive steps to create good neighbourliness through such pacts as the Lusaka Agreement. In that instance our record is extremely good. Out of about 160 violations South Africa was responsible for only four, while the Luanda

regime was responsible for the balance.

The Lusaka Agreement created a joint monitoring commission to try and make the agreement work. Likewise, with the Nkomati Accord. The monitoring commission had Mozambican participation, but the committee has been unilaterally suspended by them.

The State President has made repeated offers to create peace-keeping mechanisms, but he has also warned that it is impossible for us to accept further and future terrorist attacks from across our borders, without reconsidering our options.

I wanted to emphasise again the conflict situation in which we find ourselves. Study this academically. Put yourself in the boots of an opponent of South Africa and you would probably say: "What can we do to pre-empt South Africa from operating against terrorists outside its borders?" You would probably answer: "Let's create a climate and a perception that South Africa is destabilising southern Africa because then it will make it more difficult for them diplomatically and politically to perform such operations". So all of a sudden the focus is on our operations across the borders.

But look at the rest of the world. All countries have exercised the same rights when they were in similar positions. It is generally recognised in international law that one has the right to self-defence, as has any individual. I cannot say there will be operations across our borders in future, nor can I say they won't occur. We have only carried out these operations when it was specifically proven that we were operating against terrorists.

Murray: Why are punitive raids carried out against neighbour states when it is common knowledge that ANC directives come from Lusaka?

Geldenhuys: Accepting the principle that in some circumstances it is necessary to operate across the borders, then there are a variety of factors to be considered which vary from place to place and from time to time. The selection of targets is, of course, something I would not like to discuss. Even

accepting the cross-border principle, such operations are taken seriously and I am absolutely convinced that they are always preceded by very considered political deliberations. Those are not decisions one takes very easily.

Examination of this record over the last two years will show that in many cases the decision-makers have also been gentlemanly in this regard. What I mean is that in negotiations with a neighbouring country efforts are obviously made to avoid military actions. That is merely one factor. There are many others but I do not think there is one specific answer.

Murray: How have sanctions affected the technology and weaponry available to the Defence Force?

Geldenhuis: We have all the weapon systems that we require and I cannot

foresee a situation where for domestic defence purposes we will not have the required armaments. In an international dispute, where we are defending Western interests, I would like to have technologically more advanced equipment. However I believe there has been a shift of priorities in defence thinking in the sense that we are now forced by the arms embargo to be more concerned with our domestic situation and do not spend much time on Western interests such as surveillance around the coast.

Murray: Do you believe South Africa will be drawn back into the system of orthodox Western defences?

Geldenhuis: I think the Western countries should be asked that question. Our isolation was imposed upon us by other countries and those countries should be asked if they would consider re-establishing those ties.

We have just been told that our military attachés will have to be withdrawn from some countries because they are no longer welcome. At the moment I cannot see much reconciliation between South Africa and other countries.

Murray: Because the role of the Defence Force has changed in the last 15 years, have you, as a professional soldier, had to play a more political role?

Geldenhuis: I don't think that politics comes into it at all. As I have said, because of the conflict situation and the unstable environment, the Defence Force is more prominent and is discussed more often. Because of this many questions with a slight political bearing are put to me, but the management of the Defence Force is perhaps less politically determined than it has ever been.

Murray: At a time when peoples' emotions are running high, the Defence Force must face problems in controlling members of different political persuasions, and of remaining neutral.

Geldenhuis: You are absolutely right. But by steering a proper, decent and neutral course, the Defence Force is now, and could in future be, a stabilising factor to help the country over this turbulent period. I am not talking academically. I can prove this by taking South West Africa as an example. Consider the similarities: a ruling white party with split opinions, significant political and constitutional change, and friction. More than perhaps any other organisation, the South West African Defence Force assisted in retaining stability in that country. Just as South Africa's Defence Force is made up of citizen force units, commando units, national service members and people from various population and political groups, so was the SWADF. But while there were splits in other spheres, the SWADF remained intact. Which is why I believe it is harmful, even if people do it innocently, to try and make a political issue of the Defence Force. It is to the country's advantage that the Defence Force, incorporating people of different opinions, remains intact.

Murray: Calls to end conscription are increasing, as are those for a volunteer Defence Force. Do you believe a volunteer force is possible given the government's present priorities?

Geldenhuis: The question of conscription, among other things, has been investigated by a commission of inquiry headed by myself. The release of the findings is the prerogative of the Minister of Defence.

Murray: Does the ANC pose a serious threat to the security of South Africa?

Geldenhuis: One must look at that in terms of what threat the ANC poses to the State, and what threat it poses to public safety. I have to admit that they are a threat to public safety. You can't have a car bomb explosion in Pretoria's Church Street and pretend that the ANC is not affecting public safety. You can't have a bomb at Amanzimtoti killing holiday-makers and pretend that it is not a threat to public safety. So, in terms of acts of terrorism, I can't pretend that they are not a threat to the lives of individuals. But I do not think they pose a military threat to the State.

Murray: Are ANC operatives well trained, and do they have the sophisticated abilities often ascribed to them?

Geldenhuis: Because we have few, if any, military clashes I cannot assess their military skills. The police could give an assessment of their sabotage abilities.

On the other hand, they have taken certain cunning defence measures. For instance, by scattering their headquarters in a number of private houses they are more immune from attack. And because they allow women and children to live in these places, an attack on a terrorist base is, from our point of view, a touchy operation. By getting women and children involved, they prepare the scene for later allegations that innocent people have been killed.

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15 April 1986

SOUTH AFRICA

AFRIKANER THEOLOGIAN ON BLACK LIBERATION THEOLOGY

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 21 Mar 86 p 10

[Text]

A LEADING Afrikaner theologian said yesterday that Black liberation theology was, in a sense, the same theology used by the Afrikaans churches in the struggle of the Afrikaner for nationhood.

Prof Pieter de Villiers, director of the C B Powell Bible Centre at the University of South Africa, said, however, that Black and liberation theology in its present context had not deliberated sufficiently on the question of violence and force.

"The Biblical injunction against the use of force, the call to giving service, are in sharp contrast to the political programmes in which force is given a legitimate place," he said.

Prof De Villiers was one of the main speakers at a specialist conference of liberation theology — or the so called Social Gospel — held by his institute at Unisa.

He agreed that the church, because of its exclusive obedience to God, should be critical of the State.

"But on the other hand the church cannot allow itself to be taken in tow by a radical pressure group and be misused for political purposes," said Prof De Villiers.

In the South African context it was the church's duty to bring about reconciliation and an end to suffering.

The Black liberation theology had played a valuable role in highlighting the suffering of people.

"In the rediscovery the message Black liberation theology, in a certain sense, has done nothing more than what the Afrikaans churches did in the past with their involvement in the Afrikaans community."

But while the church should make its influence felt in the political arena, it dare not allow political differences to result in Christians slandering each other or cutting off help to each other.

"Violence creates violence and dehumanises people," he said.

It was in this sphere that earnest dialogue was necessary, particularly in a country in which violence was increasing tragically.

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15 April 1986

AWB STAGES RALLY IN REMOTE RESORT, TERRE BLANCHE PRESIDÈS

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 16 Mar 86 p 21

[Article by Allan Soule]

[Text] **THE** event was meekly billed as a *Boere saamtrek*, but the gathering of the AWB clan at a remote rural resort near Krugersdorp was reminiscent of an earlier and more sinister era.

Booming German martial music, swaggering khaki-clad Brandwag commandos, flag-wielding children, omnipresent Nazi-type triple seven symbols and tightly contained white elitist fervour merged to create an ominous spectacle at Saturday's meeting.

But there was another, far more passive and traditionally Afrikaner, side to the peculiar assembly.

Caravans and tents of AWB members were drawn in a sweeping laager, the lingering smell of braaivleis and the irrepressible bonhomie that is a universal trademark of the simple farming folk, subtly disguised the underlying belligerency of the affair.

The choice of venue by the organisers was not without its own irony.

Remote

The privately owned pleasure resort, whose only sign at the entrance proclaims that the property has been exclusively reserved for whites, lies in a densely bushed depression in the hills about five kilometres north of Krugersdorp.

The place is remote, secure and easily defended — the type of stronghold a Boer commander would have chosen to re-group and rest his fighters.

Uniformed members of the Brandwag stood guard at the gate where they warily screened new arrivals. They

say that at a mere glance they can identify their AWB brothers — strangers are barely tolerated, but as long as they paid their R10 admission fee and agree to keep a low profile they're allowed through.

The day's proceedings were well organised. There was *boeresport* for the young, *boere-orkeste* for the more sedate, and a busy shooting gallery that did a roaring trade.

On a shaded poolside patio the wives and mothers prepared and served the food — all traditional Afrikaner cuisine.

To his followers, former policeman and personal bodyguard of the late Mr John Vorster, Eugene Terre Blanche represents the ultimate leader.

After lunch his sleek luxury car glided into the centre of the laager. Stocky, bearded and neatly dressed in a business suit he cut an impressive figure more suited to the hurly burly of the JSE or the race track than the veld. The dramatic transformation was yet to come.

The city slicker slipped into a nearby tent. Minutes later the last of the great Boer generals strode out and into the midst of his worshipping followers.

Startling

The switch was startling — Terre Blanche, dressed in khaki and wearing a leather slouch hat, had assumed the image and character of an Afrikaner history book hero.

He took immediate control. The man who has in the past been crucified by his critics, shunned by the majority of Afrikanerdom, branded a neo-fascist demagogue and renegade, cast a sweeping gaze over the encampment then called his organisers together for a briefing.

He asked how many people had come. One of his aides whispered the numbers.

In a later interview, AWB secretary Jan Groenewald blamed the poor attendance on "consumer resistance".

After lunch, organisers roamed around the resort rounding up the children. The time had come for Terre Blanche to make his official entrance.

About 50 children clad in bathing suits were handed paper *Vierkleur* flags of the old Transvaal Republic and arranged in two neat rows. They were to form an unlikely guard-of-honour.

Then came the moment of high emotion.

Cheered

Terre Blanche, sitting astride a gleaming charger and carrying the AWB standard, led his executive into the centre of the laager. The grand entrance was stirring stuff.

The children cheered and waved the flags while the men stood at rigid attention. The Press moved in closer amid calls to have them ejected. But there was an immediate call for order and there was no violence.

Thirty minutes later the emotional surge was all over and the children went back to play. Now all that remained to be done was to wait out the rest of the afternoon for the highlight of the day — Terre Blanche's speech.

In his inimitable dogged style, he struck back at the Commissioner of Police, General Johan Coetzee, for refusing to let his AWB followers join the police reservists.

For his faithful flock the fiery monologue of the AWB leader — once described by a clinical psychologist who studied a recording of one of his speeches, as a man with a brilliant mind, authentic, a gifted and powerful speaker — the message was, as always, well worth waiting for.

● Police headquarters in Pretoria has pointed out that Brigadier Ben Oosthuizen did not invite the AWB to join the police reservist force as stated last week.

SOUTH AFRICA

DEPUTY EDUCATION MINISTER ON PROGRESS OF BLACK EDUCATION

Cape Town THE NATIONALIST in English Mar 86 p 7

[Article by Swart Onderwys]

[Text] **THERE should be no doubt in anybody's mind that the educational development of Black people in South Africa is directly related to the future development of the country as a whole. On Friday 31 January 1986, the State President reiterated the Government's commitment to the provision of equal education opportunities for all population groups, and said that the process of reform in education was in full swing.**

On the one hand, we have to satisfy a growing social demand for education and we also have to provide skilled and trained manpower for commerce and industry, whose needs are becoming increasingly more sophisticated.

On the other hand, we have to cope with typically Third World problems of development and growth and of transition from one world to another, from one development stage to another, with their often conflicting and different values and attitudes.

TASK

The magnitude of the task and responsibility is clearly evident from the following facts.

● The total number of Black pupils in Southern Africa has grown from 800 000 (8 % of the Black population) in 1953 to approximately 6,2 million (24 % of the Black population) this year.

● The Black population annually increases by 250 000. It means that approximately 300 large

schools have to built and that at least 8 000 teachers must be trained yearly.

● At present 75 % of all children attending school in Southern Africa are Black and demographers calculate that fully 78 % of the total population will be Black by the year 2020.

INDEPENDENT

It is against this background that the Government's commitment *vis a vis* black education must be evaluated.

It is clearly in everybody's interest that the Black man should currently be receiving the best possible education to enable him to become economically efficient and to make a meaningful contribution towards supporting and expanding the economy.

The role that education has to play in the social and political development of the Black people is not always appreciated. After all, educational development and political maturation and sophistication go hand in hand.

Following on the De Lange Report and the Government's White Paper on educational provision, the goal of equal education has become formally embedded in legislation as the first of the principles laid down for a national educational policy in the Act of 1984 by virtue of which the new central Department of National Education has been established with the responsibility of laying down and monitoring educational norms and standards applicable to the education of *all* population groups.

Since the Government took over the responsibility for Black education in 1954, "elitist" education has given way to mass education. Sufficient numbers of teachers had to be trained, training standards had to be regularly upgraded and schools and classrooms had to be erected at an ever increasing rate. The Department of Education and Training often has to endure severe

criticism because its priorities and achievements are measured against First World criteria and expectations, while it is actually handling a Third World situation with its peculiar problems which simply cannot be eliminated overnight.

Yet we cannot avoid our duty of providing nothing less than the best possible educational opportunities to Black people to enable them to develop fully their personal potential and to participate actively in sustaining and developing the economy.

But it remains essential that we actively deal with the problems and challenges arising from dissimilar historical developments, dissimilar growth rates, numbers, manpower categories, age compositions, language and cultural backgrounds, and so forth. These are developmental phenomena which cannot be eliminated through expenditure alone, but which require time, patience and effort.

There is only one realistic, scientifically valid criterion for evaluating education for Black people: the actual reasonable progress that is being made and the rate at which it is being made.

PROGRESS

The progress made in education for Black people in recent years has been impressive.

● During the decade 1974 to 1984 the total number of Black secondary pupils in the RSA increased dramatically from 147 000 to 753 000, i.e. more than five times, a growth rate that would put tremendous pressures on even the best organised education system.

● Also striking is the growth in the total number of full-time Black standard 10 candidates from a mere

11 000 in 1979 to 91 000 in 1985, i.e. an increase of 727 % in 6 years time.

BUDGET

● In the ten years from 1970 to 1980 the number of senior and matriculation certificates issued to Black pupils increased by 878 % compared to the 37 % increase in the case of White pupils.

● Since the financial year 1978/79, the budget for the Department of Education and Training has increased from R147 million to more than R900 million for the current financial year. This is a concrete example of the Government's commitment to provide equal education opportunities for all population groups.

An aspect which is closely related to the financing of Black education is the much-maligned per capita expenditure figures which, in the case of Black pupils, increased from R84 in 1979/80 to approximately R365 in 1985/86.

Contrary to what many critics seem to believe, per capita expenditure is not a predetermined "formula" which forms the basis for the Department's budget as part of a vicious conspiracy wantonly and deliberately to impede the Black man's progress.

On the contrary, it is the result, or the translation into figures, of a combination of planning, progress and achievement in any given year. In fact, the higher the educational level, the more favourable is the comparative expenditure figures for Black education.

COMPARISON

Even at this stage a comparison between a new school for Black pupils and a new school similar in size for White pupils, both staffed with teachers of equal qualification, will show that the per capita ex-

penditure is virtually the same. Obviously this must be so since the same norms and standards apply to salaries, buildings, books and equipment.

Per capita expenditure and development go hand in hand. The pace of development serves as stimulus for the increase in per capita expenditure, while the opposite is not necessarily true.

● In his book *The World Educational Crisis: A System Analysis*, Philip Coombs says that there are people who believe that "nothing is wrong with education that money won't fix" and points out that "there are, in fact, important constraints besides money which can limit the speed at which an educational system can expand, change and improve - and sometimes these prove even more unyielding than the money factor".

PROJECTS

Increased expenditure on Black education has, however, made it possible to give special attention not only to the elimination of historical and developmental backlogs, but also to the special needs of developing communities.

Some of the numerous special projects and programmes - all of which are aimed at improving the quality of education at the fastest possible rate - are the following:

● *Teacher training.* In addition to the ongoing expansion of pre-service training facilities and various in-service training schemes already in force, a new project, "Operation Alpha", has been launched to increase the competency of teachers (particularly at senior secondary level) and to assist them in improving their academic and professional qualifications.

● *Management training.* A comprehensive programme, the largest of its

kind in the world, was introduced in 1984 to improve the management skills of some 13 600 management personnel.

● A full-scale investigation is being undertaken into the provision of *education for children in rural areas*.

● *Pre-primary education*. In keeping with the Government's White Paper on education provision, a 'bridging period' was introduced for children in the 5 to 6 year age group. This programme is specifically aimed at preparing children for the formal school and to increase their chances of success in a western technological education system.

FACILITIES

● *Career education*. In addition to the establishment of new facilities to augment the existing 19 technical colleges and 31 comprehensive schools, a new approach to career education was announced recently.

● *Use of technology*. The Department of Education and Training is already playing a leading role in the use of video material, computer assisted instruction, and the application of laser technology in conjunction with computers.

● *A Motivation programme* for high school and college students was launched in 1983. Emphasis is placed on the role the student himself must play in determining his success and his future.

REFORM

The Government has pledged itself to the establishment of acceptable political reform. I have understanding for the political aspirations of people. However, when education is used as a political lever, and worse, when this threatens to paralyze education, it becomes time for all thinking people to evaluate the situation because this could lead to educational suicide.

The Department has one basic guideline concerning education and that is: **What is in the best interest of the child?**

In stark contrast innocent and uninformed children – even 6 year olds – are abused for political purposes.

THE KEY

The acceptance of the Government's good intentions is essential for the restoration of order and stability in education. Order in education and stability in the black communities is essential for progress on the road of political reform and the accomplishment of the ideal of equal education for all population groups.

The key to quality education and to a brighter future for every individual in South Africa lies not in destroying but in building; not in confrontation but in co-operation; not in withdrawal but in communication; not in indifference but in commitment.

The historian Wells summarised it aptly when he said: "Human history comes more and more a race between education and catastrophe."

SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

NEW BILL ON HOMELANDS--Legislation permitting the government to hand over control of South African territory to "independent" homelands has dismayed civil rights groups. A bill published last week, the Laws on Development Aid Amendment Bill, provides that any independent or non-independent homeland shall have the power, by agreement with South Africa, to administer land and people in any scheduled black area. The provision, if it goes through, will overturn the Mgwali landmark court order where the Legal Resources Centre established that South Africa had no right to transfer the government of its citizens to another country. According to the Transvaal Rural Action Committee (Trac) this confirms the recent trend in government action on removals. "The new policy is to avoid the physical removal of people where possible, and instead to incorporate these people into bantustans where they are." An example of this form of "removal" was the contentious incorporation of Moutse into KwaNdebele earlier this year. Trac says that the Mgwali judgment had immediate effects for other communities, such as mathopiestad in the Western Transvaal and Wartburg in the Eastern Transvaal, which had managed to stop de facto administration of their areas by homelands. Trac believes that if the bill is enacted other areas which have fought long battles against removals, such as Driefontein and KwaNgema, will be administered by one or other homeland. "The government will no doubt see this as a concession--at least they will have retained their land. However, the communities will never accept homeland government." [Text] [Johannesburg THE WEEKLY MAIL in English 7-13 Mar 86 p 4]/12828

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SOUTH AFRICA

BLACK PRIEST ON CHRISTIAN ROLE IN REFORM STRUGGLE

Cape Town LEADERSHIP SOUTH AFRICA in English Vol 5 No 1, 1986
pp 45, 46, 48, 49

[Article by Buti Tlhagale]

[Text]

The intensity of black anger and "violence" since September 1984 is unparalleled in recent South African history. Yet it has its roots in the turmoil of the 1960s when the African political leaders realised there was little hope that non-violent pressures could bring about radical change in South Africa. Apartheid had always been seen as an inherently violent system, but when the African National Congress openly resorted to violence as a means of bringing about radical political change, a new chapter in black politics began.

What is seen as violence by most whites is also experienced as violence by blacks. But blacks attach a radically different significance to it. It is a protest beyond moral indignation, beyond words. It is a direct assault on apartheid.

What the white community perceives as "unrest", as a sheer display of savagery when persons associated with apartheid are burned to death wearing "the necklace", the burning tyre, the black community interprets as a protest. Indeed the deaths are to be regretted. But what seems to be senseless destruction of life and property, of schools and buses and delivery vehicles – is seen by blacks, especially young people, as an aggressive statement of radical protest, of self-affirmation, a calculated tactic to compel the government to reckon with the frustrated aspirations of the black people.

For years blacks have been referred to as "temporary sojourners" in the urban areas. The psychological impact of forced homelessness, of "exile" – has now taken its toll. The reversal of this process as a result of the Wiehahn and Riekert reports and the subsequent labour legislation of 1979 have not yet had the desired effect. Much less the inane declaration of a dual

citizenship for black people. Denying blacks permanence in the urban areas has resulted in no development or improvement of the townships.

The litany of denials of home ownership, of industry, of business premises, of investment in cultural facilities etcetera coupled with the iniquitous influx control system and the extremely limited availability of housing in urban areas have all created a deep sense of non-belonging. Besides, blacks have also been denied the right of participating meaningfully in the planning and management of their own local affairs. The establishment of the Community Councils was a unilateral decision by government. This explains why some councillors have been driven out of their homes, and why some councils have been dismantled. Community Councils are seen as part and parcel of apartheid.

Government insists that the "unrest" is caused either by black political organisations (hence the treason trials in Pretoria and Pietermaritzburg) and/or by the "criminal elements" in the black community. The Congress of South African Students has been banned presumably because it is thought to be responsible for the upheavals. To blame individuals or groups of people for a situation of intense political "unrest" ignores the discontent of the people.

To blame hooligans or the ANC for the unrest is refusing to acknowledge that apartheid is the source of the problem. Instead of taking up arms like the South African Defence Force or like black political organisations that have been forced into exile, the present generation is using boycotts, work stoppages, work stay-aways, school disruptions, protests, the destruction of selected targets, the merciless killings of "collaber-

ators" in an irrevocable commitment to bursting the chains of apartheid. The state has been thrown headlong into the turmoil.

Blacks do not want violence any more than whites, but this mode of resistance is highly visible. It demands immediate attention. It confuses the government, destabilises the country and solicits support from the international community. The violent upheaval therefore, far from being an accidental happening or an expression of hostility is calculated to precipitate an abrupt end to racism and political domination.

Christian discussions on violence have simply dismissed as "terrorism" and therefore immoral the violent struggle of the oppressed people against white domination and against the ruthlessness of capitalism.

Christianity has tended to uphold "non-violence" as a universal principle or strategy to stir the opponent's conscience and bring about a reconciliation.

In South Africa the black experience denies this. For almost a century the inherently violent apartheid system has simply entrenched itself with all the viciousness imaginable. There are no signs of reconciliation on the horizon.

There is of course another option as argued by Pope John Paul II in his 1982 Day of Peace message: "Christians have a right and even a duty to protect their existence and freedom by proportionate means against an unjust aggressor."

Most blacks see the National Party as having no moral legitimacy to leadership and government. They have not been elected by blacks but simply imposed themselves on the people and denied them basic human rights.

The Christian tradition recognises the legitimacy of violence to defend the rights of a state.

From a township perspective the South African state is essentially a repressive state. For example, the army occupies a foreign territory, Namibia, and conducts incursions into Angola, or "pre-emptive strikes" into Lesotho, Mozambique and Botswana – leaving in its wake death and destruction. In the townships, where it is currently deployed under the state of emergency it has succeeded not only in destroying life but also in alienating the black community.

The "political police" are credited with harassment and torture, and detainees have died in prisons. (Explanations for these deaths are taken by township people with a grain of salt.) The courts mete out punishment to those who flout the apartheid laws. The different administration departments enforce apartheid either in education or in the massive forced removals. In addition, blacks are excluded from the electoral system, precluded from any access to political power and from meaningful participation in the economy.

Thus to blacks the state has no legitimacy. Can a state without any power base or even sympathy from the majority of the people have a moral right to rule over the majority or even have a moral right to use violence to preserve an intrinsically violent political system?

When blacks resort to violent means to redress the wrongs of apartheid it is perceived not only as a right to resist but also as a duty to resist the crushing repression of the racist regime.

A Vatican document states: "All those who enter the military service in loyalty to their country shall look upon themselves as the custodians of the security and freedom of their fellow countrymen; and when they carry out their duty properly, they are contributing to the maintenance of peace."

Some Christian traditions approve of investment in an army that serves not only as a deterrence but can also resort to protecting the freedom of the country's citizens.

In South Africa this can only apply in its fullness to whites. Blacks have not been recruited into the army in large numbers presumably because they are not "real" citizens of South Africa and therefore have no stake in the country.

And the freedom to be safeguarded is the freedom of whites. Blacks have not experienced the meaning of freedom in South Africa. They are denied the freedom of movement, of association, of choosing their own place of residence.

The soldiers are therefore "the custodians of the security and freedom" of the white people. In the state of emergency, they have not contributed to the "maintenance of peace", their callous behaviour has indeed strained race relations. To township people there is no difference between the security police and the army. Their ruthless killing of black South Africans and innocent people in neighbouring states simply puts the army in the camp of the enemy.

A significant number of young whites resist conscription. They see it as morally wrong especially because they know that they are likely to be sent into the black townships where they may have to shoot black people, fellow citizens, not so much for the maintenance of "law and order" but rather for an ideology, for a forced segregation of races, for a status quo that seeks to retain political and economic power in white hands.

The church, through the appointment of military chaplains is seen to give direct moral support and therefore approval to the army. The army is the "killing machine" of the state. The enemies of the state are those blacks who resist apartheid and who fight the illegal presence of South Africa in Namibia.

An option for the poor even though it is undoubtedly a "spiritual paternalism", would mean a withdrawal from any direct or indirect involvement with the army

which is clearly partisan in South Africa. Accusations levelled against the army range from harassment of innocents, searching the houses of black people, cases of rape, of beating and even shooting people while they run away. The official response is that only about one per cent of the force is involved in these "aberrations". Such accusations cannot be so dismissed.

A church that gives moral and spiritual support to such an army cannot remain untainted: it necessarily finds itself in an ambivalent situation because both the soldiers and the people they kill belong to the same church.

The army is seen by blacks as fighting for the maintenance of white domination, while blacks see themselves as fighting for the right to be free in their own country. A choice has to be made. Racial factors play a decisive role concerning loyalties to specific racial groupings or class fractions. At times the gospel imperatives play a secondary role. The South African situation can easily be said to be a case in point.

While black people are convinced they have a right to reclaim their fatherland and uphold their dignity and freedom, they do not have the lethal instruments of war which would enable them to protect themselves. As a subjugated people only stones and the ability to destroy and render the country "ungovernable" remain the immediate instruments of self-assertion. The strategy of ungovernability can be dangerous and costly. But this is the price blacks will have to pay.

The church holds incompatible and contradictory positions. On the one hand it gives its blessing to the South African military service by allowing its personnel to give spiritual support to the Christian white soldiers and on the other hand preaches restraint to the black oppressed masses. It participates indirectly in the military might of the state while criticising the state's acts of repression.

The nagging question that still needs to be answered is whether a violent struggle by black South Africans can ever be justifiable or indeed whether the violent repression by the apartheid regime is justifiable? Cast in the mould of the classical tradition of the just violent struggle, the township perspective yields the following argument.

The semblance of order and peaceful co-existence has been shattered by the spiral of a violent struggle that has engulfed the black townships. The demand of the black people especially the youth, is the abolition of the present political order and the establishment of a non-racial democratic political system on the basis of one-man one-vote.

Also the present exploitative capitalist system ought

to give way to a more equitable socialist system that will develop economic programmes to amend those areas where apartheid has simply played havoc and left human misery.

There is no solution in sight to the present political conflict as the government stubbornly clings to its racist policies of denying blacks a meaningful citizenship, of up-holding the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act, of refusing the release of political prisoners etc. Instead the government has responded to the black violent struggle with the might of the army and the security forces.

There is a rapidly growing belief that violence is virtually the only answer left in the face of government intransigence. The violence of blacks is in response to the violence of apartheid that has kept blacks in humiliating subjugation. The costs in terms of human suffering and even death, are incalculable. So desperate have large sections of the black community become that the present system can no longer continue without disruption. Whereas the older generation can tolerate injustice and pain, not so the young people. If apartheid has to continue it will seemingly have to be over their dead bodies.

The present violence is understood as an act of self-defence against a system and a people that practices oppression and exploitation. It is hoped that through violence justice will eventually be established.

There was a time when it was thought a disinterested international authority would intervene in situations of gross injustice. But the United Nations has failed dismally to persuade South Africa to move out of Namibia, nor has it succeeded in persuading the Pretoria regime to abandon its racist ways and treat blacks as equal citizens. South Africa does not recognise the UN as a disinterested party simply because the UN condemns in unequivocal terms the intrinsically evil apartheid system. White South Africa has become a law unto itself.

The major western powers, the US, Britain, and West Germany, connive with the evils of apartheid and fail to bring any measure of meaningful pressure to bear on South Africa. America's constructive engagement policy is a classic example of connivance. This leads to the belief that these powers have vested interests in this country despite the denials. The refusal to apply meaningful sanctions, claiming that blacks would suffer, is a refusal to help in the dismantling of apartheid. Against the background of the powerlessness of the United Nations and the connivance of the major western powers, black South Africans are left to their own limited resources to abolish the unjust political order. And so the violent struggle proceeds apace despite the declaration of the state of emergency.

The complexity of the South African situation defies the neatly worked out moral principles of classical Christian tradition. The assumption is that violent struggles are waged by one state against another. The classical tradition does not envisage an unjust aggressor emerging from within the boundaries of a single state.

Historically though, white South Africa could be viewed as an unjust aggressor because the indigenous black people never formed a single nation with the European settlers.

In a situation of oppression, recognised leaders of the oppressed masses are the legitimate authority to lead the masses in revolt against the perpetrators of injustice. To prevent this, the government bans or imprisons the credible leadership. Consequently the banning of the ANC and the Pan African Movement in the early sixties, then the banning of the Black Consciousness organisations, the Christian Institute and a host of other bodies in 1977 prevents black leadership from communicating with government.

If the present violent struggle does not seem to have any distinct leadership, it is because the leadership is not allowed to survive for long in public without running the risk of imprisonment. Nonetheless while violence continues, spokesmen on behalf of the oppressed masses articulate their aspirations and spell out the conditions that would need to be fulfilled if the true foundations of peace were to be made at all.

Positions expressed are generally in line with what the imprisoned leaders would themselves put forward. The conditions laid down by Bishop Tutu or the churches and other anti-apartheid organisations reflect the aspirations of the masses. If the present violent struggle appears to be leaderless and failing to satisfy the moral principles of the classical tradition, it is simply because the traditional forms of leadership are interfered with by government but do not lose their identity and competence.

The apartheid machine has forcibly relocated more than 500 000 people in an attempt to streamline the apartheid policy. Thousands have been charged with "pass" law offences. Thousands of blacks are in exile. The influx control system has destroyed family life for those denied freedom of movement and prevented them from selling their labour in lucrative markets. Imprisonment, torture and death in detention because of skin colour still continues. The list of the crimes of the apartheid system is endless. That is why this political system is considered to be the most vicious since Nazism.

The violence conducted by the ANC in blowing up installations or government buildings can hardly be compared to the human suffering caused by apartheid. Lives have indeed been lost in the process. But the

South African Defence Force has been swift to retaliate, destroying more lives, destabilising the neighbouring countries and holding them to ransom.

Since September 1984 the violent struggle has claimed more than 950 lives. More than 500 of these have been reportedly shot by the security forces while protecting lives and property. The loss of lives would undoubtedly have been much lower if the troops were kept out of the townships. While any loss of life and property is to be regretted, there is hardly any comparison between the damages caused by the repressive apartheid system and the damages being incurred in the present political upheaval. Today's violence may ebb, but the conviction that violence is the last resort, has taken root. This conviction has come to manifest itself in the following way.

The current cycle of political upheaval is simply an intense arresting moment in the process of resistance since the ANC appeared in 1912. This violent struggle has been and continues to be a costly sacrifice in lives and possessions. But its outcome, hardly measurable in terms of immediate gains, has altered the course of history for the oppressive classes and the masses of oppressed people. While it appears to have had only a ripple effect on apartheid itself it has produced a serious crack in the granite edifice of apartheid.

The government has responded to both internal and external pressure. It has extended citizenship to all black people – without political rights. There is a possibility of creating a "fourth chamber" for blacks in Parliament. There is also a promise about relaxing the much-hated influx control system. So far there are only promises. But even so the government can no longer go back on its word.

It has been said that "reforms" predate the events of September 1984. For example, the labour legislation was changed in 1979. But this change is partly the result of the 1976 upheavals. The inescapable conclusion is that limited violence, costly though it might have been, has undoubtedly attracted the attention of the world community and the local conservative business community. Pressure has been exerted on government. Shifts in the apartheid policy have been made and there is no going back.

From a township perspective the logic does seem to support a just violent struggle as a last resort at a rational level. The gospel imperatives on the other hand seem to challenge the moral principles of a just violent struggle.

- ☐ "You have heard that it was said, 'An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth'. But now I tell you: Do not take revenge on someone who wrongs you." (Mt 5:38-39)

- ☐ "Father forgive them . . ." (Lk 23:24)
- ☐ "Love your enemies and pray for your persecutors." (Mt 5:44)
- ☐ "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." (Mt 5:9)

These citations and the entire Sermon on the Mount do not make sense in the face of continuing repression and the barbarous behaviour of the servants of the state but also tend to cultivate fatalistic attitudes among the oppressed.

However, for more than two centuries large sections of the white Christian community have treated blacks as "kaffirs" and as servants. Christians have been commanded in the gospels to "love one another just as I love you". In a South Africa where the Group Areas Act, the Separate Amenities Act, the Population Registration Act, and concepts of "own affairs" and ethnic identity reign supreme, trust, and friendship remain foreign and indeed inimical to the official policy of the repressive state.

The entire black history throughout the centuries is an experience of the wilderness. Thus South Africa under white domination continues to be an unending test by fire for no "apparent reason" while the wicked racists and capitalists thrive and continue to deal treacherously.

So shattering is the experience of oppression, deprivation and humiliation that the experience of godlessness among sections of the black population is here to stay. And so too the growing convictions of atheism and communism that nurture on the devastating scourge of apartheid Christianity.

This form of Christianity sees God at the service of *some* men, not *all* men. The belief held by the universal church, that all men are created in the likeness of God and the implications of such a belief are completely shut out by the apartheid system of racial segregation and the myth of racial superiority.

Such beliefs and perceptions, rightly or wrongly, propel sections of the black people headlong against the wall. Opting for violence as a strategy to end apartheid therefore derives from a complex set of intermeshing factors, namely: the legacy of pain and bitterness, of repression and alienation, of empty promises of radical political reform and the simple continuation of racism, of clinging to the tenets of Christian faith and yet denying them in practice, of the ever-increasing cost of living, and growing unemployment – all these factors coalesce and create a desperate situation that cries to heaven for justice.

Such a desperate situation, far from crushing the burning desire to be free, has unleashed new energies especially among the young black people who have

sprung forward to resist injustice. Hundreds of young people have experienced detention without trial. Some of the young people have laid down their lives for the sake of justice – as did Christ.

The desire for freedom has been rekindled, hence the relentless effort to subvert the inherently violent socio-political order. That the gospel or the life-history of Christ makes no room for the use of violence to right the wrongs of society remains a massive scandal among the oppressed. And yet the story of this Christ is a story of a series of subversions. He was continually in conflict with the socio-religious and political order of his day.

The desire to be free and the intensive assault on the apartheid institutions is not incompatible with the tradition of subversion modelled on Christ. In fact Christian discipleship demands the subversion of the oppressive socio-political order to establish justice and consequently peace.

Unless genuine radical socio-political change comes about violence is bound to break out intermittently. Meaningful participation in politics and the economy is imperative.

If violence is to be avoided and peace to be established then apartheid must be uprooted completely. Nothing less than the fulfilment of this simple demand will do. If that change takes place then South Africa can begin to talk about "the things that make for peace".

SOUTH AFRICA

COSATU PRESIDENT ON POLICIES, ASPIRATIONS OF UNION

Cape Town LEADERSHIP SOUTH AFRICA in English Vol 5 No 1, 1986 pp 81-82

[Interview with COSATU President Elijah Barayi by Philip van Niekerk; date and place not given]

[Text]

In December 1, 1985 the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) was launched in Durban. The birth of Cosatu was by no means spontaneous but the result of negotiations dating back to 1979. Even then some of the principles on which the federation was founded, such as the inclusion of multi-racial unions, meant that it was unacceptable to a number of unions.

Cosatu, however, does represent a large number of organised people (possibly between 380 000 and 500 000 from 34 affiliated unions) and it is likely that some two million would heed their call.

President of Cosatu is 53-year-old Elijah Barayi, a personnel assistant at Rand Mine's Blyvooruitzicht gold mine near Carletonville in the Western Transvaal. He has worked on the mines for 25 years.

Born in Cradock in the eastern Cape, Barayi was politically involved with the African National Congress Youth League and participated in the Defiance Campaign during the fifties.

He was elected vice-president of the National Union of Mineworkers shortly after its formation in 1982. Barayi, a noted orator, spoke to journalist Philip van Niekerk for Leadership, on assignment.

Van Niekerk: You were involved with the ANC Youth League in the forties. How did that time shape your political views?

Barayi: The Youth League influenced my political awareness by showing me that blacks were not being treated as human beings. I vowed to myself that when I grew up I would go on fighting for the rights of

the black man for my whole life. That is how I became involved in the Defiance Campaign during the 1950s. It was an exciting time to be involved in politics.

Van Niekerk: How did you get involved in the labour movement?

Barayi: After my experiences with the ANC in the forties and fifties and my vow to fight for the lot of black people I was very pleased when the National Union of Mineworkers was formed because it offered a chance for me to stand up and show my experience. I was very active as the first vice president.

Van Niekerk: Do you think your relatively few years in the NUM has prepared you for the testing role of president of Cosatu?

Barayi: Because of my political experience I have been the backbone of the NUM and consequently it was felt that I should be their candidate for president of Cosatu. They believed I should be a great benefit to the Congress. It is a testing job and I am still learning the ropes, but I have been ably supported by my executive.

Van Niekerk: At its inaugural conference Cosatu made it clear that it would play a leading role in politics. How do you plan to do this in the months ahead?

Barayi: The actual policy decision will have to come from the Central Committee. But you might have realised from the speeches at the launch in Durban that Cosatu will not just fold its hands. It's going to involve itself in the communities and link up with all progressive political organisations in the country. Cosatu is a federation solely for workers but at the same time what is happening in the locations affects us all as workers. That is why we said we would surely involve ourselves in all that is happening in the communities and the locations. Cosatu is part and parcel of the liberation struggle.

Van Niekerk: Do you see a difference between so-called worker issues and broader political issues? If so, which is more important?

Barayi: I think Cosatu was formed to concentrate on the broader political issues. Of course, I do believe this should start with the workers on the factory floor. Cosatu should not neglect issues such as wages or working conditions, because that is where our strength comes from. But Cosatu is going to involve itself politically in the struggle.

Van Niekerk: At the launching rally, you said that if the government did not scrap the pass laws after six months, you would start a pass burning campaign. Do you intend to carry this out?

Barayi: What I meant was that if the government does not abolish passes in the country Cosatu will have to mobilise every person against them. We shall have to take action because we are sick and tired of these laws. They have gone on for long enough. We will go ahead with the campaign unless the government meets our demands and issues the same identity documents to black people as people of all other races must carry. If the government remains adamant that black people must carry passes, we shall have no alternative but to burn those passes.

Van Niekerk: How do you see your relationship with other political groups on the left such as the United Democratic Front? Does your presence not mean that they are now redundant?

Barayi: Not at all. We are specifically an organisation of workers. We have member unions who are affiliated to the United Democratic Front, and who are quite free to do so. Cosatu would not like to dictate terms to other political organisations. We would like to link up with those who share our aims for specific campaigns. I don't think that Cosatu as a whole will join the UDF or any other political organisation. Our one desire though is for all unions to affiliate to Cosatu.

Van Niekerk: Two major black union federations have still not joined Cosatu – the Council of Unions of South Africa (Cusa) and the Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions (Azactu). Do you still plan to forge an alliance with them or are your differences, over issues such as non-racialism, irreconcilable?

Barayi: Cosatu is by far the biggest federation in the country. We have half-a-million members in our affiliated unions and the support of many more. I would be very pleased if Cusa and Azactu could ultimately join forces with Cosatu. I've said on several occasions that I'm prepared to sit down with Cusa and Azactu and sort out our differences, if there are any. I believe we should have one federation in the country, namely, Cosatu.

Van Niekerk: Your General Secretary, Jay Naidoo, has already visited Harare where he met with the ANC. What is Cosatu's policy with regard to the ANC?

Barayi: I would not like to comment on that.

Van Niekerk: Chief Buthelezi has strongly criticised Cosatu, and claimed it is a front for the ANC. What do you say to this allegation and why do you think he has displayed this hostility towards your organisation?

Barayi: It is a pity that Chief Buthelezi has accused us of being a front for the ANC and in reply we say he is a front for the Afrikaner Government. He is making accusations against Cosatu because he's scared. He thinks he's supposed to be the only person who can speak on behalf of

the millions of black people in this country. We in Cosatu say: No, you are wrong Chief Buthelezi. You were not democratically elected by the majority of people in this country. He was elected by that certain clique in Kwazulu called the Zulus. So he's a self-imposed leader as far as the majority of blacks in this country are concerned.

Van Niekerk: The recent sacking of 23 000 workers by Gencor at the Impala Platinum Mine has drawn attention to labour legislation in the homelands, where workers have fewer rights than in South Africa. At your inaugural conference you said you would organise in the homelands regardless of hostile legislation. Do you intend to persist with this approach even given the difficulties?

Barayi: It is true that we would definitely try to mobilise all the black people in the homelands. We are aware that the homeland leaders are scared of the unions. Chief Lucas Mangope has openly stated that he does not want to see trade unions operating in Bophuthatswana. Gencor took advantage of this and is hiding behind the law in the homeland, but Cosatu has resolved to take action to counter them.

Van Niekerk: What action?

Barayi: We have compiled a list of all companies which fall under Gencor. What we're going to do is go right through South Africa and mobilise the workers in each group. We are prepared to see strikes taking place in such businesses as Sappi to put pressure on Gencor. That is the kind of strategy we will employ. It will be Cosatu's first major action.

Van Niekerk: Both Cosatu and the National Union of Mineworkers have taken a strong line on disinvestment and economic sanctions. What exactly is your position on this key issue?

Barayi: This is a sore point. The western countries say they are prepared to embark on constructive engagement with the South African government. The question arises: Are they prepared to engage themselves constructively with the majority of the population or with the minority government? In addition, I do not think places such as Great Britain or America which are more than 6 000 miles

away should liberate the black people of South Africa. We, the black people of this country, shall liberate ourselves.

Van Niekerk: What of the argument that sanctions will hurt black workers the most as they will lose their jobs when companies pull out?

Barayi: I don't think it is true to say that when sanctions are applied to this country it is the black people who will be hurt. Blacks have been suffering since the arrival of the Boers in this country as far back as 1652. We have massive and growing unemployment in this country yet investment is still coming in. Where does that money go to? Why should we have unemployment like this and be told we would suffer more if sanctions were applied. We are suffering right now whilst sanctions are not applied. The black man has been suffering for more than 300 years.

Van Niekerk: Do you believe that the multinational companies with their codes and labour practices are better for workers in South Africa than local companies?

Barayi: I partly agree, but this improvement happened only recently because of pressure from blacks. They just wanted to be seen to be helping the black people, but in real terms they are helping the South African Government. It's a matter of them saying: Let us console the workers by doing this or that, which amounts to very little. I don't think they're honest, for instance there's no difference in what they pay their employees. When these companies come to South Africa, we are told in no uncertain terms they are going to pay at their rate . . . no more, no less.

Van Niekerk: Do you not see a difference in approach to labour relations among the different mining houses?

Barayi: There is a big difference. In fact, I wouldn't be surprised if Gencor and Gold Fields break away from the Chamber of Mines because they don't want to follow the other groups such as Anglo American, JCI and Rand Mines. I don't say the other groups are good in implementing labour relations but I would say we are dealing with two different forces on the mines.

Van Niekerk: At the inaugural conference you said that a Cosatu government would nationalise the mines. Is that your personal view?

Barayi: That is correct. Black people are the ones digging gold and in return they are paid peanuts. Once we nationalise the whole industry, our belief is that everyone will reap the fruits of his sweat and toil, rather than a few individuals getting it all for themselves from the sweat and toil of a black person.

Van Niekerk: Would you describe Cosatu as a socialist organisation?

Barayi: Yes, I believe Cosatu is a socialist organisation and I would like to see a socialist state in South Africa. I speak of socialism as practised by the Labour Party in England. This country is in a crisis because of capitalism, if we at least nationalised the big firms, then the government could look after its people and the people could look after the government.

Van Niekerk: What sort of state would be your ideal for South Africa?

Barayi: If you read Cosatu's preamble it contains five principles. One of them is non-racialism. I would be pleased to see South Africa run by white, green, black, yellow, it makes no difference. That is, I would be pleased to see blacks involved in the administration of the country. I favour a multi-party democracy. I don't want a one-party state. I believe that is dictatorship of the worst kind.

Van Niekerk: How long can the South African government last?

Barayi: It's a difficult question, but I believe in three to four years the South African government is going to collapse. The majority of whites seem to be sick and tired of the National Party and some are beginning to say: "Please sit down with the black people and negotiate". This is why I say three to four, maybe five years before the government collapses.

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CSO: 3400/1406

SOUTH AFRICA

ANC COMMENTARY ON AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS

EA201157 Addis Ababa Radio Freedom in English to South Africa 1930 GMT 19 Mar 86

[Commentary entitled: "Workers of South Africa Unite"]

[Text] Compatriots, early this month a meeting was held in the Zambian capital, Lusaka, between the leadership of our vanguard movement, the ANC, led by the president, Comrade Oliver Tambo, and delegations of the trade union movements of our country COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions] and SACTU [South African Congress of Trade Unions], both led by their respective general secretaries. Undoubtedly, this was a meeting of historic significance, particularly because it was the first of its kind which brought together the leaders of the vanguard movements strengthening the struggle for national liberation in our country and those of the main trade union organizations in our country.

According to the joint communique that emerged from the meeting, the gathering resulted from the common concern of all parties arising from the fundamental and deep-seated economic, social and political crisis into which the Botha regime and the apartheid system of national oppression and class exploitation have plunged our country and their recognition and understanding that the Pretoria regime and the ruling class of South Africa on its own are powerless to provide any real and meaningful solutions to the general crisis, and, therefore, that real change and lasting solutions to the deepening crisis facing our country can only emerge from the national liberation movements, headed by the ANC, and the entire democratic process of our country, of which COSATU and SACTU are an integral part.

It was seen as important also that the two trade union organizations recognize that the fundamental problem facing our country is not only economic and that they should not only concentrate their efforts on the economic front, but the main problem is the question of political power which cannot be resolved without the full participation of the ANC, the genuine representative and overall leader of the majority of our people.

Equally important is the recognition that the emergence of COSATU is an historic event in the process of uniting our working class which will add immeasurable strength to the democratic movement as a whole. The three parties agreed that the solutions to the problems facing our country lie not only in

the establishment of a system of majority rule in a united, democratic and nonracial South Africa, but, furthermore, that in the specific conditions of our country it is inconceivable that such a system can be separated from economic emancipation.

It is clear, therefore, compatriots, from the communique that emerged from that historic meeting that there was indeed a unity in purpose between the leadership of our freedom movements, the purpose of doing away with the evil system of racial oppression, apartheid and class exploitation in our country for the building of a nonracial democratic society free of race and class exploitation and oppression.

It is also particularly important that they all realize that the strengthening of the unity of our working people is a fundamental prerequisite for the achievement of this goal. For this reason, their communique has stressed that the widest possible unity of trade unions in our country is of utmost importance in our people's struggle against the apartheid regime and the bosses. Hence, both COSATU and SACTU agreed that they saw no contradiction whatsoever arising from their separate (?origins).

In this connection, countrymen, it should become a matter of particular concern for every genuine patriot of our motherland, every worker who is genuinely determined to do away with the criminal system of apartheid which is the mainstay of race oppression and exploitation in our country, that at this very moment there are attempts by other quarters to establish another counter trade union organization to stand opposed, not against the apartheid system, not against the Botha regime, not against the exploiting forces, but against the giant democratic and progressive trade union federation, COSATU, in our country.

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CSO: 3400/1385

SOUTH AFRICA

BLACK ATTITUDES TOWARD WORK SURVEYED

MB191944 Johannesburg SAPA in English 1840 GMT 19 Mar 86

[Text] Johannesburg, 19 Mar (SAPA)--Blacks wanted greater participation in decisions which concerned their jobs and 74 percent of adult urban blacks agreed that workers should be involved or consulted in such decision-making, according to the findings of a survey.

The survey--by the Johannesburg-based Market Research Africa--found that support for worker and management joint decision-making increased with education and household income.

It found that 77 percent of those with matric, compared with 61 percent of those with no schooling, were strongly in favour of the idea, while 78 percent of those in households with incomes that exceeded R800 a month--as against 71 percent of those in households with monthly incomes below R300, agreed with the idea.

The findings are based on a representative sample of 1,500 black adults in cities, towns and villages in South Africa. The survey was conducted during the last quarter of last year.

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SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

BOPHUTHATSWANA TO FORFEIT LOANS--MMABATHO--The Botphuthatswana government would forfeit some of the R140-million in drought loans made to the agricultural industry, the Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Mr P H Moeketsi, said at the weekend. Addressing the bophuthatswana Farmers' Union Congress, Mr Moeketsi said drought had cost the government R140-million in loans to the Agricultural Bank, farmers and agricultural co-operatives. The government, he said, had decided to forfeit some of the money. President L M Mangope urged the hundreds of farmers gathered at the convention in Mmabatho to join the farmers' union. He reminded the farmers agriculture required dedication, determination and knowledge. According to the marketing board production of agricultural products did not meet the population's requirements last year. Production, expected to improve this year, will still not meet requirements. Bophuthatswana needs about 56000 tons of maize annually. The amount produced last year was 6000 tons. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 17 Mar 86 p 15] /12828

NEW YOUTH MOVEMENT--The Lowveld and outlying townships in the Eastern Transvaal have formed a new youth organisation--Lowveld Youth Movement (Loyomo). Their aims are to form sound youth-parent relationships and to affiliate to the United Democratic Front. The new organisation has already established branches in areas like KaBhokweni (White River), KaNyamazane (Nelspruit), Maviljane (Bushbuckridge), Emjindini (Barberton), Emgwenya (Waterval Boven), which are co-ordinating youth programmes there. Plans are afoot to stretch the organisation to areas not yet catered for in the present structure. These will include KaNgwane and outlying areas. "Our organisation is mainly working towards a non-racial, united, democratic South Africa." [Text] [Johannesburg THE NEW NATION in English 13-25 Mar 86 p 5]/12828

CSO: 3400/1401

HELEN SUZMAN DISCUSSES RECENT EVENTS IN PFP

Cape Town LEADERSHIP SOUTH AFRICA in English Vol 5 No 1, 1986 pp 34, 38-41

[Interview with PFP's Helen Suzman, by Hugh Murray; date and place not given]

[Text] *Mrs Helen Suzman is – next to the State President and Nelson Mandela – probably the South African politician best known overseas. Formerly a United Party Member of Parliament, who became the lone representative of the Progressive Party in the House of Assembly in 1961, Mrs Suzman has been an MP for 33 years. Other than Field Marshal Jan Smuts, she has probably been awarded more foreign honours than any South African this century.*

Murray: The resignations of Dr Van Zyl Slabbert and Dr Alex Boraine have been heralded with anger and bitterness by some whites and with applause from some black quarters. Have they caused a reassessment of the PFP's position in Parliament?

Suzman: Obviously the resignation of two senior members, one the leader, the other the chairman of the federal executive, is a body blow to the party, but it is not a knock-out. The party is holding firm, the caucus, particularly, has regrouped into a solid phalanx.

We will carry on. We've been elected to do a job and we must go ahead and do that job. The PFP were elected by about a quarter of a million people during the last election and I think it a scandalous suggestion that those people should have no representatives in Parliament.

It would be fatal to leave the parliamentary opposition to the right wing Conservative Party. If that were to happen

the government would be halted, even in the tottering steps it is taking towards change. The CP would loudly and articulately prevent the government moving in any measure from the old Verwoerdian apartheid ideology.

We, the PFP, have got to push the government in the direction of civilised values and Western thinking. The alternative, I believe, is an escalation of violence inside the country and a greater momentum to the punitive campaign for sanctions and disinvestment from outside South Africa.

Murray: Are you committed to remaining in Parliament?

Suzman: I will remain in Parliament.

Murray: Despite the frustrations?

Suzman: I've been here such a long time I've become pretty inured to the frustrations.

Murray: And despite the PFP's disapproval of the present Parliamentary structure?

Suzman: As we showed during the referendum the PFP strongly disapproves of the new system because it has fundamental flaws, because it is based on apartheid and excludes blacks. But we decided, largely on Dr Van Zyl Slabbert's advice, that we would engage the system and go into the tri-cameral Parliament.

I want to say quite categorically that I believe Parliament has an important role to play, that it is an unique institution where

the government can be held to account for its actions, for its sins. Dr Van Zyl Slabbert recognised this when he tried to get Parliament reconvened during the last recess to tackle the government over the state of emergency and the manner in which the police and government were behaving.

Through questions in Parliament an enormous amount of information can be gathered about the government's activities and through this system alternative policies can be put to the electorate.

It is the only institution that can change the laws that need to be repealed and it is the institution which will ultimately give franchise rights to blacks.

Murray: Had you prior knowledge of Dr Van Zyl Slabbert's resignation?

Suzman: I knew that Dr Slabbert was very unhappy in Parliament and I knew that he was thinking of leaving at the end of this session. I tried hard to dissuade him from that view and suggested he wait until the session was over before he made up his mind. But I learnt only in the morning that he was going that afternoon.

Murray: Did other senior party members know?

Suzman: Some knew, some didn't. There hadn't been any caucus discussion; we certainly weren't given the opportunity to put our point of view.

Murray: Do you not think extra-parliamentary pressures have been responsible for some of the changes we've seen recently?

Suzman: I do accept the importance of extra-parliamentary pressures. Together with the economic pressures inside the country they have been responsible for some of the changes. Here I'm thinking about the trade union organisations, but then we pushed for them inside Parliament as well.

I believe the two must go together, but I don't believe that in a country as authoritarian as this that street protests and mass meetings are the vehicle through which change will come.

The growing economic muscle which blacks are acquiring, and which they demonstrated during the consumer boycott in Port Elizabeth, will help to accelerate change. Imagine when blacks are in the

majority as skilled workers, when the trade unions are organised with a power base and proper strike funds to back up their demands . . . Then, together with pressures inside Parliament from the representatives of white South Africa who

are against apartheid, I hope the necessary changes will occur.

Murray: South Africa has begun its second year with a tri-cameral parliamentary system. How is it working?

Suzman: From a technical point of view it's effective due to the real diligence and dedication of the staff at parliament. They have a difficult time, especially as they lost the Deputy Secretary of Parliament and one of his assistants. Those two were highly experienced officers who really would have been invaluable in training staff to look after the other two houses and ensure the Hansards are produced.

Despite that, I think the staff have managed very well but that is not to say I think the tri-cameral system is correct. I think the system is a disaster because it has divided communities on ethnic and racial grounds, and polarised the situation between whites and blacks by excluding 72 per cent of the country's population. To my mind it is incredible that anybody could have thought this was a feasible proposition.

Murray: The State President in his address to Parliament proposed a National Statutory Council where "black leaders can now have a voice in central government". Do you think the council will be effective?

Suzman: I don't think the council has a chance unless the accepted black leaders are allowed to participate. Here, I'm talking about Mandela, and all the others banned, in exile or detention. They must be released and the ANC unbanned if we are to create a climate for negotiation.

As for the rest of the reform measures he mentioned, I am heartened by the tone but I would like to see the relevant laws struck off the statute books. I am depressed, however, that the foundation stones of apartheid, such as the Group Areas Act and the Land Act, have remained untouched.

Murray: There has been a call from the NRP to the State President to include at least two homeland leaders in his Cabinet. They named Mangosuthu Buthelezi as somebody who should immediately be seconded to the Cabinet.

Suzman: The government might do it but it really wouldn't be effective because it excludes all the urban blacks and they are a considerable proportion of the black population. Nor would it satisfy radical black opinion, in or out of the homelands for that matter. You must have elected representatives. There is no point in nominating people. Also, I don't think Chief Buthelezi would accept because he has already said that sort of compromise is not going to satisfy the blacks. It has no element of power sharing. It has an element of participation but it certainly isn't power sharing.

Murray: How would the PFP deal with the constitution?

Suzman: We would scrap it and start again. If we were in power we would call for a National Convention to which elected representatives of the different groups would come to negotiate. There has to be a process of negotiation and I believe concessions have to be made on all sides. It's not just the whites who have got to make concessions, I think blacks would have to make concessions too. I am not talking of a transfer of power from a white minority to a black majority. I am talking about a non-racial democratic system for all South Africans, and for that there must be some protection for minorities. This would be important even for a non-racial society. One must be realistic and I believe that to give some stability and some sense of security to the minorities, there would have to be a constitutional safeguard such as a Bill of Rights. This would safeguard both individuals and groups from oppression by the State.

Murray: You are talking about a Federal System?

Suzman: Yes, the PFP is in favour of a Federal System made up of a number of regions which would be decided on geographic not racial grounds. These different states or provinces would be responsible for their own administration although matters such as defence, international trade and the fiscus would remain with the central federal government. In other words a federal system of government such as the Americans or Australians have. In addition we would introduce an electoral system based on proportional representation which eliminates the winner takes all risk and ensures that minority groups are represented. Likewise, our policy would not be to have a Marxist or socialist type of economy. We would have a mixed economy. This means the state is responsible for the provision of an infrastructure, for looking after the health, education and welfare of the people. But for the rest we advocate free enterprise.

Murray: What would happen to the independent homelands and the non-independent homelands under your federal system?

Suzman: First of all the country would be divided into multiracial states. The independent ones could join the federation as states, but not as black states. They would be states in name but anybody could go and live there or move out if the conditions didn't suit them.

Murray: Any such political dispensation would require the participation of currently banned organisations. What would your attitude be towards such organisations?

Suzman: I believe we must bring black political bodies in from the cold. We must allow them to advocate their principles and policies and see exactly what support and representation they can muster. Otherwise it is anybody's guess who represents the majority of blacks or who should be the leader of a political party, be it AZAPO or the ANC. I think it is very important to unban these organisations and allow them to function normally and to have internal elections to decide on their leadership. The same would have to be done with the coloured and Indian groups. Hopefully in the end one would have a national convention composed of South Africans from all walks of life.

Murray: Surely with an organisation such as the ANC, which has been involved in what they term "the armed struggle", amnesty would be required?

Suzman: There would have to be a truce before negotiations can begin. If a satisfactory settlement is not reached then one is still in a state of war. But negotiation means making concessions, although I believe there are certain principles and ideas which are non-negotiables. We, the PFP, would propose the abolition of all discriminatory legislation but we would try to avoid the oppression of a majority over minorities.

Murray: To set the scene for such negotiations would you declare an amnesty for political prisoners?

Suzman: Yes, and allow exiles to return. Those people left because they really had no alternatives. The ANC struggled for many years to bring about change by peaceful means. It was only after Sharpeville that they turned to violent methods. I can understand that. If you don't have the vote and your pleas for peaceful change are ignored, you take the hard tough line of the armed struggle and hope that in a new climate negotiations can take place. If and when a federal government is elected, the whole climate in South Africa will have changed so that the possibility of consensus and negotiation would be much greater.

Murray: You have acquaintances within the ANC, what is your opinion of these people?

Suzman: Except for Mandela I haven't seen any of them for a long time. Mandela I've seen over the years. I have visited him as often as I was allowed to, both on Robben Island and at Pollsmoor. Our relationship is one of, I think, relaxed and genial friendship. I can't say that I have quizzed him on his political beliefs.

Murray: Were those contact visits?

Suzman: They were. I visited him in his dormitory, walked with him in the exercise yard, talked with him in the library at Pollsmoor.

I remember the first time I went to see Mandela was in about 1966 on Robben Island. I was taken straight to the single cells, we met and started talking. He was very open and I asked how he was treated and what his complaints were. There were many because in those days Robben Island was like the island in Athol Fugard's play. It really was awful.

At that stage the prison authorities believed prison wasn't just a deprivation of liberty and freedom but a place where you were punished. It was as tough as Alcatraz. The prisoners were doing hard labour, breaking stones in the quarry or collecting seaweed. There were no recreational facilities of any kind and the warders used to drive them to work (this is what Mandela told me) with dogs at their heels. There was one warder there who, Mandela said, had a swastika tattooed on the back of his hand. I undertook to see he was transferred because the thought of a man like that in charge of politicals seemed to me to be absolutely appalling. Also the food was bad, they weren't allowed photographs in their cells, they were all sleeping on bedrolls and they had no newspapers. Conditions were very tough.

After that visit I went to see Piet Pelser who had become the Minister of Justice and complained bitterly about the conditions, because those men were lifers. At the time there was no remission of sentence for politicals. I also told Pelser about the man with the swastika and said it was disgraceful that a man like that should be in charge of political prisoners, or any prisoners for that matter! I told him I would raise the matter under the prison's vote and he said: "Oh God don't do that it's dynamite". "You are telling me it's dynamite," I replied, "you'd better get rid of him." I must say he was gone within two weeks.

Anyway things have improved. Year after year I have raised these matters and in all cases, in the end, things have changed. Please don't think it was all due to me. New men with new attitudes came into the prison service as well.

Today the politicals have newspapers, which is an enormous victory. Only four or five years ago they were cut off from the outside world except for radio broadcasts. Nowadays they don't do hard labour, "A" group prisoners are allowed contact visits and all prisoners have beds. Politicals are

now classified as "A" group, so they get full privileges and they are allowed a movie once a week.

Murray: Have conditions improved generally in prisons throughout the country?

Suzman: I wouldn't say so in our grossly overcrowded, ordinary jails, but the attitude of the authorities is better. However if I do get evidence of ill treatment the top authorities do take action. For instance, I received a pile of letters smuggled out of jails all over the country complaining of rotten food, warders kicking inmates, overcrowding and insufficient medical attention. Obviously I can't submit letters that are smuggled out to the authorities, although they keep telling me there wouldn't be any retribution, but I still don't feel I can risk it.

What I do is to correlate all the information regarding a particular jail and then submit it to the prison authorities for them to investigate. Generally I get letters back saying the matters have been investigated and found to have no foundation. However, they do investigate and that alone does make a difference.

Certainly as far as politicals are concerned there have been changes for the better and many of them are furthering their educations. The last time I went to Robben Island they were playing tennis, but I don't want to give you the idea that it is a leisure resort. They may not be doing hard labour, but it is still prison.

Murray: Was there not a period after the text of "No easy road to freedom" was smuggled out when they were not allowed to study?

Suzman: Yes, those rights were withdrawn as a punitive measure. The prison authorities said that they were using their UNISA exercise books to write notes to the other prisons and the other sections.

Murray: You have known Mandela for 20 years. What is your opinion of him?

Suzman: He is a most impressive man – handsome, tall, relaxed, very much in control of himself. He has an easy relationship with the prison officials first on Robben Island and now at Pollsmoor. He is not disrespectful but he has obviously got the situation under control and they treat him with respect and deference. I think that is really symbolic of the man himself.

I never discussed politics with him because it was understood that was not the purpose of my visits. My purpose was to see how he was, what the conditions were, whether there were any major complaints and so on.

Murray: Who would lead the ANC today – Mandela or Oliver Tambo – if Mandela were released?

Suzman: I think Tambo would defer to Mandela. I haven't seen Tambo for many years but that's not the point. I think Mandela is first of all a folk hero, the world's most famous political prisoner. He wouldn't come out and take a secondary role nor do I think Tambo would want him to.

Murray: Do you think there may still be a reservoir of goodwill among the ANC-in-exile?

Suzman: They don't generally display the sort of vengeful attitude one finds among some of the younger people. But then you must remember that they are out of the country, they don't really feel the pressures of apartheid. Whatever they may feel about being exiled, which is no doubt a source of great sorrow, they still don't experience the same conditions as the people living here.

Murray: I was told by some members of the ANC that they had little control over the children in the townships. Where are those people going to find their political home?

Suzman: That's the point. They are probably going to say that men such as Thabo Mbeki and Tambo are fuddy duddies without any knowledge of how the country should be run. I don't know. Who knows? It depends who gains the power within the ANC. But what would satisfy the young generation? One doesn't know.

Murray: The education boycott is widening the gap between whites and blacks. What do you think of this policy?

Suzman: It is a terribly shortsighted policy. Denying children the conclusion of their schooling years is going to dictate the whole tenor of their lives. They won't catch up on those lost years. I understand the political motivation behind the boycott, but I think

it is a self punitive move in the end.

Murray: Do you think there is a way out of this situation?

Suzman: I suppose a start would be to release the leaders from detention, and begin implementing a single system of education. The government has talked about getting around to it but there's been no positive action yet. There is still a big gap in the per capita expenditure on white and black school children. About eight times as much is spent on white as on black children. Certainly teachers are being upgraded, much more money is being spent on black education than ever before, but there's a long way to go.

The other measures are long term. I don't know what can be done in the immediate future to get these children back into the classrooms.

Murray: The political climate has produced a feeling of despair among many whites. What can be done about that?

Suzman: There is more awareness among whites of the political realities. Take the business community. Three years ago they were starry-eyed when they came out of the Carlton Conference and the Good Hope Conference. Today you don't hear businessmen talking about our competent government anymore. Now they are saying that the government has really messed up this country in the most unconscionable way. That I think is one of the hopeful signs.

Murray: However, skilled members of the white community are leaving the country.

Suzman: There is always a brain drain after political incidents. We have had it time and

again in this country, after Sharpeville, after the 1976 Soweto riots and we are having it now.

Murray: But in a way we have never had it before.

Suzman: Certainly, but then the unrest is much more widespread and it is escalating. Consider, too, that in the two years of the Soweto riots about 700 people were killed. Since September 1985 nearly 900 people have been killed. The killings must stop, that's a number one priority.

Before the children will sit down to lessons, the police must get out of the townships, as must the army, the state of emergency must be lifted and all those in detention released. Those are among the immediate steps which could be taken to get the children to call off the boycott. I don't think most of the youngsters want to boycott school. I think they are dying to get back to school but they are being intimidated and in this climate people toe the line.

Murray: Their cry is "liberation before education" . . .

Suzman: Liberation without education isn't going to be of much use to anyone.

Murray: Let us assume we are able to wipe the slate clean to a certain extent, do you think whites will adapt to change?

Suzman: People do change. I have watched Nationalists change. They have repealed laws in which they firmly believed. Job reservation is a case in point. I remember when job reservation was introduced in the mid-fifties. I spoke against it as did the whole United Party. We talked about industry being put in a strait-jacket etc. There were Nationalists who stood up and said that I wanted to grind the Afrikaner workmen into the dust and make him compete with the black man and take home a lower wage.

Then in '77/78 job reservation was repealed and the Nationalists who had defended the legislation before stood up and made the sort of speeches I made in 1956. They talked about an expanding economy and if you gave blacks the opportunity to become skilled workers, they would earn more and expand the consumer market.

Or take the Immorality Act. Recently I was reading up the old debates where I

moved two private member's motions to repeal the Immorality Act and the Mixed Marriages Act. I used all the arguments about the terrible effects these laws had on people's lives and the terrible image South Africa had in the eyes of the world because of them. In response I was told I didn't understand the South African psychology and couldn't ever be expected to understand it with my extraordinary views.

Last year I listened to the Nats talking about the need for change and supporting the whole idea of repeal. So they do change, they adapt. Whether their real intrinsic feelings change or whether they do this for political expediency, I am unable to tell. But certainly they are prepared to stand up and be counted as people who have changed.

Murray: You sound to me like someone who hasn't lost hope.

Suzman: one has to bolster oneself. I am very apprehensive and I have seldom been as depressed about this country. Every day one reads that somebody has been killed,

every day one reads about police violence. Have you ever known a government shoot itself in the foot with the ease with which this government does? If it isn't Cabinda it's a raid on Gaborone, if it isn't Gaborone it's people being shot at Uitenhage or Mamelodi . . . so there is no real cause for optimism.

I think we are in a state of utter confusion. The government is going along with the idea that strong-arm methods are the only way to calm the situation. I don't believe that to be the case.

All the same, I haven't given up. I am encouraged that so many more people now are questioning the government's wisdom, that businessmen are at last opening their mouths.

Another important change in attitude recently has emanated from the judges. They are now instituting the law of natural justice and using that to overthrow some of the draconian clauses in the Internal Security Act. That so many interdicts have been granted to prevent the police from beating people up, is a good sign. It means that law and justice are still around.

Murray: Yet there are horror stories of what happens to some people when they are detained. How should that element within the police force be dealt with?

Suzman: The only way is to make examples of those people. I have raised this issue with Louis le Grange privately and in parliament. It is no good saying that you don't condone unlawful acts by the police if you are not prepared to take steps against the people who have committed these deeds. When a policeman has exceeded his authority he should be discharged immediately and prosecuted. That is the only way it'll be stopped.

As long as there appears to be tacit condonation from the top, or a man just gets transferred from one police station to the next, unless he is found guilty of unlawful acts, this problem will recur. Undoubtedly there is an element in the police force that is brutal, that doesn't give a damn about whether or not the rest of the police force lose their good name or that their relationship with the black people is ruined for ever. You have got to make an example of those people.

Murray: Do you have some ideas on what we can do to improve our image abroad?

Suzman: We must return to the rule of law. That is a basic principle. Section 28 (preventive detention) and Section 29 (solitary confinement) of the Internal Security Act must be scrapped. There are other major sections such as 50 and 51 which must also go, and then the rule of law (habeas corpus) must be instituted. It is, after all, the basic element of a democratic country. It distinguishes democracies from police states.

Individuals are powerless unless they are protected from the state – the police force and the army – by habeas corpus. If someone commits a murder, or steals a car, or is charged with drunken driving he has to be produced in court within 48 hours and a charge has got to be laid against him or he has to be set free.

This business of keeping people locked up without trial is the absolute death knell to the system of justice. In addition there must be very stern directives from the top about interrogations and the manner in which they are carried out.

We need something similar to what was introduced in Northern Ireland after the Bennett Commission's report to the British Government whereby the number of days that anybody could be held was limited to five, thereafter special permission had to be given by the Home Secretary. The main thing was that all interrogations were monitored. Nobody could be beaten up or

given electric shocks as I believe happened before the Bennett Commission.

Murray: Let's look ahead at a situation where the only way the blacks can express themselves politically is through their unions. Surely as long as the blacks remain without political rights businessmen will bear the brunt of their activities.

Suzman: Yes, I think industry is going to become a battlefield.

Murray: How do you see the businessman's role in the future?

Suzman: I think more and more businessmen are becoming aware that their own viability is going to depend on political change. How far they want that political change to go is another matter and how far those who are pressing for change from the black side are prepared to moderate their demands for total transfer of power, remains to be seen.

At the moment they haven't got the means of enforcing those demands but I foresee a situation where trade unions are well organised, where blacks become the majority of skilled workers in this country and then have the ability to exercise economic muscle to back up their demands. Once that point is reached there could be a clash of interests and the possibility of a general strike.

Murray: It seems to be absolutely inevitable that until such time as blacks are given full political rights business will have to bear the brunt.

Suzman: Which is why the PFP proposes one man, one vote. But blacks would have to agree that there is a distinction between minorities and majorities. Probably a lot of them would say they want a non-racial society, that we don't recognise colour at all. But is that possible, I wonder, in reality.

Murray: The ANC say that it is.

Suzman: But I think the realities are that most people in this country are very colour conscious. And I don't think there would be a chance of the PFP coming to power unless it could offer some security to the white minority and to the other minorities for that matter. How you maintain a constitution, of course, is another matter altogether.

Murray: If politics for a man is a cruel mistress, then for a woman it must be a cruel master. You have had a long career in politics, are there any observations about it you would like to make?

Suzman: It is a hard and often very frustrating and upsetting way of life. It's particularly upsetting when you find yourself fighting the people who ought to be on your side. In a way this is what I'm experiencing now. I am against sanctions and against disinvestment because I think in the long run it will be disastrous to wreck the economy of the country and create unemployment. These issues undermine the one weapon that I really believe is going to be effective – economic muscle.

These views are also the views of the party, but my friends in the outside world are shaken that I have taken this attitude. Now I find myself, as indeed the PFP did in the referendum, on the same side as the most abominable people.

However, leaving that aside, I have found politics to be very rewarding. It is nice to be able to help people and the very fact that I have been an MP for such a long time does give me access to Ministers and I can go across and see them, I can talk to them in the lobby without feeling that I am being presumptuous.

Probably the work I've done in trying to improve conditions in the prisons has been the most constructive task I've tackled. But there are other aspects that involved black housing, pass laws, passports, visas, which were also rewarding.

Murray: You seem to have enjoyed good relations with journalists, what is your assessment of the fourth estate at the moment?

Suzman: I think the standard is not as high as it used to be. There are still some good journalists but by and large I think suddenly the giants have disappeared and haven't really been replaced. There have been some very conscientious journalists and there still are, people who really understand what is going on and know what is important.

I have been lucky because many of the journalists I got to know in the early years have ended up as editors and it's rather nice to have grown up in politics together. For a politician I think that is absolutely invaluable.

Murray: The PFP was severely criticised with the demise of the *Rand Daily Mail*. Do you think the criticism was justified?

Suzman: The demise of that paper was a very sad event and the PFP did come in for much criticism which, I feel, was unjustified because they didn't have the power or the authority to do anything about it. Attempts were made behind the scenes to try and finance the paper. But if you are unable to pull out R15 million you can hardly ask other people to do so. We did try but we don't have the power, the authority or even the influence that people thought we had. I miss the *Mail* greatly.

Among the Honours conferred on Helen Suzman are:

Honorary Doctorate in Civil Law, Oxford University, 1973.

Honorary Fellowship, St. Hugh's College, Oxford, 1973.

Honorary Fellowship, London School of Economics, 1974.

Honorary Doctorate of Laws, Harvard University, 1976.

Honorary Doctorate of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, 1976.

Honorary Doctorate of Law, Columbia University, New York, 1977.

Honorary Doctorate of Law, Smith College, Northampton, U.S.A., 1977.

Honorary Doctorate of Law, Brandeis University, 1981.

Honorary Doctorate, Humane Letters, Denison University, 1982.

Honorary Doctorate, Humane Letters, New School for Social Research, 1984.

Honorary Doctorate, Humane Letters, Sacred Heart University, Conn. 1984.

United Nations Award for Human Rights, 1978.

University of the Witwatersrand Alumni Award, 1979.

Nominated for Nobel Peace Prize, 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984.

Annual Award New York International League for Human Rights, 1983.

American Jewish Committee, Civil Rights Award, 1984.

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SOUTH AFRICA

WENDY ORR TAKES ALEXANDRA CLINIC JOB

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 14 Mar 86 p 11

[Article by Colleen Ryan]

[Text] Dr Wendy Orr is a reluctant young heroine, trying to rebuild her private world after six months of intense publicity brought about by her court application restraining police from torturing detainees in Port Elizabeth.

After moving from the Cape to work at the Alexandra Health Clinic last month, Dr Orr has been settling into the demands of her job as a medical officer. She described the Alexandra centre, run on mainly private funds, as a "huge general practice with doctors seeing 500 to 600 patients a day."

Dr Orr (25) shot to prominence last year when she won an interim interdict restraining the South African Police from assaulting detainees held at the St Albans and North End prisons under the emergency regulations. She was later named *The Star's* Woman of the Year for 1985.

EXPERIENCE

She decided to leave Port Elizabeth, where she was employed by the State, after she was barred from further visits to detainees.

Dr Orr said she did not have enough experience to compare her work in Alexandra to other

centres. However, she thoroughly enjoyed it despite the frustrations. "It is difficult because there is a language problem — but I intend to do something about that."

"There are doctors who have been working at the clinic for many years and they have been able to develop relationships with patients," she said.

The Alexandra Clinic in Wynberg, which overlooks the "backyard" of the township, deals with problems associated with overcrowding and poor facilities.

She said she did not have any long-term ambitions: "This time last year, I would never have dreamt I would be where I am. I'm taking life as it comes."

She said she was extremely reluctant to be in the limelight.

Her fame has opened some doors, however, and later this month she will visit the United States as a guest of the US Information Service.

Dr Orr has made it clear her clash with the authorities was the result of her merely following her conscience. "It is very easy for medical people, practising in cities, to turn a blind eye and not to get involved in ethical and moral issues. I think for too long that is what has happened," she added.

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SOUTH AFRICA

ROLE OF NATION'S SECURITY FORCES IN REFORM PROCESS DISCUSSED

Cape Town LEADERSHIP SOUTH AFRICA in English Vol 5 No 1, 1986 pp 63, 64, 66

[Article by Craig Williamson]

[Text]

It would be naive to believe that 1986 is not going to bring increased levels of political, economic and social conflict to South Africa.

The security forces will increasingly have to act as the shield between the reformers and the revolutionaries – to maintain the status quo and to protect the reformers from revolutionary violence.

Their most difficult task lies in distinguishing the reformers from the aggressors.

We live in a time of serious misconceptions.

As a community, whites feel threatened by blacks.

Take a friend of mine in Camps Bay. As he sits at sunset in his fancy condo overlooking the Atlantic Ocean, he figures he hasn't got a real problem because three strategically placed roadblocks can seal off his area from any unwanted elements.

Or take those people who say, if blacks are going to put bombs into our shopping centres, as happened at Amanzimtoti, let's exclude them from those centres.

What people do not realise is that it is difficult to draw back into a white laager because the blacks are not outside – they're with us. We are all South Africans.

Take another friend of mine, a middle class black living in a reasonably nice house in one of the better areas of a black township.

He's angry with the whites for two reasons.

Despite being a professional he sees himself forced to live in some sort of lower socio-economic area which, already ridden with unemployment, poverty, crime and violence, has been torn apart in the last 18 months by politically inspired violence.

And those same whites who forced him to live in an area which he cannot escape expect him, as a moderate and responsible middle class black, to get involved in official community councils and play a role in the process of administration and to bring the situation under control – but without giving him the protection or the means to accomplish the task.

He has friends whose houses have been burnt down, whose families have been threatened and hurt. His own family has suffered from the effects of teargas fired from a passing Casspir. His car gets searched at roadblocks. He's been called a kaffir by some young soldier or policeman carrying a big rifle.

His children haven't been allowed to attend school for a year – or write exams. He's worried about their future and is considering putting them into a convent because he sees education as the only way out for them.

Now violent political attitudes have taken that opportunity away from his children as well.

He's angry with the blacks, the revolutionaries and the whites because of the unrealistic situation they've created and the lack of support given him and his peer group.

Unlike whites he doesn't have a nice tough security force erecting roadblocks to protect him. It is vital we give people like him real power.

What about the people who are actually causing the violence, used by the revolutionaries? They're a disparate bunch with a vague sort of support for the ANC or organisations such as the UDF or Azapo.

It is an accepted fact that there are individual organisations in and out of South Africa attempting to bring about an organised revolutionary onslaught on South Africa.

A fundamental part of this onslaught is the use of violence, even the use of various degrees of warfare.

Any revolution is merely a violent way of achieving a political goal. The goal of revolutionaries in South Africa is to obtain power, to seize the state. Two important components of this onslaught, are mass political violence and civil disobedience.

Despite what all sorts of apologists for the revolution say, there is very little spontaneity in this type of internal revolutionary activity, especially in the beginning.

To develop the mass base for their violent challenge to the state, they identify existing community grievances and exploit them. They attempt to mobilise the community into conflict with the state on a range of political and socio-economic issues.

Rents that are too high, poor housing, bad education – the revolutionist uses whatever he can to create a climate of dissatisfaction which can be manipulated and agitated into an uncontrollable situation.

He seeks the opposite of the evolutionist who wants to change the mistakes and problems in a society in a peaceful, negotiated and constructive way.

The revolutionary wants to eliminate negotiation. He wants to polarise. He intends to create two clashing and irreconcilable camps in the community he is trying to disrupt.

He attempts to manipulate our society by violence and unrest. He infiltrates organisations, uses radical slogans in political statements, all of which are designed to create increasingly hostile attitudes between black and white.

On the other hand there is the young security force member probably doing his national service. He has never been particularly politicised but suddenly he experiences total hostility to him and everything he represents.

He sees a very dangerous, lawless and anarchist element being encouraged in the townships and he doesn't understand why there is a call for police and troops to be removed from these areas.

He is trying to maintain law and order. As a sensitive young man he understands that some law abiding blacks may be upset by the way the forces act, but he also recognises that a total reign of terror would erupt if the troops were removed. His black colleagues believe this even more strongly.

So while the whites are fearful, the blacks are angry with the whites, the security forces and the revolutionaries who are intimidating their children. The security man is caught in the middle, horrified by his exposure to a violence he never knew existed in the world, let alone in his own town.

These attitudes are in line with what the revolutionaries want.

Faced with this scenario, what is the prognosis for 1986? What can the security forces do to make a positive contribution towards defusing the situation so that a prosperous and peaceful evolution can occur?

First they must understand the totality of the revolutionary strategy – both violent and non-violent.

Basic ANC strategy for the year starts with mass political action to destroy any groups considered part of the status quo, be they community organisations, students, teachers, parents, youths, women, religious groups, sports groups, political associations.

They intend to take over control of as many authority structures in the communities as possible.

They want people power.

The ANC can be expected to exploit the rebellious youths in black townships, to celebrate June 16, the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the 1976 Soweto riots, as South Africa's National Youth Day.

They want to continue exploiting the issue of black education and to form an ANC controlled national youth organisation to fill the vacuum left by the banning of COSAS.

They want to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the South African women's march on the Union Buildings.

They want to continue using consumer boycotts in relevant situations.

They want to try and bring about a national rent strike in the black areas.

They can certainly be expected to make an all out assault on the so-called pass laws knowing full well that the influx control regulations will probably be abolished by parliament in the coming session anyway.

They want to boycott and disrupt to as great an extent as possible the Johannesburg Centenary celebrations.

For the workers, they plan to continue developing the so-called democratic trade unions as a means of national liberation for the working classes.

They plan to organise the unemployed. The focal point for the year will be the celebration of the 100th anniversary of May Day – May 1, the international communist workers holiday.

The third leg of the ANC's internal policy is the armed struggle. Terrorism. And this year they will be celebrating the 25th anniversary of the formation of their armed wing Umkhonto We Sizwe.

They wish to expand the violence into white areas and not restrict it to black areas as has been the case up to now. They want to develop the armed struggle in the rural areas, concentrating particularly on what they call white soldier-farmers.

They can be expected to continue their assault on the country's economic base, looking in particular at important targets like energy supplies and arms production. In this process they can be expected to kill more innocent civilians. I, like Helen Suzman, wonder if they have any conception whatsoever of the ferocious reaction they are going to provoke?

Concurrent with the ANC blueprint for the year, the security forces and the government are faced with calls from all sorts of sources within the country – and the world – to comply with measures which actually aid the blueprint. For instance, the removal of troops and police from the townships; the release of imprisoned ANC leaders; negotiations with the ANC; nor consenting to demands on how black education should be organised.

So how must the state react?

The first – and most vital – aspect of a successful counter revolutionary strategy by the state is the combination of all its resources into an offensive and defensive strategy against this revolutionary plan.

History has shown in similar situations that it is a mistake to hesitate too long in mobilising and demonstrating the forces available for the defence of the state. In this country's circumstances the use of troops in the townships and for internal security duty is unavoidable.

While acting legally, and in a controlled manner, the state has to act fast and efficiently to preserve law and order by identifying and removing the revolutionary political leaders and the structures that support them from the positions they hold in the community.

While the state is initiating reforms it is imperative that its reaction to revolution be reformist and, without affecting the efficiency of this reaction, it should be done in as controlled and democratic a means as possible.

South African society is threatened by the political-military strategy of revolution using terrorism and subversion, usually of a criminal and conspiratorial nature.

In this situation one of the main purposes of the revolutionary will be to try and discredit and break down the power, authority and morale of the security forces which are at the forefront of the conflict.

And while a lot of gullible observers believe, or assume, that the South African state is currently confronted with a massive political crisis, and that collapse

cannot be far away, the professional security force members and the professional revolutionists – both hardnosed realists – know these views are naive.

The South African state, in revolutionary terms, is stable – and will remain in effective control of the entire population.

In terms of state revenue the country is strong and can afford to take the measures needed to maintain internal security.

The police and the defence force are both modern and well equipped and have no trouble in recruiting the necessary manpower, including black manpower.

They've got the men, the equipment, the training and the power to do a very effective job of protecting society. If they wanted to – or if the state wished not to be reformist – they could maintain the status quo as has been done before in places such as Argentina.

If it were merely a question of maintaining pure white power their job would be easier than the subtle job they face today.

They have to avoid the Vietnam syndrome: "Sir, we saved the village from the communists. There's only one small drawback – we had to destroy the village in order to do it".

We must avoid destruction of the townships and the black communities in our efforts to destroy the ANC.

Strategists in the security forces understand this and even more clearly understand that they can expect even more strident accusations of brutality, massacres, murders, rape, torture and oppression from the revolutionaries this year.

Our forces are fighting not only a physical confrontation but an image war with the revolutionaries depicting them as Nazis. The ANC has even accused army and police patrols, sent in to maintain law and order, of being given permission to rape, loot and kill.

According to propaganda the image of our security force man is one of a dumb, short-haired brute oppressing blacks in the name of white domination. This image of our security forces as the storm troopers of apartheid must be countered.

The reality is very different. Many of the forces' members are the children of ordinary black and white South Africans. And it is these young people who are faced with what is quite definitely the most critical, difficult and important task in South Africa today. To do this task effectively they all have to demonstrate restraint even in the face of the most terrible provocation. And they will have to allow as much public scrutiny of their actions as possible.

Without them there is no future.

While the revolutionaries don't have a short term hope in hell of achieving their goal – the overthrow of the state – they can make life relatively unpleasant for many people.

But, despite 25 years of effort, the armed struggle waged by the ANC and other revolutionary movements has hardly posed any serious threat to South Africa's economic or political stability.

While they will possibly be able to escalate their scale and number of attacks, they're nowhere near having any effect on the stability of the state. In fact, in world terms, the ANC terrorist ability is hardly impressive when compared with organisations such as the IRA or PLO. Their effectiveness can only increase with radically increased support from the black population, so state and security force strategy must be to frustrate and neutralise this possibility.

Through judicious but firm use of state power and the security forces we can protect what needs to be protected and destroy what needs to be destroyed.

The only way South Africa will have a prosperous and peaceful future is if the political process underway in the country is allowed to evolve. Consequently the only way to avoid a cataclysmic revolutionary situation is for the security forces to play their role effectively.

We should not be alienating some of the very people we could entice into the laager. We want everyone in our laager, except the lunatics.

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SOUTH AFRICA

DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF UDF EXAMINED

Cape Town LEADERSHIP SOUTH AFRICA in English Vol 5 No 1, 1986 pp 19, 22-23

[Article by Tom Lodge, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Witwatersrand]

[Text]

'This is the politics of refusal, and it is the only dignified response black people can give in this situation' - Rev. Allan Boesak, 22 January 1983.

The last three years have witnessed the revival of organised mass opposition in South Africa. Fighting in the townships, labour unrest, classroom revolts, urban guerilla warfare - all these have been familiar features of the political landscape since 1976. From the inception of the United Democratic Front, though, radical black opposition has assumed an increasingly organised form, organisation which has made it considerably more formidable and impressive.

The formation of the UDF was the outcome of the development of a sophisticated local political culture. In the late 1970s, following the crackdown on national Black Consciousness bodies in 1977, there was a proliferation of civic associations campaigning around such matters as housing, rents, bus fares, and services in Black, Indian and coloured communities. The mobilisation of local communities was accelerated by trade unions which began to appeal to township residents to boycott products of firms involved in labour disputes. Reciprocally unions began to concern themselves with local non-workplace-related issues. Contributing to the growing local consciousness of a shared communal identity was the flowering of a radical press: *Grassroots* in Cape Town, *Speak* in Tembisa, *Ilizwe LaseRhini* in Grahamstown, *Ukusa* in Durban, and *The Eye* in Pretoria.

The Reverend Allan Boesak's call at the January 1983 Transvaal Anti-SAIC conference for the formation of a front to oppose the constitutional proposals affecting Indians and coloureds met with a ready response. A series of regional conferences in Natal, Transvaal and the Cape heralded an exuberant national launch of the UDF on 20 August 1983. The 85 bodies listed provisionally as affiliates in the convention booklet provide an impression of the scope of the movement's support. As well as various political bodies including the Natal and Transvaal Indian Congresses, trade unions, religious groups (Muslim and Christian), women's organisations, youth and students congresses, and a large number of civic associations are represented.

The UDF was conceived of as a front, a federal body to which different groups could affiliate and a body which could link different social interests on the basis of common issues. It has a national executive and five regional committees for Natal, the Transvaal, the Western Cape, the Eastern Cape (Port Elizabeth) and Border. UDF affiliates exist also in the Northern Cape and in the Free State. Affiliates according to the constitution have equal voting powers on the regional and national councils which elect officials but of course vary enormously in size and nature. In the Rand communities in which the UDF has support a frequent combination of affiliates is a civic association (sometimes with several district branches), a youth congress, a women's group, and until its banning during the

	Student branches	Youth leagues	Trade Unions	Women	Civic	Religious	Political	Others	Total
Transvaal	12	16	8	7	30	11	9	16	109
Natal	8	15	5	3	28	4	11	7	81
W. Cape	23	271	2	20	27	4	9	4	360
E. Cape	3	13	3	2	2	6		4	33
OFS	1	1							2
Total	47	316	18	32	87	25	29	31	585

emergency, usually a branch of COSAS as well. By early 1984 there were just under 600 organisations affiliated to the UDF. These could be classified as in the table.

Like the Black Consciousness movement before it, the UDF finds its main institutional base in the churches and the schools, and its constituency is a predominantly youthful one. The figures indicate weak trade union participation – the membership of trade unions linked to the UDF was estimated recently at a modest 40 000. The largest proportion of these, though, are located in the Eastern Cape where SAAWU and MACWUSA have a strong following. Of the UDF affiliates the student organisations have contributed many of the grassroots activists while the civics have played a crucial local leadership role. The figures for regional affiliation provide a somewhat misleading picture of the relative regional strength of UDF support; events in 1985 were to demonstrate that the Eastern Cape was the area in which the UDF was impregnable while of the organised regions Natal presents for the Front the most problems.

What sort of people lead the UDF? The men and women who have served as its patrons, spokesmen and office-holders span four generations of black political protest. There are the veterans of the mass campaigns of the 1950s, old ex-ANC stalwarts like Archie Gumede and Oscar Mpetha and the Federation of South African Women leaders, Albertina Sisulu, Helen Joseph, and Frances Baard. Then there are the survivors of the first Umkonto we Sizwe guerilla offensive of 1961-1965. The present national chairman, Cumick Ndhlovu, is one of these, the Border regional leader, Steve Tshwete, is another. A considerable proportion of the leadership is drawn from Indian Congress politics and particularly those responsible for reviving the Natal Indian Congress in 1971. Mewa Ramgobin and George Sewpershad are two of the best known of such figures. Younger leaders graduated from the Black Consciousness movement of the early 1970s and the radical initial phase of the (coloured) Labour Party: Curtis Nkondo, Aubrey Mokoena, and George du Plessis. Finally there are those whose first

experience derives from the construction of community organisations and youth movements in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Trade Unionists are rather thinly represented among UDF office-holders: a few old-timers from the days of SACTU and a handful from the newer unions, mainly of the general worker variety.

The leadership is socially heterodox. Though teachers, priests, lawyers, and doctors are especially well represented many UDF notables come from a working class background or through their involvement with community organisations are closely in touch with a working class constituency. There are regional variations. In Natal and the Transvaal the commanding echelons are more middle class than elsewhere and include more people with a national reputation than in the Cape regions. The Eastern Cape and Border regional committees are younger and the conspicuous number of former teachers reflects a local tradition of teacher activism dating back to the time of the All-African convention in the 1940s.

Ideologically too, the UDF is complicated. Though the major affiliates subscribe to the social democracy of the Freedom Charter (adopted by the ANC in 1956) it is not mandatory for them to do so. It is true that UDF spokesmen often refer to events, symbols, and an iconography which can be associated with the ANC's history. To quote Mewa Ramgobin at a meeting in 1984:

"These ideals, the passion to realise these ideals, which are enshrined in the Freedom Charter, continue to keep our leaders in jail. Rivonia for us will remain a milestone in the history of South Africa. Generations to come will wonder whether such men as Mandela and Sisulu and Mbeki in fact walked this earth, in fact were prepared to give up their lives for the ideals they believed in."

But this general adherence to a political tradition allows for differences of interpretation and emphasis. Eastern Cape UDF orators speak frankly of their efforts as part of "a history of class struggles" of "the boer struggle against the workers". The rhetoric of the imams and churchmen is more conservative referring

to divinely-ordained human rights and liberal conceptions of individual liberty. Some of the NIC leaders take their Gandhist philosophical heritage very seriously – a heritage which ultimately is at odds with a proletarian ideology. Even socialists within the UDF hierarchy believe that working class consciousness can best be nurtured within the course of a “popular-democratic struggle” – a “fight of both workers and non-workers against racism and the anti-democratic militaristic nature of the apartheid state”. In this they find themselves in conflict with trade unionists and political groups like AZAPO who adopt a position to the left of the UDF.

The formal programme of the UDF does not emphasise class-related concerns. The Declaration adopted in 1983 called for a government based on the will of the people, the creation of a non-racial unitary state, and a unified movement embracing “all democrats regardless of race, religion or colour”. Only in August 1985 did an official UDF statement explicitly advocate universal suffrage. Beyond these broad guidelines the kind of alternative society envisaged by the UDF remains undefined and from the statements of various UDF personalities there seems to be no single source of inspiration.

In the first year of campaigning the UDF's effectiveness was difficult to evaluate. The organisation's original concern was to oppose the extension of (separate) parliamentary representation to coloureds and Indians, the (black) Local Authorities Act and the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill. Certainly a vast majority of eligible voters abstained when the parliamentary and council elections were held in 1984 and the UDF's energetic boycott campaign in the preceding months was undoubtedly influential in this. But elections to the advisory bodies which the new institutions had replaced had customarily been apathetic affairs. There was a well-established tradition of political boycotts in the coloured and Indian communities, and the UDF's million signature campaign had aroused a very uneven response.

In mid-1984 widespread classroom unrest and a worsening economic climate helped to prompt a reawakened interest in the UDF hierarchy in the localised “bread and butter” struggles around which its most important affiliates had originally developed. Speakers at local UDF rallies began calling for strikes and consumer protests in response to rent increases from July 1984. Newly-elected local councils had been forced as a result of the government's insistence on township fiscal self-sufficiency to impose major increases in the charges for housing and services. This was the principal source of tension which led to the popular uprising in the Vaal in September 1984 and the more generalised national township insurrection which followed it. By

1985, the UDF, caught up in the maelstrom of township conflict, was, in the words of one perceptive journalist “a movement spurred from below rather than pulled from above”.

From May 1985 onwards a succession of consumer boycotts broke out, beginning in the Eastern Cape, with the movement growing to include in its wake many of the main industrial centres in the Transvaal as well as other localities. The impulse for the boycott was in each case a local one, the main issues being the presence and behaviour of the SADF and the SAP in the townships as well as local social, educational, and economic grievances. The leadership was usually supplied by the civic associations which mushroomed during the boycott, the civics often acting in conjunction with the regional UDF committees. At one time 15 towns in the Eastern Cape were affected. Small town Chambers of Commerce reflecting the anxiety of near bankrupt retailers were the first to capitulate, in some cases actually negotiating the withdrawal of troops from the townships as well as promising to desegregate central business district facilities and undertake other reforms.

With the onset of the state of emergency in July, boycott committees sprang up in the Transvaal adding the ending of emergency powers to the now familiar mixture of parochial and national demands. Transvaal response to the boycott call was patchier than in the Cape, attributable partly to the greater size of major centres, profiteering by township businessmen, and the shortcomings of local organisation. Where the consumer boycott worked best, as in small towns like Port Alfred or Cradock a quite remarkable consensus existed within the community with a virtually total participation, few reports of intimidation, and a united leadership exercising a high degree of control and discipline. In Cradock, for example, at the behest of the leadership youthful activists refrained from trying to kill the discredited former community councillors.

The boycotts testified to the relative quality of UDF organisation and influence. It is relatively weak in Natal. Here the often bloody antipathy which exists between it and Inkatha is one problem. Also a substantial section of the Natal leadership was involved in the treason trial proceedings in Pietermaritzberg for a large part of the year. Yet it is significant that where the boycott movement took root in Natal it was the FOSATU trade unions rather than the UDF affiliates which provided the inspiration. In the Transvaal, Pretoria and the East Rand were better organised than Soweto. But it is the Eastern Cape in which the UDF seems most deeply entrenched through its civic affiliates.

In Cradock, Grahamstown, Uitenhage, and most recently, Port Elizabeth, organisation has been restructured on the basis of street committees, a concept originally introduced into the Eastern Cape by the ANC

in the mid-1950s. Notwithstanding the deaths, disappearances, and detentions which have decimated the UDF leadership during the last year, the roots of the movement have now penetrated certain communities too profoundly for its influence to be eradicated by police coercion. And with this democratic entrenchment in the working class communities of the Eastern Cape, the UDF is likely to generate an increasingly radical conception of a liberated society.

If the government's conception of the UDF is to be gauged from the speeches of politicians or the arguments of prosecuting lawyers in treason trials it is one which is simplistic. Government spokesmen depict the UDF as a front for the ANC manipulated by that organisation through secret cabals to play a role in the ANC's grand revolutionary design. No substantial evidence has yet been produced to support such contentions but in any case this portrayal of the UDF ignores the process of popular communal mobilisation which helped to create it and which continues to sustain it. The UDF is the product of history, not of a revolutionary conspiracy. With all its merits and its deficiencies it mirrors the society and the culture which gave birth to it.

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SOUTH AFRICA

SLABBERT OUTLINES CAUSES FOR RESIGNATION FROM PFP

Cape Town LEADERSHIP SOUTH AFRICA in English Vol 5 No 1, 1986 pp 50, 52, 53

[Interview with Frederik van Zyl Slabbert by Riaan de Villiers; date and place not given]

[Text]

With the 1986 parliamentary session merely a week old, the leader of the official opposition, Dr Frederik van Zyl Slabbert resigned. His announcement came at the end of the No Confidence debate and abruptly ended his 12 years in Parliament, the last seven as leader of the PFP. His resignation infuriated many in his party, in government, the media, among the electorate, but it also drew a positive response, mainly from extra-parliamentary organisations. Leadership's Riaan de Villiers interviewed Dr Slabbert.

De Villiers: Could you explain the reasons for your resignation?

Slabbert: The one thing that I regard as a totally invalid interpretation of my resignation is that it was a sudden aberration of the mind, a coping out or an opting out. It was quite clear to me from the outset that a party such as the PFP was going to have a very tough time in politics because the rules of the game had been structured by the National Party, to such an extent that all the competitors were really fighting a losing battle.

Nevertheless, I decided to aim for the broadest possible base of support in the white electorate – not just for the sake of getting support, but for the sake of actually showing that there was a significant number of whites who were prepared to accept the consequences of getting rid of apartheid.

People in my party and elsewhere could never have been under any illusion that it was going to be an easy task. After all the government could even make it impossible

to play a political power game. Secondly, the outcome of the referendum was a big blow to me, because I saw to what extent the support that had been built up was fickle and could be bamboozled and seduced.

But that was not as important as the nature of the new constitution itself. If it was difficult under the old one for the PFP to play any kind of balance of power, leverage role, then it became even more difficult in the tri-cameral system.

Senior members in the party know that I went to them and told them I preferred not to go into the tri-cameral system. I argued that we should insist on referendums for coloureds and Asians, and blacks for that matter. This was seen as brinkmanship, this was seen as an instance where the government would call our bluff and we would be stuck. So they persuaded me to go in.

De Villiers: You were a reluctant participant?

Slabbert: Oh yes. But they persuaded me to go in, and I said, if we go in, we go in boots and all. But I also made it clear that I would do so for a limited period. In fact, I told some of them I would do it for a year and then see what happened. This has actually been my third year.

So last year I called together some of the top people in Parliament, who formed what I called my strategy committee, and told them that this year we should go flat-out for what I called the politics of power. I

outlined three areas. First I said I would engage government as best I could in a negotiation process. With that in mind I saw the State President at least five times, I went to the Cabinet Council and gave evidence there, I served on the enlarged Cabinet Committee, I sought out Cabinet ministers individually and talked to them about the need for dismantling apartheid, I sought special appointments, the whole lot.

The second objective was to get representation in the other two houses, once they had lifted the Political Interference Act. I said, if we can get control of them plus a sort of balance of power position in the white house, we're in a position of leverage, we can do something and get some movement on apartheid.

The third objective was to see if we could get a coalition of anti-apartheid organisations outside Parliament. That was the idea behind the convention alliance.

All three of those strategies were part of what I regarded as the politics of power, not the politics of protest. I've never denied the validity of a party or group in Parliament protesting the injustices of apartheid. But I set myself an objective to see to what extent I could get rid of apartheid, not just protest against it.

Those three objectives were combined with the fund-raising campaign, and it was successful precisely because people thought we stood a chance of achieving those objectives.

On all three counts I failed.

I failed for a number of reasons to get a convention alliance off the ground. I failed, for obvious reasons, to get the party positioned in the coloured and Indian communities. The major reason was the disrepute in which the tri-cameral system was held. And I failed in my attempts at engaging government. I mean, at some stage you have to decide that the man understands your position and that you understand his position, and that he is not going to change. And that the State President made abundantly clear to me personally in my last interview with him last year, and he repeated it in Parliament when he slapped down Pik Botha.

So I took stock at the end of last year, and I said to myself, well, where am I going as leader of the official opposition and where is the party going? And, I told some of the senior members, I was taking a holiday to redefine strategy to see to what extent movement was possible.

I took a week off and wrote a strategy paper in which I said that unless the State President moved fundamentally to restore freedom of choice on a non-racial,

non-ethnic basis in South Africa, this was going to be my last session. There was one condition under which I said I would consider continuing to lead the party: that was if all of us resigned our seats, stood again in our constituencies and asked a mandate

from the electorate not to go back until the Political Interference Act was scrapped.

That paper was read by the top leadership of the party, not by the caucus. They decided it wouldn't work. I said in that case you must understand, if Botha doesn't shift, I'm out. And they knew it. Four weeks before the time I went to them and I can mention their names. They know who they are.

Now I was confronted with a practical problem. How do you announce your resignation without being caught in a ridiculous position? Do you debilitate your party before the No Confidence Debate? Or do you let them go into the No Confidence Debate and see if something comes out of it?

Botha's opening speech in Parliament was the final straw. It was simply compounded by the reaction of the business community. I thought this is the 1983 referendum all over again. We're not into reform, we're into public relations and advertising. And that's when I decided, this is final, I'm not going to carry on.

Even so I still tried to talk to some of the caucus members. I told them how I felt. They tried to persuade me to think of the alternatives, and I said I couldn't.

I had also just come through a very successful fund-raising campaign that was going to spill into a second leg. Knowing what I did and the others knowing what I had told them, I was caught in an impossible position. I couldn't give the go ahead for the second leg of the fund-raising campaign using my name.

De Villiers: Are you saying there was a moral reason because you no longer believed in what you could achieve?

Slabbert: Exactly. So it was a matter of urgency. That's why I decided to do it at the end of the No Confidence Debate. Now, one can obviously criticise the

manner in which I did it. But that would have happened in any case, whenever I had chosen to resign.

If you give notice over three months that you will resign at the end of the session, the party is subject to ridicule and exploitation by its opponents. If you carry on with the fundraising drive but announce you're resigning in three months' time in any case, the party is totally demoralised. And it's ridiculous to say I'll wait until the next

Congress but I'm going to resign whatever happens. It's a case for or against political euthanasia. Do you die quickly or do you take a long time to die?

And how do you do it? There is no proper way to resign, unless you do so for reasons of infirmity or old age. I did it in this manner and obviously it came as a shock and made people angry. But I refuse to accept that the party hierarchy was unaware that I was not going to be leader indefinitely. Those who now walk around and say I had no stamina or endurance simply work on the assumption that to be Leader of the Opposition in South Africa is to accept a life-long calling, irrespective of what government does and what happens. I've just got to be there to decorate the scenery.

De Villiers: The reaction seems to be quite vehement. In fact, people in the party are furious.

Slabbert: Sure. I can understand that people feel angry and betrayed, and I regret that. It certainly gives me no pleasure to hurt them or to make them feel abandoned. But I think one must draw a distinction between reasons for not getting out and reasons for staying in. Most of the anger and upset has to do with reasons for not getting out. The party's people have worked hard, they've sacrificed, they have expectations and desires and hopes which they have projected onto me. Those are all valid reasons for not getting out, provided that I can find even more important reasons for staying in.

But they never gave me any of those. And I desperately, and I mean that, desperately, looked for those reasons. The anger and the despair that people feel is a function of the hopes that they had pinned on me to perform the impossible.

I've now said to them, yes, it is impossible. That's why they're disappointed and angry.

De Villiers: Do you see this as a conflict of obligations?

Slabbert: Yes. My obligations are simply wider than those of people who believe that it is your responsibility to be leader of your party in Parliament for ever and ever, amen. My moral obligation relates to the country, to what's happening, to the position of Parliament in relation to the crisis in which we find ourselves. I must ask: am I making any contribution towards resolving that crisis? Am I really doing the best I can to get rid of apartheid?

These are the kinds of moral issues that play a role for me and despite all the hopes and fears that people may have, those are the most important questions. If anybody could come to me and say, this is why you

have to stay because this is how you're going to get rid of apartheid, I would have taken him absolutely seriously.

But if he comes to me and says, I like you because you're such a nice guy and you make such good speeches and you make me feel good because you're in Parliament, then that's not good enough.

De Villiers: So do you feel you've fully discharged your obligations to the party?

Slabbert: Twelve years is not an inconsiderable amount of time. I'm open to criticism if people want to point out what else I should have done, what I did not do which could possibly have made the situation more relevant for me and the party.

But what else could I have done? I can't think of anything. Talk to the government, yes. Raise funds, yes. Jack up the party organisation, yes. I did that. I tried. Moving into extra-parliamentary politics, yes. I tried that. Go to Afrikaans universities. I went to them all, for 12 years of my life. Every year. What more was I supposed to do?

De Villiers: What does your resignation imply for the party? You were identified with saying that the party should continue operating in Parliament. To what extent does your action imply that the PFP should get out of Parliament and that Parliament and parliamentary politics is irrelevant?

Slabbert: I'm saying one thing and there should be no mistake about it: If the PFP thinks it can abolish apartheid from within parliament, then they have discovered a

strategy which I have obviously neglected. I can't see that strategy, which is the reason why I left. I have said that political protest is a valid form of political activity. So from that point of view the continued presence of the PFP is justifiable. They can highlight the injustices of apartheid, ask questions, pose alternatives, expose government brutality. That needs to be done and I've never denied it.

But that is not the politics of power. When I decided on the leadership, I was interested in the politics of power: how to get rid of apartheid, not just oppose it.

Anybody who wishes to oppose apartheid from within Parliament has my blessing. But I certainly don't think that Parliament is going to change apartheid by the mere fact of being Parliament. This government is going to change apartheid or be changed as a result of pressures being brought to bear on it. During my leadership I tried to make the PFP one source of pressure. Quite frankly, I came to the conclusion that it wasn't. Yes, we engaged government in debate, got their rhetoric to shift, but when P W Botha said, there will be reform but only on the basis of segregated schools.

segregated residential areas and segregated political institutions, I had to believe him.

De Villiers: Do you believe the only parliamentary role left for the party is that of protest?

Slabbert: I can see there is a valid protest role for them in parliament. But it would be arrogant of me to say they can't tilt at the politics of power.

De Villiers: With a different leader?

Slabbert: That's exactly my point. I have tried everything I could without making any headway. I'm not saying it's impossible, I'm just saying I couldn't do it.

De Villiers: Will you remain a party member?

Slabbert: Sure, I'll remain a member.

De Villiers: Do you envisage any participation in party activities?

Slabbert: I don't think that would be fair on the new leader or members who have to play a public role.

De Villiers: There seems to be resentment about the fund-raising campaign which was tied to you.

Slabbert: I objected to the fundraising being tied to my name or the trust being called after me, right from the start. It's on record. I said I didn't want it, I didn't like it, I didn't think it should be personalised. But the fundraisers persuaded the senior party members and the Federal Council that this would assist the campaign.

Obviously, in a way I'm tied to that fund. But I did try to spell out the implications.

De Villiers: What do you think will happen to the PFP?

Slabbert: I think it would be presumptuous of me to prescribe a strategy. It can try to play a more important extra-parliamentary role. It can try to consolidate itself within parliament and be a voice of reason and sanity. Outside of protest politics there are a few simple options: you can win the majority of seats in white politics. But I don't think that's on. You can try and win all the seats in the coloured and Indian houses, but I can't see that happening. Then you can try to mobilise external groups which was what the convention alliance was all about. That didn't come off.

So what else is there? Many reasons could probably be found for this failure, one of them may have been the leadership. If, as Ken Owen says, I'm a self-indulgent glamour boy who doesn't take politics seriously and doesn't have the staying power, well, then the sooner I get out the better.

De Villiers: Has the reaction to your resignation been worse than you anticipated?

Slabbert: It's always difficult to anticipate reaction. One hopes the reasons you provide will be understood, if not accepted. But I've also been overwhelmed by a positive response. I've had hundreds of letters; nine out of ten are positive.

De Villiers: Does that vindicate your decision?

Slabbert: At least it shows that one has touched a nerve, that people feel it is a relevant political act. For very clear and understandable reasons, the dismay and anger at what I've done comes from within the party; after all they have to carry on with the job.

De Villiers: What of your political future?

Slabbert: At the moment it's open-ended. I certainly foresee the possibility of playing some sort of political role. I'm interested in exploring negotiation politics outside Parliament, exploring the areas of education, labour, community organisation, in an attempt to get at the nerves of extra-parliamentary politics.

There is a ridiculous, hushed silence when people talk about extra-parliamentary politics, as if there is no such thing in a normal society. It's because the government, through its propaganda campaign, has succeeded in presenting extra-parliamentary as unconstitutional that people shy away from it.

The most important movement in extra-parliamentary politics for the first 20 years of National Party rule was the Broederbond. They didn't go into Parliament but they influenced decisions, applied pressure and brought about a lot of changes to the structure of society.

As for myself, some direction will emerge. In the meantime, I'll do some teaching, some writing, some consultancy work.

De Villiers: You don't envisage a full-time political commitment in another organisation?

Slabbert: No. I don't see myself starting an organisation or joining an organisation. Of course, that may happen, depending on what opportunities arise.

De Villiers: Your political commitment will continue. It's not as if you are withdrawing from politics?

Slabbert: Not in the slightest. My political commitment made me leave Parliament.

De Villiers: Don't you think you may have permanently alienated the political and business concerns associated with the PFP, and that this may hamper you in future?

Slabbert: I would hope not, but that is not for me to decide.

De Villiers: To what extent has a practical involvement in politics changed your theories?

Slabbert: Theories I had about South African society have certainly been changed and modified as a result of my experience. I don't accept, for example, the conventional Marxist analysis of a conspiracy, that a highly intelligent cabal plans events in a society. It is more by accident than design that many things happen. But when they do you may find groups trying to protect their particular interests.

I also discovered voters often want to be kept in ignorance, and tend to support political parties who promise them the impossible, as the National Party has done for the last 30 years. So my approach to the electorate has been modified.

It has also become clear to me that virtually all the parties in Parliament view the black population as an abstraction. As long as parliamentarians are not prepared to talk to blacks, to find out what they are thinking, their political participation will be informed only by their own prejudices and assumptions.

I also believe it is short-sighted, even dangerously romantic, to think that this whole edifice of apartheid is on the point of cracking up, that armed revolution or violent struggle can actually be successful against the might of the State. Many theories of change presume that the harder you kick government the more reasonable they become. This is not true. They become more obdurate, more angry and more resolute. Those are facts of political life that must be taken into account.

De Villiers: But you still believe that a negotiated solution is possible?

Slabbert: Sure. The difference between now and the time government will negotiate is the body count, how many people will have to die. It's as simple as that.

SOUTH AFRICA

MP SPEAKS ON FOREIGN CHILDREN IN SCHOOLS

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 21 Mar 86 p 10

[Text] CAPE TOWN. — South African pupils must get priority in the provision of educational opportunities and financial support, Mr Horace van Rensburg, MP for Bryanston and PFP spokesman on White "Own Affairs" education, said yesterday.

He was commenting on a weekend newspaper report that White children from Zimbabwe and Botswana were studying at White schools in the Northern Transvaal, and their hostel fees were being "secretly" subsidised by R170 a child each term by the Transvaal Education Department.

Reportedly about 500 "foreign" children had been subsidised for the past five years without sanction by the Transvaal Provincial Council, Mr Van Rensburg said.

"It appears that this undercover operation has as its purpose the filling of large numbers of vacancies at schools in the rural areas of the Transvaal which may otherwise have to close down.

"It is particularly alarming that vacan-

cies at these schools should be filled by foreign scholars, when there are thousands of Black, Coloured and Indian children who are South African citizens and who could easily fill these vacancies."

Such blatant discrimination and gross injustice could only serve to create greater inter-racial tension and animosity, he said.

"The policy for the admission of foreign pupils and students, and for any financial support for such persons, must be approved by parliament and must be a matter of public knowledge.

"The State pays about R1 500 a year for every pupil at a white school and accommodation bursaries.

"The policy must not discriminate on the grounds of race, colour, creed or sex but must be based only on merit.

"If these conditions are met and if both Parliament and the public are informed about such a policy, it could contribute considerably to improved relations with neighbouring Southern African countries," said Mr Van Rensburg.

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15 April 1986

SOUTH AFRICA

POLITICAL TURBULENCE HELPS FUEL LABOR UNREST IN WEST RAND

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 14 Mar 86 p 11

[Article by Sheryl Raine]

[Text]

Behind the specific domestic issues raised as the causes of labour unrest on the West Rand, lie a host of reasons which have contributed to strikes by black mineworkers in the area.

Included in the list of contributory factors are:

- Delays in the scrapping of statutory job reservation.
- Years of frustration on the part of migrant black workers.
- Significant consciousness raising of black mineworkers since the advent of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), as well as growing tensions between white and black employees.
- Reports from Witbank that white miners on coal mines were threatening to arm themselves for protection against militant black workers.
- Spill-overs of political turbulence from nearby black townships into the workplace.
- The unnatural concentration of thousands of men in hostels.

All avenues

Rand Mines gold division deputy chairman Mr Paul Forbes explained why his company had decided to exhaust every avenue of negotiation available before thinking about dismissals or arrests of illegal strikers.

This week, the company obtained an interdict restraining individuals from interfering with production at Rand Mines Blyvooruitzicht gold mine but has so far declined to enforce it.

Rand Mines would, however, not pay strikers for days not worked and would take strong action against intimidators where they could be identified.

Although the NUM has been involved as an honest-broker between management and striking workers, there have been allegations that the union is not representative of those on strike, does not approve of the strike and cannot exercise authority over strikers taking action which the union does not condone.

The NUM has denied that it has limited control. The key issue in the strike is the introduction of a production bonus system at Blyvooruitzicht. As a domestic issue, the NUM believed it should be settled directly with the workers involved.

However, efforts to resolve the strike have been aggravated by difficulties in setting up meetings with worker representatives. So far meetings with NUM officials have not broken the deadlock.

Mr Forbes said there was militancy on the West Rand, which was working itself out in

labour unrest and which, he believed, concerned largely non-work issues.

He said: "We believe this strike is a demonstration of solidarity involving many issues, including the scheduled persons issue. Employers are bearing the brunt of widespread worker frustration."

Anglo American's group industrial relations department chief Mr Bobby Godsell said industry had a central role in demonstrating that real progress could be made in resolving conflict in an orderly manner.

Hopefully, in the course of time, such methods of resolving conflict would be applied to redress political grievances.

Asked to comment on allegations by some mine managements that the NUM's control was not what it could be, that there were internal tensions between the union's old-guard and young radicals, and that the union was not representative, he said it would be presumptuous to do so. However, it was naive to expect NUM's dramatic growth during the past four years to proceed without a certain degree of turbulence.

Creates turbulence

Mr Godsell said: "People must not be surprised by periods of turbulence in South

Africa now. Even if this country had no problems other than labour problems, mass unionisation creates turbulence and has in every country that has experienced it.

"The turbulence in the work place here is without doubt being affected by the turbulence being experienced in the black townships. On most of our mines there is a high level of natural interaction between the black townships and the hostels. What we started to see at the end of 1985 is a spilling over of turbulence from the townships into the workplace."

However, Mr Godsell did not believe turbulence in the workplace was in management or union interests.

What role could management play in defusing complex situations with strong political undercurrents?

Mr Godsell said: "There are certain issues management can do nothing about. When criminal offences occur, when people are assaulted or murdered

or property damaged or vehicles stolen the due process of law must occur. There is nothing we can or want to do to interfere with that process in any way. That's the process of an ordered and civilised society.

"The central issue is: Is industry going to find ways to sort out conflict? Can we maintain our fragile pattern of orderly relations? Can we demonstrate to workers that there are effective, orderly and reasonable ways of resolving conflict?"

"To help us carry on doing this, there is an urgent need for South African society, the State and black organisations to find an analogous process of negotiation to deal with township problems and to deal with problems of political change.

"If they looked closely at labour relations during the past 13 years, they would find some important lessons to learn."

Walk Outs, Sit-Ins, Strikes; 3 Weeks on the Gold Mines

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 14 Mar 86 p 11

[Text]

The chronology of recent mine strikes on the West Rand:

● Feb 24: Strike starts at Anglo American's Vaal Reefs gold mine near Klerksdorp. Between 12 500 and 19 000 refused to work, following the arrest of nine black miners for questioning in connection with the killing of four team leaders on Feb 18.

Miners demanded the release of those arrested. Workers return to work Feb 26 after talks with the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM).

● March 5: Black miners at four Vaal Reefs shafts walk out half-way through their eight-hour shifts. Action escalates to include 15 500 mineworkers and the mine closes four of its nine shafts, metallurgical works and engineering workshops.

The NUM says problems related to mine hostels and demands for the release of those arrested. Company gains an interdict restraining workers from working short shifts. Workers return to

work on March 11.

● March 9: Sit-in strike launched at Rand Mines Blyvooruitzicht gold mine near Carletonville. Workers say the strike centres on a bonus system being run on a trial basis at some sections and not others.

Underground sit-ins include one involving 1 200, who sit-in underground for more than 36 hours without food.

● March 11/12: Anglo American reports two miners killed and 25 injured in fighting at Vaal Reefs No 1 shaft. Only 180 of 4 000 on the morning shift report for work on March 12 but situation returns to normal by March 13.

● March 12: Rand Mines temporarily close Blyvooruitzicht and refuse to allow workers to go underground until an undertaking is given that they will work and channel grievances through agreed grievance procedures.

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SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

POLL RECORDS PAY RAISES--Forty-two percent of housewives in the PWV area say breadwinners in their households received no increase in the past year. This emerges from an Omnichcek poll of 473 white women in the region, 60 percent of whom were housewives controlling family finances. "Considering that the same group of respondents anticipates the inflation rate will run anywhere between 15 and 24 percent this year, these women must find the squeeze between static income and erosion of money pretty despairing," says Research Surveys joint managing director John Rice. Sixty-three percent with incomes of R3500-plus said they had received increases, 58 percent of those earning R2000 to R3499 replied likewise while the figure for those earning less than R2000 was 47 percent. In Pretoria 72 percent of households received bonuses; in Johannesburg it was 56 percent. [Text] [Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR (Finance) 16 Mar 86 p 3]/12828

PUBLIC POSTS DOWN--PARLIAMENT--The total number of posts in the Public Service at the end of 1985 had declined by 1,1 percent compared to the previous year, according to the Commission for Administration's annual report, tabled in Parliament yesterday. According to the chairman, Dr Johan de Beer, the decrease was due "mostly to the Government's initiatives to save on personnel expenditures and to further increase productivity". Excluding the SA Defence Force and the police, the total number of posts at the end of last year was 126242, in comparison with 127665 at the end of 1984. In contrast, the average growth of the Public Service in the previous five year was 3,5 percent. In the previous three years the net personnel gain (appointments against terminations of service) had averaged 3662 units per year. In contrast, the personnel gain during the year under review was only 954 units. There was still a tendency to replace men with women--especially men in temporary positions were replaced by women appointed to permanent positions, Dr de Beer said. In the current economic climate and the resultant restriction on personnel expenditure, it has not been possible to maintain market-related remuneration for the Public Service and other government institutions. "The result was that those professional classes were highly qualified manpower is to be found could not be maintained satisfactorily," he said. [Text] [Johannesburg THE STAR in English 14 Mar 86 p 4]/12828

CSO: 3400/1400

SOUTH AFRICA

IMPLICATIONS OF NATION'S FINANCIAL PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

Cape Town LEADERSHIP SOUTH AFRICA in English Vol 5 No 1, 1986 pp 8-10,
14, 16

[Interview with Fritz Leutwiler, Swill mediator, by Hugh Murray in Baden;
date not given]

[Text]

On February 20, the eminent Swiss mediator in negotiations between South Africa and its major foreign creditors, Dr Fritz Leutwiler, announced details of the debt rescheduling programme.

In terms of the deal struck with the 30 major banks, (there are still a large number of smaller creditors – about 230), South Africa has to pay five per cent of its short-term debt, equivalent to R1-billion (\$500-million) within 12 months, and the group will meet again with SA's Standstill Co-ordinating Committee in February, 1987, to reassess the situation. In the meantime, a punitive interest rate has also been set on the balance.

Though many South Africans would have liked better terms, those close to the international bankers believe Dr Leutwiler negotiated the best deal possible, against heavy odds.

Leutwiler is a tough, no-nonsense character, with a fortuitous liking for South Africa. A former Chairman of the Board and President of the Bank for International Settlements, and Chairman of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, he is currently Chairman of Brown, Boveri and Company.

He was chosen from a host of top international bankers to negotiate the settlement. In his first comprehensive interview with any South African publication, Dr Leutwiler met **Hugh Murray** in Baden, Switzerland to talk about the far-reaching consequences of SA's political and financial problems. He also explained how – and why – he became involved in the first instance.

Murray: What – from your perspective – was the real cause of South Africa declaring a debt standstill?

Leutwiler: It originated in growing pressure on the American banks.

There was more pressure in America than Europe. The American bankers started calculating the plusses and minuses. Clearly the most significant pressure came from important institutional customers who said simply that they would not do business with the banks unless they withdrew from South Africa. The first bank reacting to this pressure was Chase Manhattan. Don't ask me whether this was a well considered step – I just don't know. But the same thing happened in a different country where I was involved – Hungary. Hungary came under pressure after the political crisis in Poland because many banks assumed that Hungary would be unable to repay or service her debt. Banks decided not to renew short-term deposits.

The problem with both countries – Hungary and South Africa – was that short-term commitments were too high. There is no country in the world that can repay all its short-term debts, even when the proportion of short-term debts is much lower. That is absolutely impossible. And if one bank, such as a big American bank, starts the process then a chain reaction is almost inevitable.

To be honest, a general withdrawal of short-term funds did not happen in South Africa's case. It was mainly US banks, certainly not European and very few British banks, which started the process. But this, combined with some capital flight from South Africa, for which you cannot blame the bankers, was sufficient to create difficulties, to make it impossible for the South African Reserve Bank to cover these outflows of capital. South Africa's exchange reserves were limited. But this was not typically a South African problem – it could have happened anywhere.

But there was political pressure. I know that from the US banks. They were faced with the risk of losing very important customers or starting this chain reaction against South Africa. Confronted with this problem they chose the latter.

Murray: Presumably a more thorough examination of South Africa's situation revealed a set of serious problems which determined the way the more neutral institutions reacted?

Leutwiler: Let's be clear about one thing: South Africa is much less important to the big US banks than a South American

country. A US bank would have considered the matter many times before withdrawing from a big Latin American country – Mexico, Brazil or Argentina. Any banker knows that what is at stake in South Africa is less important because South Africa's total external debt is much less than the big Latin American countries where American banks are more exposed. This had an impact too.

Murray: What were the circumstances that led to your involvement?

Leutwiler: Two months before I was first asked, I took over at BBC – as chairman of the board of a company that has problems, and is not very profitable. I thought I had more than a full-time job here.

Then at the end of August the South African government declared the standstill.

I have been interested in South Africa for a long time. I first went there as the guest of the Governor of the Reserve Bank seven years ago. I was on very good terms with the former Finance Minister, Mr Horwood. I tried to help South Africa while I was still at the Swiss National Bank when the country had difficulties raising international capital because there was a ceiling on South African borrowings, even in Switzerland.

You could call me a friend of the country – not of any particular regime. Not that I like everything that happens in South Africa, mind you.

One day early in September a Swiss banker called me and said there was a job for me as a mediator. Shortly after that Governor De Kock visited Switzerland. Not a very successful trip, to say the least. On his visit some (non-Swiss) bankers mentioned my name to De Kock along with that of Lord Richardson, the former Governor of the Bank of England. He came to see me and we discussed the matter. I said I would think about it.

The first thing I did was to call the President of the Swiss Confederation, a personal friend of mine, and ask if my involvement would cause my country any harm. If he had said it would I could not have done the job. I then asked the general managers of Brown Boveri how they would react. Some were positive, others reluctant because they thought the job would be too time consuming.

Also, my friends in the banks encouraged me to take the job. Finally I said I would on condition that all the major creditor banks agreed.

At the same time Price Waterhouse and Partners approached me and offered their services as a support operation. I knew I couldn't do it alone. They're very capable people, and they were of great help to me. The South Africans agreed to foot the bill, because I could not afford, nor was I willing, to pay them.

Price Waterhouse had to find out who the major creditors were.

Then we had to get together with Dr Chris Stals and the Standstill Co-ordinating Committee (SCC) in order to establish the extent of the problem.

Murray: That was the first time you were able to get to grips with the problem?

Leutwiler: We all had an idea of the magnitude, but not the details. After a month or two we knew the amounts involved, and we were then able to deal with the problem.

My feeling was always that in view of the political situation, we could not proceed as we would have with a Latin American country by asking for a multi-year rescheduling. The SCC did not share my view. They thought they could come forward with a very ambitious programme for a multi-year rescheduling.

Murray: What happened to the proposal put by the South Africans – how was it received?

Leutwiler: At the end of November, my South African partners said they wanted a multi-year rescheduling. I said this was much too ambitious. The SCC insisted on sending this proposal to the major creditor banks. It went out through my channels, but not as my proposal. I did not, however, tell the banks it was not a good proposal. I

just sent it out as the South African proposal.

The reaction was absolutely disastrous. I had immediately to travel to New York for a meeting with the bankers – and at a very senior level.

They called me names, because in a way I was identified with this proposal – though they knew it was not mine. They said the proposal was counter-productive. They said it was arrogant of South Africa to ask for a multi-year rescheduling, and not to offer anything to the banks.

Maybe with hindsight it was useful to send out such a proposal because when I came up with my own it was received rather more positively. It was in contrast to the South African proposal.

Murray: Was your proposal largely accepted?

Leutwiler: Not only largely! I did not make a proposal on technical questions, if you don't call interest rates and duration technical. My proposal concerned the substance of an interim debt settlement. This was accepted. I said, take it or leave it. I will not modify it.

Then in January I went to South Africa to discuss my proposal with the SCC and the

Finance Minister, and to meet the State President because of the political background to this problem.

I did not present my proposal, it was not ready at that time, but I told the South Africans about my ideas.

They, of course, were reluctant to accept my ideas on a short-term solution because it gave them a relatively limited breathing space, with costly repayments. But I said the banks wanted a token payment as a demonstration of goodwill. Then, the relatively generous interest rate had to be offered to the banks because of the political background. It would have been easy with, for example, the Swiss and German banks. It was much more difficult with the US banks.

You have to consider the lowest common denominator, and this was acceptance by the US banks.

Murray: Some South African bankers feel that the creditor banks pressed far too hard on interest, because South Africa was already paying a punitive rate. Then came the additional one per cent.

Leutwiler: You can argue about whether it should be three quarters or one per cent. But it could not have been less than three quarters of a percent in South Africa's position. I'm not talking about the political situation there, but the economic situation. In order to get this proposal through, I offered one per cent, which is on the high side, I agree. But I had to offer something and I couldn't risk a failure. I could not run the risk of a refusal of my proposal by the banks. So it had to be relatively generous.

I was heavily criticised by some groups who said I was going to bail out the South Africans. Obviously I had to be independent. I went on radio and television, gave interviews to the press in which I criticised apartheid, not for tactical reasons, but because I don't like the policy and have never liked it. I think I have some understanding for your political problems but apartheid goes against my beliefs. I was very critical of apartheid. In turn I was criticised in SA. Some people said I was a financial mediator and should not get involved in politics. I had to. I had no choice. Officially the banks did not want to talk about politics, but they stated quite clearly when I met with them for the first time in London that they expected some positive political signals from Pretoria. After all they had to sell any proposals to their creditors, and they needed political assurances.

The purpose of my trip to South Africa earlier this year was to ask the State

President if there were positive signals, if he meant business when talking about reform. I left SA knowing the signals would come. I said I needed something or I couldn't continue with my mission and be successful. I went home, finalised my proposal and sent it out not knowing if the international banking community would accept it. I told them it was a matter of "take it or leave it". I didn't see a future role for myself if those proposals were rejected either by SA or the banking community, or both.

The banks had about 10 days to examine and discuss the proposals before we got together in London.

Murray: That must have been a nerve-racking business.

Leutwiler: Absolutely. Most of the banks were in favour but in many cases they said yes, but . . . For example: Yes. They agreed in principle but wanted more than five per cent. I said it was five per cent. That was my proposal. I examined the issue very carefully. I knew the numbers, I knew what the South Africans could afford. Even at five per cent it would be a heavy burden. I considered everything beyond five per cent would be irresponsible and too heavy a burden for SA. I was ready to have a discussion between the banks and SA about the technicalities, but the five per cent was not a technicality.

Then I had to fight to get the proposal through.

Murray: What would have been the consequences for South Africa if the talks had come to a deadlock?

Leutwiler: I think you will believe me when I say it was not a matter of reputation or prestige that made me say I would walk out if the proposals weren't accepted. I wrote the proposal to the best of my ability and I could not see an alternative which would be acceptable to both parties. The proposal went to the limits of SA's capacity.

I think there are probably people in SA who say: "To hell with our debts. For a while, maybe we'll pay interest, but for the rest we can be self sufficient". I don't think these people are familiar with the financial consequences of such a solution. There would be a lot of court cases: South African aircraft would be attached, likewise ships. The lawyers would be happy and extremely busy.

Murray: How long will it take South Africa to regain its credit worthiness and international financial credibility?

Leutwiler: It depends very much on political developments in SA. The more reform policies appear in positive headlines, the more banks would be prepared to do business again.

Murray: How did recent political events in the South African Parliament affect South Africa's image?

Leutwiler: I wasn't very happy about the argument between the President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, nor was I happy about the resignation of the Leader of the Opposition. But not many people in Europe or the US know much about SA. All we know is what we read in the newspaper and see on television, which is mostly bad news. I blame the media and the South African Government. The government could do a lot more public relations, to put it mildly.

There are many people outside and inside South Africa, especially some blacks, such as Bishop Tutu, who may not be representative of South African blacks, who get a lot of publicity, who are very good salesmen, and they create an image of SA which cannot easily be corrected by responsible journalists.

The news media are always interested in bad news, because that's what makes headlines. But one thing is clear. South Africa should improve its PR. Even if the government is doing sensible things they are misinterpreted outside the country.

Murray: What is your assessment of the business community in SA? Is it a constructive force?

Leutwiler: Yes, they are people who know the world, who know how it reacts. I've learnt much from people like Anton Rupert, like Harry Oppenheimer. If these businessmen, who love their country, criticise some aspects of the government's policies then I feel free to take advice from them.

Murray: What are your impressions of the ANC?

Leutwiler: I've had some experiences with communists, but to put it bluntly I'm reluctant to shake hands with a communist without counting my fingers afterwards. I don't trust them. My impression of the ANC is that it does not represent the blacks. I've met many blacks who hate the ANC. They say that the problem is other blacks, not whites, because its blacks who are bombing their homes. I am suspicious of the ANC because of the influence of the communists. Clearly the Soviet Union has an interest in Southern Africa. They want to get a foot in, and we know from experience that once that happens you can't get rid of them.

Murray: How about comparing your role

as mediator in these negotiations with your role in other countries?

Leutwiler: I have negotiated in Hungary, in the Soviet Union, where nobody paid any attention to the political background. Suddenly,

when I came to South Africa it was a different matter. People said if I didn't talk to the ANC then I had got entirely the wrong picture, or I shouldn't have talked to Chief Buthelezi. That's how it is.

Murray: Do you really believe that South Africa can find a way out of its problems?

Leutwiler: You talked about the businessmen. Listen to your businessmen. I strongly and honestly believe South Africa can do it. I'm an economist. Maybe I think too much in economic terms. But talking to many blacks, coloureds and Indians, I came to the conclusion that what they want, first and foremost is peace for their children, no discrimination, and a better standard of living. They know that their standard of living – although they are discriminated against – is still so much better than the standard of living of their black brothers in other African countries.

Murray: Did you meet South Africans you wanted to see, or were you simply taken on a guided tour?

Leutwiler: I didn't name people, but I wanted to see non-organised types. I didn't want simply to concentrate on Chief Buthelezi, who I had met before in Switzerland. I can't tell you whether they were truly representative. But I don't say the standard of living is everything. Of course, the people want freedom, they want rights.

Murray: What happens in February 1987 when you meet again? What happens if South Africa hasn't been able to meet its short-term commitments to its foreign creditors by then?

Leutwiler: I'm sure you will be able to meet the financial commitments. There are some risks involved, but South Africa is strong enough, has good people, and can meet its commitments. I don't see any problems.

But what happens if you don't meet the political expectations? What happens if the world comes to the conclusion that it was words, words with no action in the right direction? What if not very much has happened after the end of January, 1986? That would be disastrous.

Then I don't think it would even be worthwhile to call for a meeting with the banks. This pressure will remain, and the banks, not only those from the US, will review very carefully what happened, what was implemented. Now my hope is that many more things will be implemented, that reforms will continue, and the heavy criticisms will disappear.

Of course, there will be some people next year who will not be satisfied short of one man, one vote; short of the blacks or the ANC taking power. But you have a chance now. And if you continue reforms, if the reforms announced by PW Botha are implemented, then there is a fair chance (of improved relations).

My hope is that I won't be needed in February, 1987, that the banks will be ready to negotiate.

Murray: Individually?

Leutwiler: That is the most normal thing – individually. There will be banks who prefer to withdraw from South Africa. OK. They should feel free to do so. But I'm hoping no new agreement will be necessary. I hope we can achieve that. It is my target, and it should be your target too.

But it's unconditional that you make political progress in the sense that you must do away with apartheid – what is interpreted by the world as apartheid.

Murray: To what extent is the general international financial community susceptible to pressure and swayed by the vociferous groups that frequent such elitist political territory as Capitol Hill?

Leutwiler: If it is a problem, it is much less serious in Europe. But it is certainly a problem in England – particularly with the churches. The churches are involved, don't ask me why, but they concentrate on South Africa. They talk much less about Russia, Iran and so on. There are three countries in the world that everybody is beating – South Africa, Turkey and Israel.

Talking about Capitol Hill, there is much less pressure from that quarter on US banks, than from institutional investors – the big customers: universities, pension

funds, churches. There is some black pressure, but there are many blacks who share my view that the most important thing is peace.

Murray: What other criticisms do you have of South Africa?

Leutwiler: There is one thing that I truly hate about your country. Forgive me for saying so. It's the fact that workers have to travel for hours to work in the factories, leaving early in the morning, then repeating the exercise late at night. That is terrible.

We have factories in South Africa where there is no apartheid. But we cannot do anything about homes. We would be prepared to build homes, to give workers loans. But the way things are they're already tired when they arrive at work. You expect the same performance from them that you get from a white man. But they have to get up in the middle of the night to go to work.

That's one thing I hate – that I cannot stand! And you won't have peace until you abolish this kind of thing.

Admittedly it's your business. But I would not say a word about South Africa if it were not part of my role as a mediator. I can't say my work is purely financial and not political. As long as the banks are interested in political development in South Africa, I have to be interested too.

Murray: What about the spirit in which the deal was struck on February 20 in London? Was it done with sufficient goodwill to make commitments stick? We won't have recriminations half way through the initial payment period, or bad blood between the parties, will we?

Leutwiler: Be careful. There's no deal yet. It was a negotiation with the 30 major creditor banks representing about 70 per cent of the total claims on South Africa. There are roughly another 230 banks involved. I need 100 per cent or 99,9 per cent positive response – at least.

Murray: Can you achieve that?

Leutwiler: I must get that. Otherwise the whole deal would be spoiled. But I was very pleasantly surprised at the constructive stance that the banks took, including the overwhelming majority of US banks. You know, you have to deal with human beings.

They represent their banks. They get instructions. But they still act as individuals.

Murray: Has South Africa now accepted the proposals with good grace? I believe you had to do some arm-twisting.

Leutwiler: It was certainly hard for the South Africans to swallow my proposal. My proposal was closer to the banks' ideas than the South Africans' ideas. It was not easy for them to accept, but there was no reasonable alternative. They tried what was for them a better proposal, a multi-year rescheduling, and it was bluntly rejected by the banks.

I accepted the responsibility of making a proposal that was acceptable. The question was: acceptable to whom? To the banks first of all, of course. And to South Africa. But I needed the banks.

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SOUTH AFRICA

RANDS PERFORMANCE CHARTED, APARTHEID LINKED TO PRICES

Cape Town LEADERSHIP SOUTH AFRICA in English Vol 5 No 1, 1986 pp 31-33

[Article by David Rees Associate Professor at Cape Town University's School of Economics and Graduate School of Business]

[Text]

Late last year I illustrated for two successive audiences on two successive days the painful performance of the Rand/Dollar exchange rate in the recent past. The first audience, a group of businessmen, received it with an audible groan. The second audience, a group of undergraduates, with a roar of laughter.

Read into this what you will, but the fact is that few people are unmoved when presented with this picture. Everybody knows that the State President can push the exchange rate down with a wave of the finger and Allan Boesak claims that he can too. Probably he is right. Let's face it, unless you can claim to be able to wind down the exchange rate you don't really count in this country at present. Most people with an economic stake in South Africa view the recent performance of the exchange rate with justified concern however, and are worried about the future.

The exchange rate is the price of our currency in terms of other currencies and this price, like other prices, is a manifestation of underlying market forces. The exchange rate does not do the Indian rope trick. Its level is determined by supply and demand and this in turn depends on the calculations, expectations and decisions of participants in the markets as well as the legal arrangements which constrain their decisions. Clearly something dramatic has happened in South Africa over the past 18 months to generate so dramatic a shift in perceptions about South Africa.

What has happened is that the value of assets in the country has been heavily discounted by foreigners. The value of a gold mine, a plot of land or other fixed

asset in South Africa measured in dollar terms is substantially less than it was two years or so ago. The rand has been declining for some time virtually without interruption. Up until about the end of 1984 this negative judgement on the rand could be attributed largely to economic factors - to the inability of the authorities to deal with the inflation problem combined with an unhelpful gold price.

During 1985 however a succession of political shocks dominated the picture. One effect of this rapid shift is that prices in South Africa are perceived to be, and indeed are, well out of line with international prices. Prices, like water, eventually find their own level.

The implication of this proposition for South Africa is obvious. Inflation is likely to remain high over the next 12 months (at least). Wages as well as prices will rise strongly.

Wages as well? It is argued that in current recessionary circumstances wage increases of any magnitude are unlikely. Maybe so, but this implies a substantial short term boom if domestic prices rise well ahead of domestic wages. I am less sanguine myself. The greater likelihood is that wage increases will be a newsworthy item in 1986.

We move from likelihoods to possibilities. The performance of the exchange rate has become a lively if disconcerting index of confidence in South Africa. Few things are predictable in this country these days but it could certainly be predicted that the rapid fall in the value of the Rand would be accompanied by calls

for a fixed exchange rate at some stable and higher level.

Choosing the lesser of two evils the preference of the Reserve Bank has been for a dual exchange rate. This requires that some sort of distinction be made between capital and income and this definition enforced. A dual exchange rate system obviously offers the continuous incentive to export capital disguised as income. In other words it is a subsidy to disinvestment. A pegged and higher exchange rate offers an even greater subsidy. A pegged and higher exchange rate would imply a lower measured inflation rate but also lower exports and more imports, unless of course we opted for a restrictive policy of import quotas and heavy policing over exports as well as imports to make sure that capital (somehow defined) wasn't finding its way out through the back door.

This possible future is unattractive but is familiar enough in the rest of Africa. We are in the middle of an important era of debate at all kinds of levels – within government as well as in the broader political arena – as to the direction the South African economy should take. The shocks of the past few months have immensely strengthened the influence of those who believe in a more regulated economy. Further adversity, particularly on the foreign trade front during 1986 is likely to be associated with a swing towards a regulated, siege type economy.

An index of confidence, of course, can move both ways. At these prices South African assets look very attractive indeed for foreigners. After the successive shocks of 1985 it would take a brave man to forecast a substantial strengthening of the exchange rate. There is no good reason to do so; nevertheless it is worth recording that the only influence depressing the exchange rate – both the financial rate and the commercial rate – is the negative political atmosphere. The rewards available from an improvement here are enormous.

Of all these considerations, however, it may be that the most important impact of the exchange rate has been overlooked. One of the peculiarities of public discussion in South Africa for many years was the fact that economics was divorced from politics. The Verwoerd era – which is now a source of embarrassment to many South Africans who prefer not to remember that they participated in it and even voted for it – was only possible because economic explanation on the working of the policy was not even naïve. It was simply non-existent. Liberal economists have argued for a long time that apartheid was not consistent with achieving the most rapid attainable economic growth, but this argument was difficult to sell convincingly in the prosperous 1960s and even in the 1970s.

Nobody in South Africa is fooled any longer, however. The Rubicon speech has passed into history. Many South Africans perceive a direct link between that speech and the price they pay to fuel their cars. Such a salutary experience may be valuable. The reason why we want a different society or constitutional arrangement in South Africa may be presented in terms of some ideal of justice. But the more important driving force is the real concern of everybody for their quality of life and material welfare. Taxes, the provision of government services and mechanisms for their allocation are becoming more important in public discussion.

The fall in the rand has reopened the simmering dissatisfaction in many quarters with the market oriented policy actively pursued by the Reserve Bank. Nothing fails like failure and the battle is far from over. On the economic and the political front the fall in the exchange rate and the timing of it has forced hard ideological questions to the top of the agenda. For those of a crusading disposition now is the time to enter the fray.

Whilst recording various impacts of the exchange rate it is worth recording a false perception or two. It is believed that the weak exchange rate has the virtue of putting a break on the emigration of skilled people. Cutting oneself adrift is tough enough but the prospects of arriving on the other side with barely enough for a second hand car make the prospects of emigration even less attractive. Hence allegedly you are more likely to stay.

Standing on the sloping deck of the Titanic you lean over the side and discover that instead of a place in one of the lifeboats there is only space for you on a crowded raft. You scornfully turn down the offer, preferring to remain on the ship. The analogy of the Titanic is an overworked one in South Africa but the calculation is the same. In fact the decision to emigrate is only partly determined by how much you can take with you and the younger you are the less relevant is the calculation. If you are young not only is exchange control largely irrelevant since you have not accumulated enough assets for it to matter. If you are young you also must take a much longer term view in assessing your employment prospects. Starting out as a lawyer, say, can you confidently expect a clear run for the next 40 years in your profession in South Africa?

Suppose you are slightly older, say in your thirties. If you leave South Africa your assets are trapped in the country by exchange control and the weak rand. If you stay here your assets are also trapped in South Africa. The only difference is where you prefer to build up *future* assets. The weak exchange rate offers little of a disincentive to emigrate and it is a mistake to think

South African emigrants arrive at Heathrow with only the price of a currant bun. They arrive with skills, expertise, in short with human capital which the Reserve Bank has not thus far managed to constrain. Of course, if you could send money out of South Africa you might stay, but you cannot. The only way to achieve a diversified portfolio is to leave your money in South Africa and take your human capital abroad. Emigrants are not leaving despite exchange control. They are leaving because of it.

One of the stranger consequences of the weak exchange rate is that by stimulating inflationary expectations it has helped to get the consumer back into the market place, making the rational portfolio swap from money to material goods. Getting into debt makes a good deal of sense right now, and the stock market seems to be reflecting this calculation.

It would be an overstatement to suggest that all our financial problems in South Africa arise from exchange control but it is at least a workable starting point for a discussion. Certainly the value of the exchange rate cannot be discussed in any other context. Exchange control locks South African investors into South Africa and thereby pushes up asset prices in South Africa.

(It is a matter of debate whether exchange control actually does have this effect, but if you don't believe it then you will be hard pressed to find any other justification for it.)

For any given political situation there is some equilibrium share which foreigners choose to hold of South African assets. As the political climate deteriorates they wish to disinvest. This shift will be reflected in some combination of a fall in the exchange rate and a flow of assets from foreigners to South Africans. Exchange control increases the enthusiasm of South Africa for acquiring these assets – indeed they have no alternative except to spend on consumption. Thus either the flow of assets to South Africans is greater or the exchange rate is weaker in response to political uncertainty than it would otherwise be. If the exchange rate and asset holdings are unaffected by exchange control there is no point in having it at all.

Future historians may well look back on 1985 as a watershed year in South Africa. Whilst they may be able to regard it dispassionately we have difficulty in doing the same. For most of us 1985 was unpleasant. The consequences of high inflation and difficult economic adjustments will persist long into 1986. Yet there may be some benefits as well. Our choices, economic as well as political, were placed under a harsh spotlight. In the long term it is better to know what your options are rather than what you think they are or what you would wish them to be.

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SOUTH AFRICA

DECENTRALIZATION INCENTIVES SEEN CAUSING INEFFICIENCY

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 14 Mar 86 p 4

[Article by Peter Wallington]

[Text] **GENEROUS** decentralisation incentives offered by government tended to encourage abuse of the system, the Free Market Foundation and the Progressive Federal Party said yesterday.

They were reacting to a *Business Day* report that the SA Police commercial branch had launched a countrywide inquiry into abuse of decentralization incentives, possibly involving fraudulent claims for millions of rands.

Charges of fraud against five people who appeared in the Cape Town magistrate's court recently were said by Commercial Branch sources to be the "tip of the iceberg".

The Free Market Foundation's Leon Louw said government subsidies or grants, by their very nature, rewarded higher costs and less efficient methods of production.

And the PFP's spokesman on trade and industries, Andrew Savage, said the system was a disaster because it was designed to achieve ideological goals in the first instance.

Savage said a further major problem appeared to be the tax-free cash wage incentive offered.

For every employee, a company would receive R110 a month, and for a company with 100 workers, this brought in R1,1m a year.

Savage and Louw cited a case in the Ciskei where a clothing company employed more than 3 000 people, of whom 520 were classified as cleaners and more than 300 as security officers.

These workers were paid far less than the R110 the company was receiving in terms of pay incentives, thus ensuring a healthy profit whether workers were productive or not.

Nevertheless, Savage said, there was

merit in the argument for decentralisation, but that it should be concerned with the development of four or five core sites where some infrastructure already existed.

He pointed out government had in one year approved decentralisation benefits for applications in 177 different places.

The artificially high price for job creation was one of the decentralisation policies major flaws, Louw said.

He pointed out the emphasis was on job creation, which would reduce unemployment, but added that it was not always productive employment.

There were also unnecessary expenditures incurred in developing social and physical infrastructures which already existed elsewhere.

Louw said the decentralisation policy should be replaced by a "commonsense development policy", and cited the path taken by the Ciskei as an example.

The Ciskei has no company tax, company law formalities have been eliminated and labour relations deregulated.

This development policy, as opposed to offering incentives in the decentralisation policy, had proved so successful that the Ciskei was in the process of phasing out the latter, Louw said.

□ A Cape Town businessman with a R1m investment in Transkei is threatening to take the government to court because, he says, he has not received his decentralisation concessions since December.

"I am reluctant to take the action and I don't want to cause ill-feeling but we are in a ridiculous situation," said Seymour Pritchard, who owns two companies in Butterworth employing 250 people.

SOUTH AFRICA

ELANDSRAND GOLD MINE FACES PRODUCTION PROBLEMS

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR (Finance) in English 16 Mar 86 p 8

[Article by John Orpen]

[Text]

"DURING my long association with the group, I have had the good fortune to be involved in many great projects but I must say that I have taken particular pride in the development of Elandsrand and wish to congratulate all those associated with it."

So said Mr Harry Oppenheimer on December 19, 1978, when the first bar of gold was poured at Elandsrand.

But in spite of all the fanfare that accompanied the commissioning of Elandsrand, after a record-breaking run-up to the production stage, there are many who have been disappointed in its subsequent performance.

No one ever really expected Elandsrand to produce another bonanza like its neighbour Western Deep Levels, but nonetheless in those heady days of the late 1970s the talk was that Elandsrand was going to produce grades of around 10 to 11 g/t.

Lower-grade policy

To this day, such grades have simply not been forthcoming from Elandsrand. But in fairness it should be stressed that the current relatively low average grades are being mined as a matter of policy in the light of the cur-

rent price of gold, which permits the mining of lower-grade reserves.

On top of that, Elandsrand is still very much a developing mine and things are likely to look a lot rosier once it gets into the south-western part of its lease area, where development is now going ahead.

Elandsrand, straddling the Gatsrand on the West Wits line, was established and brought to production faster than any other deep mine in South African gold-mining history.

It took only 54 months from the date when site-work was begun to the pouring of the first bar of gold — no less than 30 months ahead of schedule.

Innovations

This was made possible by time-saving innovations in shaft pre-sinking, headgear construction, the main sinking operations and underground development. In the past, it had always been the practice to take these steps one at a time, but at Elandsrand the first two operations were undertaken at the same time, using temporary headgear, and the latter two using mid-shaft loading facilities.

By the time the two shafts had been sunk to their final depths — the rock/ventilation

shaft to 2195 m and the men/materials shaft to 2127 m — in December 1978, much of the necessary station-cutting, excavation of pump chambers, installation of pumps and haulage development had already been completed.

Perhaps even more surprising is the fact that Elandsrand was brought on-stream within budget. It seems incredible to think only seven years later that the entire mine was brought into production after the expenditure of a "mere" R172 million.

Compare that with neighbour Western Deep Levels, where the new No 1 shaft system is now being commissioned at a cost of more than R1 000 million.

However, capital expenditure at Elandsrand to the end of 1985 totalled R498 million.

After production had started, various problems were encountered, among the more serious being underground faulting which was much more extensive than had been anticipated.

The sinking of the sub-vertical rock/service shaft was completed in March 1984 at a final depth of 876 m. The sinking of the sub-vertical ventilation shaft was completed in June 1984 at a final depth of 775 m. Both shafts have now been commissioned.

But Elandsrand also faced problems in meeting production targets because of difficulties associated with dip-faulting on the upper levels of the orebodies. In addition, a certain amount of inconsistency in grades was encountered on the upper levels.

Production increased

However, since the mine management has been able to concentrate development on the lower levels, Elandsrand has been able to exceed planned production. The gold plant has also been expanded to cater for the increased production from the sub-vertical shaft.

Elandsrand's production up to the end of the last full financial year was 42 125 kg of gold. This earned R625 million in revenue and R282 million profit.

The mine is now milling around 200 000 t at a grade (in the 1984/85 financial year) of 5.59 g/t. The mine's reserves are said to grade 8.69 g/t.

Although three years' reserves are proven, it will take more than 20 years to mine the parts of the lease area which are accessible from the vertical and sub-vertical shafts if the inferred reserves prove to be payable.

Prospecting work is continuing, however, as the remaining part of the lease area and the adjoining areas would require deep-level shafts to exploit them and these shafts will take many years to come into production.

Possible merger

There has been some speculation in the past as to a possible merger between Elandsrand and Deelkraal on the one hand or Elandsrand and Western Deep Levels on the other. But Deelkraal is in the Gold Fields stable while Elandsrand is an Anglo American mine.

In fact, in the early 1970s the two houses failed to reach agreement on a possible joint mine, so a merger between Elandsrand and Western Deep Levels (also in the Anglo stable) seems more likely in the not-too-distant future.

In fact, these two mines already share senior management. For its part, a merger between Deelkraal and neighbouring GFSA mine Doornfontein seems more likely.

This week Elandsrand was trading at R20, which doesn't make it a bad bet given the longer-term prospects of the mine.

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CSO: 3400/1390

SOUTH AFRICA

CHARTS RECORD WAGE BILLS, EDUCATION COSTS, STATE OF ECONOMY

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR (Finance) in English 16 Mar 86 p 10

[Text] The wage bill for all races in the private sector approached R12 billion at the end of last year, an annual increase of about 11 percent on the 1984 figure (graph A). As the inflation rate averaged 18,45 percent in 1985, the man on the street has effectively lost 7,45 percent. Another worrisome comparison involves the wage bills of black and white employees. Graph B shows that about 2,8 million blacks and 1,4 million whites were employed in the private sector; a third of the working population is hence earning about two-thirds of the private sector's wages (graph C), while black workers account for the remaining R3,5 billion (graph D). The wage bill for all races in the manufacturing industry totalled about R1,1 billion, while that for the mining sector, which employs almost double the number of workers, was less than R0,5 billion, mainly as a result of the cheap black labour used.







High hazard



It's an expensive job to put your health at risk: the cost of smoking has increased by 12,1 percent since January last year and by 96,8 percent since 1980. The average smoker uses about 20 cigarettes a day. At R1 for 20, this means an expenditure of almost R300 a year--a substantial sum for a hazardous habit. The CPI for all items was 213,8 in January this year (January 1985--177,1). Education recorded a staggering 257,2 at the same time, a price hike of 21,1 percent from a year ago. While the CPI has steadied at these levels since April 1985, it recorded a tremendous rise in March from 202,9 to 254,5. This was mainly due to an increase in university fees and an average 40-percent rise in the price of books as a result of the weak rand and the additional 10-percent surcharge.

Better balance

South Africa's favourable trade balance has been the major contributor to the R7 billion surplus on its balance of payments in 1985. While total imports amounted to almost R23 billion, the country exported goods worth about R36,5 billion, a surplus of R13,5 billion (graph 1). Machinery--R6,5 billion--made up the major part of imports (graph 2), while a R300-million surplus was recorded in the trade balance for agricultural products. Graph 3 shows that agricultural output improved dramatically after good rains in

in the second half of the year. Base and precious metals accounted for the largest part of South Africa's export incomes. Gold, uranium and platinum made up 47,9 percent (R17,5 billion) of this figure, while R4 billion worth of base metals were exported (graph 4).





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SOUTH AFRICA

COUNTRY'S ARMS INDUSTRY GROWTH DESCRIBED

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 16 Mar 86 p 14

[Article by Stephan Terblanche]

[Text] The unveiling of South Africa's first helicopter last week marks 22 years of phenomenal growth in the arms industry--most of which has been achieved in nine years since the United Nations arms embargo began to operate in 1977.

And this week South Africa introduced a number of other new military products for the first time at the Fida International Air Show in Chile.

These products included:

The CB 470 cluster bomb which ejects 40 bomblets in high-speed low-level air attack situations.

Air-lowered parachute platforms which allow cargoes to be dropped at low altitude from aircraft flying under the level of radar detection.

The GA servo-controlled 7,62 mm aircraft weapon system with four rapid-fire barrels, and a 20 mm GI quick-fire cannon.

Licence

Twenty-two years ago, South Africa had no indigenous arms industry to speak of, and before 1977 the country was self-sufficient only in the field of small arms and ammunition, apart from items such as the Impala aircraft, built with foreign technology under licence.

But since then the arms industry, headed by Armscor, has developed so rapidly that it is now considered among the top 10 arms producers in the world.

In Santiago yesterday, Mr Fred Bell, executive general manager of Armscor, said there had been "tremendous interest" in the South African display, particularly in the new Alpha-XHI helicopter, the cluster bombs--and a water purification kit

"We never realised we had such a hit with the kit," he said.

Even the Red Chinese delegation spent some time at the South African stand.

The range of Armscor's output is indicated by the pictures on this page.

The company, its affiliates and a number of private companies, are responsible for jet aircraft, helicopters, artillery systems, transport and general purpose vehicles, battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers and mine-resistant fighter vehicles, naval craft, electronic sight and navigation systems, high-tech radio equipment, missiles, mortars, light and heavy ammunition, bombs, rifles, cannon, machine-guns and radar systems.

Among the earlier products were the Eland armoured cars (then still known as the Panhard) which are still today produced as the widely used Eland Mark-VII; the Cactus radar-guided surface-to-air missile system, developed jointly with France, and the Impala Mk I jet aircraft, which were replaced in 1974 with the Impala Mk II.

The SADF, faced with unique problems in the Namibian border war, identified its needs in specific areas, which led to South Africa becoming a pioneer and world leader in building mine-resistant troop vehicles.

Most notable among these are the well-known Buffel troop carriers.

What makes South African arms production unique in the world today is the fact that all items have been battle-tested.

The international military buyers know that when they buy a South African product it will work in battle.

Todar, Armscor's catalogue can offer a vast range of highly sophisticated weaponry, including:

The Olifant main battle tank (MBT). Over 200 MBTs, originally British Centurions, have been redesigned and modernised, having been equipped with new engines, gearboxes and armaments, all locally produced.

Its speed, range and firepower have all been vastly increased, and the tank offers a credible offensive capability by modern standards.

Armscor has been developing a new type of armour for a future tank offering a very high degree of protection, together with a three-man turret, integrated fire-control system and a diesel engine with power output of 18 to 22 kW/t.

The Ratel armoured personnel carrier (APC), a six-wheeled armoured vehicle capable of carrying a crew of three and eight fully-equipped infantrymen at speeds of up to 105 km/h.

The most recent addition is the Logistic Ratel, an 8 x 8 wheelbase with a flat cargo bed, which can operate for 10 days or 1500 km without replenishment.

It carries supplies for a 45-man platoon, including 2000 litres of fuel, 500 litres of water, 1,5 tons of ammunition, 500 kg of frozen food, as well as spare wheels and engine parts.

The Ratel continues to travel unhindered even after a wheel has been blown off in a landmine explosion. It employs a self-inflating system which pumps a flat wheel while in motion.

The G5 and G6 artillery systems, both world leaders. The system, a 155 mm gun howitzer with a unique locally developed base-bleed projectile, out-ranges all comparable systems in the world.

It is capable of hitting targets 37,5 km away. South Africa is the only country so far to have such projectiles in regular production and battle-tested, although several countries have been trying to achieve the same for a number of years.

The G6 was developed from the G5 as a self-propelled howitzer.

The Valkiri 127 mm artillery rocket system, which fires 192 pre-fragmented warheads in 23 seconds from a truck-mounted battery of eight launchers over a distance of 22 km.

This is South Africa's deadly answer to the Soviet-supplied Stalin Organ used by Cuban forces in Angola. It has been proven in battle situations.

The Minister class naval strike craft of 415 tonnes, fitted with two 76/62 rapid fire guns, six sea-to-sea missiles with 40 km ranges, close combat weapons and four diesel engines capable of 30 knots over 3000 nautical miles.

A smaller harbour patrol and protection vessel is also manufactured.

The 40 mm grenade launcher, which replaces American Vietnam-proven M79 and is better suited to local conditions. There is a six-shot semi-automatic version, a 40 mm single-shot launcher and a 37 mm single-shot launcher.

A revolutionary occluded eye gunsight is fitted. This hand-held weapon fires anti-personnel and anti-armour HEAT projectiles, smoke grenades and signalling flares and is effective over ranges between 30 m and 375 m.

The R4 assault rifle, which is said to incorporate the best elements of the Israeli Galil and the Soviet Ak-47, topped by improvements to suit local bush conditions. It is an addition to the R1 rifle and is of 5,56 mm calibre.

The Kukri air-to-air heat-seeking missile which is used by fighter jet aircraft such as the Mirage and Impala.

The missile is linked to a revolutionary helmet-mounted sight, another South African first, worn by the pilot. This allows him merely to look in the direction of his target to cause the "eye" on the missile head to follow and lock onto the target, before squeezing the trigger.

The heat-seeking system further ensures a hit. The helmet-mounted sight is now also used in the new Alpha-XH1 attack helicopter where it is linked to a 20 mm gun.

Two hundred different types of ammunition ranging from the smallest rim-fibre calibres to heavy aircraft bombs, supplying the total needs of the SADF.

The Miniature Night Sight (MNV), one of the most effective in the world, used with a variety of small arms. Armscor has within a few years become a world leader in the field of optics and electro-optics.

Other products in this area include the compact laser range-finder used by long-range gunners.

Frequency-hopping radio which allows almost 200 different code sequences to be used on any one of 28000 centre frequencies, providing secure radio communications.

Other developments include the SS-77 multi-purpose machine gun, mobile operating theatres, artillery charges, and a wide range of pyrotechnical products.

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SOUTH AFRICA

NATAL'S SUGAR INDUSTRY PLANNING TO PRODUCE ETHANOL

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR (FINANCE) in English 16 Mar 86 p 8

[Text] If Natal's sugar industry goes ahead with the production of ethanol to blend with petroleum, the implications across the province will be far-reaching.

This is the view of energy expert and chemical engineer Dr Brian Preen, who was commissioned by the SA Sugar Association to produce a feasibility report on possible ethanol production in Natal.

He said that without affecting sugar for food production, ethanol from cane was one of the principle means of replacing lead in petrol. Tetra-ethyl lead, which was imported, was the cheapest way of boosting octane rating.

"The other way is for the oil companies to increase the octane rating in the refinery by additional processing," said Dr Preen, who was in the international oil industry for 10 years.

"However, going this route means increased operating procedures which leads to a higher cost as well as the import of more crude oil, which could require a lower yield per barrel."

Tetra-ethyl lead recently came under the spotlight in South Africa as posing a public health hazard. Dr Preen maintained that, at this stage in the country's consumption of lead, the element did not pose as great a danger as generally believed.

"An 18-percent blend of ethanol would obviate the need for any lead additive," he said.

"But to my mind the benefit of reducing smog-forming unburnt hydrocarbons and nitrous oxides in exhaust fumes by 80 percent by blending ethanol is far greater. Other benefits include minimising the aromatic content of the fuel."

He added that Sasol already supplied ethanol to enable a 10-percent blend in the Transvaal and Orange Free State from the alcohol by-product of its oil-from-coal process.

The stabilisation of creation of 26000 jobs in the sugar industry was another extremely important factor to consider.

Normally the cost of maintaining jobs in rural areas was much higher than in urban areas and was a tremendous problem in upgrading the quality of life outside the cities.

"But in the case of ethanol production and all its ramifications in Natal, we are talking about a capital investment of less than R10000 a job, which is very low indeed."

Dr Preen, whose firm, project Engineering Africa, works in association with Durban-based Bosch and Associates, said he did not know whether the sugar industry would go ahead with ethanol production as there were too many variables to consider.

Tetra-ethyl lead was still cost-effective. The bottom line was always rands and cents and he did not know what the long-term relationship between the rand and the dollar would be, nor how far the price of crude would fall.

And above all, the oil and sugar industries would have to arrive at consensus before marketing a blended fuel in Natal.

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CSO: 3400/1407

SOUTH AFRICA

MOTOR MAKERS SPEND R190M AS MARKET PLUMMETS

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES (BUSINESS TIMES) in English 16 Mar 86 p 1

[Article by Don Robertson]

[Text]

THE motor industry is locked into spending an estimated R190-million this year on new models in spite of predicted sales of only 200 000 cars.

The manufacturers are committed to go ahead with launches and face-lifted models by decisions taken up to three years ago.

Kadett boot

The expenditure will hamper manufacturers, all of which lost money last year. Last year's combined loss is estimated at R1,5-billion.

Because of long lead times in ordering retooling equipment and the need to follow the decisions of foreign source companies, SA car-makers have had to decide in 1982 on model changes.

Models, which have either been launched or are on the drawing boards, include a new Mercedes-Benz W124 series, a new Toyota Cressida, a reshaped Ford Sierra range, a new Ford Laser, engine changes to the BMW 3

Series and General Motors Kadett with a boot.

The Toyota Cressida cost R57-million for retooling. Marketing director Brand Pretorius says: "We were locked in three years ago. We have already committed our-

selves to the next generation Corolla."

"However, it is good marketing sense to launch a model now. You cannot afford to be defensive. A new model gives an opportunity to increase sales."

Japanese model life is usually about four years, but the new Cressida will probably be available for about six years.

Derivatives

Mercedes-Benz, which has spent R80-million on retooling and R20-million on a warehouse, decided in 1983 to produce the 124 "bread-and-butter" model to replace the top-selling 123 range.

Public affairs manager Delene MacFarlane says: "Even under present circumstances, we would have gone ahead with the new model. The 123 range sold 77 000 units in its eight years. We hope to sell about 6 900 of the new models this year."

The life of a Mercedes model is generally about eight years.

BMW is to launch derivatives of its 3 Series soon. It is believed there will be a model with a 1,6/ engine to give it a bigger share of the medium-priced market after price increases on its lower end of the range 318 model.

The 323 will be phased out and a model with a more responsive 2,5/ engine will be introduced.

Additional tooling expenditure is expected to be minimal.

Samcor is to give its Ford Sierra a face-lift later this month, which will include improved specifications. The new Ford Laser, based on the Mazda 323 will also be on the market soon. Spending on the changes is R13-million, and another R4-million has been incurred on retooling for new Mazda and Ford light commercial ranges.

Managing director Spencer Stirling says that although the company made these decisions three years ago, "you have to keep products up to date and competitive".

"We depend on components from source companies, but we are getting clever in substituting as much as possible from local sources."

General Motors will produce the Monza — a Kadett with a boot. The decision was taken four years ago. The Monza will replace the Ascona.

Without the Monza, GM would have been left without a medium-sized notch-back, a sector which the company sees as the only one likely to show any growth this year.

Monthly sales of between 800 to 900 of the new model are expected over a life of seven years. It will be launched in October.

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CSO: 3400/1409

SOUTH AFRICA

R2, 5BN FOR INDUSTRY PLANS IN DECENTRALIZED AREAS

Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English 12 Mar 86 p 2

[Text] Latest figures indicate investments of up to R2,5bn are planned in decentralised areas, says Industrial Consulting Engineers and Developers MD Kosta Babich.

The private-sector aspect of this proposed spending would create 77000 jobs. There had also been a 25% increase (to R519m) in government incentives allocated for the current financial year to the Decentralisation Board.

Claims for incentives rocketed during the board's previous financial year (to March 1985) to 5614, compared with 2000 the previous year.

Babich said in Johannesburg the decentralisation policy had come in for undue criticism over the years and said the recent revamp of incentives had further improved the policy.

He discounted suggestions the policy had merely relocated industry from the major centres rather than encouraged the establishment of new ones. "The re-location of existing projects from the larger cities during the last financial year of the decentralisation board accounted for only 17% of the total.

"It could be argued therefore that the programme was not being promoted at the expense of urban development" Babich said.

"The economic climate has had some effect on the rate of implementation of projects. Nevertheless these have held up well in SA, although there has been a decrease of 7% in proposed investment in the national states."

If contributions from the Homeland Development Corporation, the Southern African Development Corporation, the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the IDC, the Department of Works and Land Affairs were taken into account, the total investment could exceed R2,5m.

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SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

NEW HYDRAULIC MINE JACK--A sophisticated new hydraulic mine jack, which could save the gold-mining industry millions of rands a year, has been designed and launched by Bosal Africa. In 1984, 22 million sq m were stopped in gold mines and the timber bill amounted to some R163 million. Before drilling and blasting can start, the hanging walls have to be shored up with temporary supports--a manual, time-consuming job. The traditional method was to use timber poles, wedged into position by the miners. During blasting, 90 percent of these poles were destroyed and most of the rest dislodged. The next shift then had to repeat the shoring process before continuing at the stope. Using the new hydraulic jack, two men can shore up a 25-metre face in about 30 minutes. Traditional methods would have required up to four hours. The jack is blast-proof and will stay in position, holding pipesticks and preventing them from being shattered. It can support a pressure of up to 20 tons, both horizontally and vertically. [Text] [Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR (FINANCE) in English 16 Mar 86 p 8] /12828

MERCEDES-BENZ EXPANSION--PRETORIA--Mercedes-Benz of South Africa is in the final stages of a R100 million expansion programme at its production plant in East London, the company said in a statement issued here yesterday. This has involved the phasing-in of a new model range production line, the commissioning of a large modern warehouse, and the incorporation of the latest in advanced handling equipment and computerised monitoring systems. This expansion, together with a high demand over the past few months for Honda Ballade and Mercedes-Benz S-class cars, has resulted in the short supply of these cars. For this reason the company has decided to hold the current price on these models until April 1 and not to follow the current motor industry trend to increase car prices. However, the Mercedes-Benz W123 range is set to go up by an average of 5 per cent this week. [Text] [East London DAILY DISPATCH in English 4 Mar 86 p 3] /12828

NITRATE PLANT FOR SASOL EXPLOSIVES COMPLETED--Work on the R15,5-million design and construction of a porous ammonium nitrate plant for Sasol Explosives at Sasol One in Sasolburg has been completed. The facility, which contains some innovative features, came on-stream late last year at the completion of a 15-month contract. The project involved Belgian and South African expertise. Certain aspects of the contract were carried out by Coppee Lavalin of Belgium, and other phases were awarded to B E Morgan Associates, a company in the Murray & Roberts Engineering subgroup.

The contract covered two areas. In the first, design, overseas procurement and detailing were carried out by Coppee Lavalin, while local management of the construction work was supervised by B E Morgan Associates.

The second area called for the local procurement, design, engineering and construction of the plant's bulk-handling and bagging facilities. This was carried out by B E Morgan Associates under sub-contract to Coppee SA, on a turnkey basis. The main production unit comprises a prill tower--which at 66 m high is the tallest of any porous ammonium nitrate system in the world--and a series of drying and screening systems. Other facilities in the plant's overall construction included a de-humidified product store, two conveyor systems with a 60 t/hour capacity, a bagging unit and bulk-loading which caters for both road and rail transport. [Text] [Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR (FINANCE) in English 16 Mar 86 p 7]/12828

EXPORT SCHEMES CRITICIZED--Certain large projects in South Africa--notably the Richards Bay coal-export scheme and the sishen-Saldanha iron-ore export scheme--could have used alternative technologies such as conveyor-beltting or slurry-pumping to achieve greater efficiency and savings. This is one of the messages that will be put forward during the International Freight Pipelines Seminar being held at Indaba Centre, Witkoppen, on Wednesday, March 19. It is being held by the University of the Witwatersrand in association with the South African Institute of Mechanical Engineers and other bodies representing the materials-handling industry. [Text] [Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR (FINANCE) in English 16 Mar 86 p 7] /12828

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